

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST

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B11

CIA Admits Using Foreign Police

By Jack Anderson

The Central Intelligence Agency has admitted in an extraordinary private letter to Sen. J.W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) that the agency has penetrated the police forces of friendly foreign countries.

The remarkable confession by CIA Director William Colby came in the course of a discreet but intensive lobbying effort to keep alive U.S. support for foreign police programs.

Colby told Fulbright that the "relationships" built up with policemen through these programs had been highly useful in "obtaining foreign intelligence" from foreign constabularies.

The friendly foreign cops, like national police everywhere, are privy to their nation's darkest secrets. And while Colby does not say so, our government sources tell us the foreigners are not above trading a national secret or two for a little CIA cash.

Colby, in his message to Fulbright, delicately skirts the matter of corrupting foreign police, conceding only that the liaisons bring the CIA vital information on "illicit narcotics traffic, international terrorism and hijacking."

Colby's covert lobbying was directed against a bill by Sen. James Abourezk (D-S.D.) that would kill U.S. aid to foreign police and prison operations. The measure was drafted after shocking abuses were disclosed in South Vietnamese prisons constructed with the U.S. taxpayers' funds.

The CIA director, who as a top U.S. hand in Vietnam saw the abuses first hand, said, nevertheless, that the Abourezk measure would "appear to restrict activities . . . by the CIA." The main cutback would be in "obtaining foreign intelligence information" from friendly espionage services and agents "within national police forces . . ." Colby went on.

Some of the agents in foreign police forces, Colby indicated, had been developed during "specialized training and other support" given by the CIA.

Colby's lobbying proved effective. In secret session, the committee permitted the CIA to go on supporting foreign police operations.

Insiders suspect that Colby's effort to defeat the Abourezk provision was actually aimed at preserving the International Police Academy, an institution dear to the hearts of the spooks.

According to Victor Marchetti and John Marks, authors of "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," the agency has funded training of foreign police at the academy and recruited spies there.

Colby himself wrote to Abourezk last January that the academy, ostensibly run by the State Department, had "called on us in the past for some support for their program. But," he added, "all such support has been terminated."

We also reported last September that the CIA was involved in a Texas bomb school where the academy trained foreign policemen on explosive devices. A State Department official later admitted the CIA provided "guest lecturers" for the course, which has now been moved to Edgewood Arsenal, Md.

Footnote: Both the CIA and the academy say no CIA funds are now going into the school. Colby has also personally said support by the CIA for the school has been terminated.

History Lesson—Famed historian Daniel Boorstin used some \$65,000 in government employees' time and federal facilities to help him write his Pulitzer Prize-winning book, "The Americans - The Democratic Experience."

According to government attorneys, the use of taxpayers' money for such private activities is against regulations. Boorstin claims it is common practice for universities to allow scholars use of students, researchers and office space.

Boorstin, director of the Smithsonian Museum of History & Technology, used two of the museum's historian researchers, Peter Marzio and Louis Gorr, to work on the book. They alternately shared the duties over a three-year period. Their salaries, while on the project, totaled more than \$35,000.

Boorstin's personal secretary also helped the enterprising prize-winner. She typed away on his handwritten manuscript for the better part of a year. In addition, some \$15,000 in federal funds was spent to convert a conference room into a private library for the prestigious author.

Boorstin conceded that none of his royalties will be used to reimburse the U.S. treasury. He told my reporter Ed Tropeano that he divided his work day between his book and museum matters, and that his project had the approval of the Smithsonian.

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The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Laser to Destroy Tapes Was Eyed

By Jack Anderson

Former presidential aide Charles Colson once considered firing a high-voltage Buck Rogers-style cannon at the White House to erase the taped conversations of Richard Nixon.

Such a mission impossible would have wiped out the evidence on the White House tapes which led to Mr. Nixon's resignation. Colson, however, contends he never seriously pondered putting the scheme into action.

Despite this denial, Colson did meet twice with an industrial research consultant, Gordon Novel, and discussed the possibility of using an experimental "degaussing cannon" to fire a gigantic magnetic pulse at the White House tape storage room. A rough design of the ray gun, named after a magnetic measurement, was even drawn up.

"Novel talked about driving by the White House and demagnetizing all the tapes," Colson told us from prison through friends. "It was something that he said would fire three blocks."

Novel, who is also an electronics expert, told us he was visiting Colson in March on an unrelated legal matter when the talk turned to the tapes.

Colson, he said, told him tapes at the White House and the CIA "could cause the President grief." Novel mentioned the "degaussing cannon" and Colson urged him to look into it. Colson insists he gave the con-

sultant "no encouragement."

Novel, however, obviously thought he had a mandate from Colson. He journeyed to El Paso, Tex., and spoke with Jack Prentice, innovative research and design chief for Jetco, Inc. Jetco already was marketing a metal detector using "degaussing" principles.

Prentice told Novel, and confirmed to us, that he had built a prototype cannon and could construct an operational one for \$25,000 to \$30,000. Prentice believed that because the tapes belonged to the President, there would be no crime in erasing them if Colson, acting for the President, okayed it.

The Jetco specialist drew up a simple plan for the "degaussing cannon," using capacitors, a switch, a parabolic reflector and a special heat resistant coil. The electronic artillery piece could be housed in a van, or mounted in a light plane or helicopter.

On March 21, Novel wrote Colson that he would "forward by hand courier the known facts on the El Paso erasure matter," the code name for the "degausser."

Shortly thereafter, the industrial consultant flew to Washington again and talked to one of this area's best known electronics men, Allan Bell, president of Dektor Counterintelligence and Security. Bell threw cold water on the mission, calling it "iffy" and "impractical."

At its best, advised Bell, the bizarre device would obliterate a few layers of tape, leaving the rest intact. At worst, it would de-

stroy huge quantities of other taped material and scramble all computer "memories" in its path.

One part of the scheme was to bombard the CIA—and the irresistible jolt of magnetism might blot out priceless files of Russian and Chinese agents and other espionage and security matters.

In his report to Colson, Novel said hiding in the heavy woods near the CIA, or "degaussing" the tapes from the tank-van while they were in transport, offered a better chance of success than magnetically bombarding the CIA or the White House from a plane.

But as Novel recalls it, he and Colson mutually decided not to pursue the plan because of its danger to national security tapes and computers near the target tapes.

Colson scoffs at the idea that the magnetic beam ever came that close to development. "I laughed at it," he said. "It was a little bit of comic relief." But Mr. Nixon might have had fears Colson would be a sucker for just such farout ideas. In the transcripts, Nixon said Colson "loves the action . . . Colson would do anything."

Footnote: Colson and Novel also discussed a caper to patch H. R. Haldeman's voice onto a tape along with an actor who would imitate President Nixon and make false confessions. The fake tape would be sent with a phony authenticating note from an allegedly disgruntled Secret Service man to the Senate

Watergate committee which, Colson surmised, would leak it. Then he and Novel would reveal the tape was fraudulent and the hoax would tend to discredit the whole case against Mr. Nixon. Colson said it was true he discussed this idea. "Wouldn't that be a great gag!" his statement said.

Baker's Bombshell—Bobby Baker, the former Senate aide who went to prison in a celebrated scandal of the early 1960s, has completed more than half of a book that will embarrass some present senators.

Now a successful businessman, Baker insists he isn't writing a cruel book about those who condemned him. Indeed, the book will contain many warm anecdotes about prominent political figures.

But the book will charge that Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.), now the Senate's "Mr. Clean," twisted arms for political funds when he was the Republican Senate campaign chairman.

Baker will chide the present apostle of political reform, Sen. Sam Ervin (D-N.C.) for voting consistently against reform in times past.

Baker also will point out that Sen. Carl Curtis (R-Neb.), who saw no great wrong in President Nixon's conduct, lashed out against the Democrats involved in the comparatively small-potatoes Baker case.

The former Senate boy wonder hopes to publish his book after the din of Watergate dies down.

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A 14 Thursday, August 8, 1974 THE WASHINGTON POST

Haldeman's Testimony, Tape Conflict

By Timothy S. Robinson
Washington Post Staff Writer

The tape transcripts released Monday by President Nixon of his June 23, 1972, conversations with former White House chief of staff H. R. (Bob) Haldeman are in direct conflict with Haldeman's sworn testimony about those meetings before two Senate committees.

In summing up the June 23 meetings in May, 1973, testimony before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee that was investigating alleged CIA involvement in the Watergate affair, Haldeman testified under oath that:

"We had only very sketchy knowledge of what and who were involved in the Watergate affair. We had no reason to believe that anyone in the White House was involved and no reason, therefore, to seek any cover-up of the Watergate investigation from the White House."

At another point in testimony before the same panel, Haldeman said, "We did this in the full belief that we were acting in the national interest and with no intent or desire to impede or cover up any aspects of the Watergate investigation, itself."

Before the Senate Watergate committee, Haldeman described the President's concern over the possibility that the FBI investigation might uncover CIA operations and said that was why the President ordered him to contact the CIA. "I believe that the action I took with the CIA was proper, according to the President's instructions and clearly in the national interest," Haldeman told the Senate Watergate committee on July 30, 1973.

By contrast, the taped June 23, 1972, conversations show that Haldeman and the President discussed details of FBI information about the Watergate break-in and that the President approved Haldeman's suggestion that he call the CIA as part of a cover-up of the involvement of Nixon aides in the Watergate affair.

Willfully lying under oath before a Senate committee constitutes perjury, punishable by a jail term of up to five years and a \$10,000 fine. Haldeman has not been charged with perjury in connection with his testimony about the meetings with the President, but does face three perjury counts in the Watergate cover-up case for his testimony before the Senate Watergate committee concerning the payment of alleged "hush money" to Watergate defendants.

The Watergate special prosecutor's office would not comment yesterday about the possibility of any future perjury charges being filed against Haldeman for his Senate testimony about the June 23 meeting. However, it is known the prosecutors re-examined the testimony after the President released the June 23 transcripts Monday.

In the first meeting of the day on June 23, Haldeman relayed to the President what he said was a suggestion from former White House counsel John W. Dean III and former Attorney General John N. Mitchell that the CIA be told to block an FBI investigation of the Watergate break-in.

It is clear throughout the transcript that Haldeman and the President were worried that the FBI would be able to trace funds to the Nixon re-election committee and to the involvement of Nixon campaign aides, rather than being concerned about any "national security" interests.

Once, early in the conversation, President Nixon mentioned that the investigation of former White House consultant and ex-CIA employee E. Howard Hunt in the Watergate case "will uncover a lot of things. You open that scab there's a hell of a lot of things and we feel that it would be very detrimental to have this thing go any further. This involves the Cubans, Hunt and a lot of hanky-panky that we have nothing to do with ourselves..."

Then, 10 pages later in the transcript, the President added, almost in passing, that Haldeman should tell the CIA: "Look, the problem is that this will open the whole, the whole Bay of Pigs thing and the President just feels that, ah, without going into the details — don't, don't lie to them to the extent to say there is no involvement, but just say this is a comedy of errors."

without getting into it, the President believes that it is going to open up the whole Bay of Pigs thing up again."

As a result of that meeting, with those two fleeting references to the CIA, Haldeman met with CIA officials with what he told the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee was a "five-fold" purpose:

"One, to ascertain whether there had been any CIA involvement in the Watergate affair;

"Two, to ascertain whether the relation between some of the Watergate participants and the Bay of Pigs was a matter of concern to CIA;

"Three, to inform the CIA of an FBI request for guidance regarding some aspects of the Watergate investigation because of the possibility of CIA involvement, directly or indirectly; I could interject there that this request had been made known by John Dean, counsel to the President, and had been transmitted by me to the President immediately upon being told of it by John Dean. The President, as a result of that, told me to meet with (CIA) Director (Richard) Helms and (CIA Deputy Director) General (Vernon) Walters and John Ehrlichman to get into this matter as I am laying it out here.

"The fourth purpose was to discuss White House concern regarding possible disclosure of non-Watergate-related covert CIA operations or other national security activities, not related to Watergate, that had been undertaken previously by some of the Watergate principles (sic).

"Fifth, to request General Walters to meet with acting Director Gray of the FBI to express these concerns and to coordinate with the FBI so that the FBI's area of investigation of the suspects, the Watergate suspects, not be expanded into unrelated matters which could lead to disclosure of their earlier national security and CIA activities."

Haldeman testified further that he did not recall any discussion at any time of a suggestion to involve the CIA in Watergate matter except as he described in his testimony.

"In summary, the meeting of June 23 with the CIA was held at the President's request in the interest of national security," Haldeman told the senators.

Haldeman testified in much the same way before the Senate Watergate committee. He referred the committee to the statement he had made before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee as one containing "considerable detail" on his account of the meeting with CIA officials and the reason for it.

In addition, he testified: "... the meeting, one of the purposes of the meeting, as assigned to me by the President on the morning of the 23d ... in addition to ascertaining whether there was any CIA involvement, whether there was any CIA concern about earlier activities of people who had been arrested at Watergate, was to tell the CIA directors that the FBI had expressed concern that as to whether there was CIA involvement or any impingement."

Haldeman further testified that "the question raised was not solely the question of whether the CIA had been involved in the Watergate break-in but also whether the investigation of the Watergate break-in, which was to be thorough and total, could possibly impinge upon the activities totally unrelated to Watergate and related to national security and to covert CIA operations, the activities of some of the individuals who had also been involved in the Watergate and had been arrested at the Watergate."

Haldeman said before the Watergate committee he could not recall either the President or himself discussing the problem of a connection between the "Mexican money"—a campaign contribution that investigators traced to convicted Watergate burglar Bernard Barker's Miami bank account—and the CIA.

According to the June 23 tape transcript, however, the President and Haldeman specifically discussed that money in detail, and expressed their concern over it being traced to the campaign.

THE WASHINGTON POST, WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 7, 1974

Walter Pincus

The Continuing Cover-up

It is hard to believe, but a close reading of the President's Monday statement and the released, edited transcripts of the June 23, 1972, White House tapes indicates that a desperate, last-ditch attempt to cover up is still going on.

In his statement, Mr. Nixon said that when he listened to the June 23 tapes this past May, "I did not realize the extent of the implications which these conversations might now appear to have," although he "recognized that these [tapes] presented potential problems." That is not a true statement: He knew they were serious and so acted.

On May 5, 1974, Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski and two deputies, Philip Locovaro and Richard Ben-Veniste, went to the White House to talk with the President's lawyers. They had earlier subpoenaed 64 additional White House tapes, and the President's lawyers had moved in court to quash that subpoena. That day, Jaworski declared to Mr. Nixon's lawyers that if the matter were litigated further, he would have to disclose in court that the

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Watergate grand jury had named Mr. Nixon as a co-conspirator, since his best argument, to get the tapes, was that they involved discussions among conspirators. In such a situation, Jaworski said, he would maintain that executive privilege could not successfully be asserted.

Jaworski added that he did not want to take that course — that he wanted to avoid having to reveal that the President had been named a co-conspirator. Rather, he suggested the matter could be settled out of court if the White House provided 19 specified tapes, almost all of which were among the 64 already subpoenaed.

The next day, May 6, the President's lawyers went to court and asked for a delay. Later it was learned that after Jaworski left the White House, on May 5, the President requested that his aide, Steve Bull, begin supplying him with tapes on the Jaworski priority list.

The President listened to tapes on May 5 and 6. Among the tapes he heard, by his own admission, were those of June 23, 1972. On May 7, the President's lawyers went into court to announce that a compromise could not be reached — that the requested tapes would not be turned over voluntarily. Why did the President turn Jaworski down? Clearly because he realized the damaging nature of the discussions and not because he failed to "realize the extent of the implications."

The President's latest pronouncement has other misleading aspects. He restates the proposition, contained in his May 22, 1973, statement that "shortly after the Watergate break-in I became concerned about the possibility that the FBI investigation might lead to the exposure either of unrelated covert activities of the CIA or of sensitive national security matters."

A reading of the transcript, shows that statement to be questionable. The transcript shows the idea of using the CIA to stop the FBI was apparently suggested by John Mitchell with no concern at all for either real CIA operations or national security. From the start, the purpose was to prevent the FBI from discovering that money which went to a Watergate burglar originated with the Nixon campaign committee. In fact, before national security was even mentioned the President showed concern that continued FBI investigation of Watergate would lead to former White House aide E. Howard Hunt and thereafter "open that scab — there's a hell of a lot of things and we just feel it would be detrimental to have this thing go any further." What things would open up? "This involves these Cubans, Hunt and a lot of hanky-panky that we have nothing to do with ourselves," says the President. The only "hanky-panky" known to date that Hunt and the Cubans had been involved in prior to Watergate was the break-in at the of-

fice of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist — an event which Mr. Nixon has maintained up to now he only learned of in March 1973.

On Monday, the President said his May 22, 1973, statement was "based on my recollection at the time—some 11 months later—plus documentary materials and relevant public testimony of those involved." In fact, just one week before the President's May 22, 1973, statement, testimony by CIA Deputy Director Vernon Walters before the Senate Armed Services Committee had been released, outlining the events of June 23, 1972. Walters declared he had been told it was "the President's wish" that the FBI investigation be halted with the five men already in jail and that for the FBI to pursue an inquiry into the Mexican money would "lead to higher ups." Walters' testimony and his memorandum of the June 23 White House meeting were available to refresh the President's memory. Rather than using that material, the President, on May 22, 1973, used the inaccurate story that served as the basis for misleading testimony by his chief aide, H. R. Haldeman.

The President even presented the public with an illusory gesture when he stated he would "voluntarily furnish to the Senate everything from these tapes that Judge Sirica rules should go to the Special Prosecutor." The judge is limited to turning over only Watergate-related material while the House Judiciary Committee and, most probably, the Senate will want tapes that go beyond—to the abuse-of-power allegations contained in the House committee's Article II of impeachment.

The President made two final points in his Monday statement. He noted that the CIA made an "extensive check" and determined that its covert operations would not be uncovered. Although the President failed to note it, this fact had been revealed by the CIA

Director, Richard Helms, to the acting FBI Director, Patrick Gray, on June 22, 1972, the day before the President's intervention. The President also said that on July 6, 1972, he had told Gray to "press ahead vigorously" with his FBI investigation. Again the President did not note that, by July 6, the Nixon re-election committee had destroyed the records of cash payments to Watergate conspirator G. Gordon Liddy and that two committee employees, Jeb Stuart Magruder and Herbert Porter, had worked out a false story to explain the cash that Liddy had been given. In short, the two week delay gained by the CIA ploy had permitted the cover-up to get well under way.

The June 23 transcripts also show that Mr. Nixon's final point—that "the evidence (must) be looked at in its entirety"—is also misleading. The President contended on Monday that "when all the facts were brought to my attention I insisted on a full investigation and prosecution of those guilty." In fact, the new transcripts show that all the facts known at that time were presented to him; he was told, for example, that his campaign chairman, John Mitchell, knew about Watergate; that Hunt and Liddy were involved; that it was financed by his re-election committee. At that moment he blocked rather than "insisted on a full investigation."

His policy was cover-up. "We won't second guess Mitchell and the rest," he told Haldeman on June 23, 1972. And as for cleaning house and finding out for himself what occurred, the President said, "I'm not going to get that involved..." To which Haldeman responded, "No, sir, we don't want you to."

"A close reading of the President's statement and the tape transcripts indicates that a desperate, last-ditch attempt to cover up is still going on."

THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, AUGUST 6, 1974

2 Americans Held in Calcutta Jail for Over a Year in Bizarre Case

By BERNARD WEINRAUB
Special to The New York Times

CALCUTTA, India, Aug. 5 —Two young Americans, who have been in a Calcutta prison for more than a year, are on a hunger strike in advance of a trial that has stirred tensions between the United States and India.

The case, which has political overtones, is to be heard within the next few weeks, and involves allegations that the two men were spies. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and United States Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan are now involved in the tangled case.

The defendants are 27-year-old Richard W. Harcos, an Army veteran, and Anthony A. Fletcher, 30, a graduate of San Francisco State. The men, who lived in San Francisco, have listed their occupations as taxi drivers. Both deny the spying allegations, and lawyers in the case say that they were seeking to smuggle out narcotics and that suspicions of espionage are unfounded.

Allegations Unspecified

To American officials, the detention of the men for nearly 16 months in a bleak jail is a source of deepening anger. "These guys have been held this long without a trial, without charges against them," said one senior American official. "It's an outrage."

Indian officials decline to discuss the specific allegations against the two prisoners, but have made it clear that the men face charges

under the Official Secrets Act, a measure that deals with spying, conspiracy and acts "prejudicial to the safety or interests of the state."

This week a Calcutta judge is to rule on a defense plea that the trial be held in open court. Virtually all cases under the Official Secrets Act are closed. If found guilty, the two men would probably face a 14-year prison sentence.

They have been on a hunger strike since June in protest against their detention and in an effort to open the trial to the public. They have lost about 20 pounds each and are being forced-fed through nasal tubes.

Facts Are Bizarre

The known facts of the case are bizarre. At about 3 A.M. on April 26, 1973, Indian security men seized Mr. Harcos, who was swimming in a "prohibited area" of the King George dock along Calcutta's Hooghly River. He was carrying scuba diving equipment. His companion, Mr. Fletcher, was later arrested at the Waverly Hotel in downtown Calcutta.

According to persons involved in the case, Mr. Harcos initially insisted that he had been merely taking a swim. This was repeated for months, to the disbelief of Indians and American consular officials who visited the Americans in jail. "No one goes swimming in the middle of the night in the Hooghly because it's hot," said one American official.

Lawyers say the two were seeking to smuggle narcotics, apparently hashish, out of India by fixing a plastic bag to the hull of a ship. Lawyers say that the two failed to admit the scheme because of a fear that India's narcotics laws are as stiff as those in Turkey or Iran.

In fact, India's laws are relatively mild, and foreigners who plead guilty to narcotics violations are generally fined \$75 to \$200 and ordered to leave the country.

On the other hand, the Official Secrets Act is a stern measure that places the burden squarely upon a defendant to prove his innocence. The law says that a defendant "may be convicted if, from the circumstances of the case or his conduct or his known character as proved, it appears that his purpose was a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the state."

Americans have been arrested before under the act; an American engineer was in prison here about ten days for taking photographs of the Howrah Bridge during the Bangladesh war. But it could not be recalled when an American had been in prison this long in India or placed on trial under the act.

Evidence Also Unclear

Why it took the defendants more than a year to change their story remains unclear, although one Indian lawyer in the case said that a prisoner has only 14 days to make a statement to the police before the judicial process begins. Nevertheless, the defendants told American consular officials for months that Mr. Harcos had been merely taking a swim.

The specific evidence against the two, beyond swimming in a prohibited area, is also unclear.

Recently Leonard Boudin, the civil liberties lawyer, has involved himself in Mr. Fletcher's defense. A colleague, Dolores A. Donovan of San Francisco, has spent more than a week here, meeting the defendants, consular officials and lawyers. Two prominent Indian lawyers are defending Mr. Fletcher, and another is working for Mr. Harcos.

A further murky element in the case was the arrest, shortly after the incident, of two men linked to Mr. Harcos and Mr. Fletcher. One, the Chinese owner of a Calcutta hotel where was said to be swimming

long-time resident of Calcutta. The Jamaican, whose citizenship is unclear, is a popular figure and a habitué of the Calcutta docks.

What complicates the case is the delicacy of India's relations with the United States and the Government's sensitivity—Americans call it "obsession"—to alleged Central Intelligence Agency activities, especially in north-east India.

Moreover, some Indians and Americans say officials in Calcutta, the capital of the politically volatile state of West Bengal, are fearful of dropping the case because it would leave them open to charges of being pro-American.

One Indian lawyer in the case said that it had political overtones because "it might be useful to show that the Americans are doing harm to India." But some sources indicated that Mrs. Gandhi had grown concerned about the treatment of the prisoners and had discussed the possibility of placing them under house arrest until the case is resolved.

American officials say privately and angrily that middle-level Indian officials in New Delhi, as well as the West Bengal government, were largely unhelpful and even cut off consular access to the prisoners from April to June. Officials in Calcutta say that access was re-

established only after Mr. Moynihan met India's Foreign Secretary, Kewal Singh, and brought up the case in mid-June.

"Before then we made requests that weren't answered and we got no indication at all that they were trying to expedite the case," said one official in Calcutta.

Currently, an American official meets the two prisoners three times a week and gives them news magazines, paperback books, soap and cigarettes. The two live together in a cell, about 20 feet by 50 feet. "They seem to be fairly cheerful, not despondent," said one official. "They say the jailers treat them well."

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Vietnam War: The Role of the CIA

Ten years ago, the Gulf of Tonkin incident led to massive U.S. involvement in an unwanted war in Vietnam. Did the Central Intelligence Agency play a hidden role in that incident?

We have now pieced together part of the story, together with other CIA exploits in Vietnam, from intelligence memos and old Vietnam hands, including an ex-CIA officer, John Kelly, who has agreed to break his long silence. It is a fascinating story, sometimes hilarious, sometimes deadly grim.

At the time of Tonkin, the CIA was already deeply involved in a vast undercover operation known mysteriously as Op-34-A. Memos show that the CIA, working secretly with the Saigon government and U.S. armed forces, kidnaped North Vietnamese fishermen to recruit them as spies, landed rubber-boat crews on the North Vietnamese coast to blow up bridges, parachuted agents into the Communist back-country and engaged in other clandestine activities.

Although U.S. forces weren't supposed to participate in open combat, a favorite Op-34-A sport was to send dark-painted U.S. patrol boats to bombard Communist-held islands off the Vietnam coast. This sometimes led to shootouts between U.S. and North Vietnamese gunboats. The incidents, according to one Pentagon memo, were regarded as acceptable risks.

The public wasn't told about these naval engagements until the late President Lyndon Johnson chose to make an issue of the August 2, 1964, attack on U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin. There is some indication that the destroyers may have been preparing to draw North Vietnamese gunboats away from an Op-34-A operation when the celebrated incident occurred.

After the United States was drawn openly into the war, the CIA brass settled into a handsome dwelling next to the Italian embassy in Saigon. Instead of CIA, one of its units adopted the initials SOG—short for "Special Operations Group."


In long interviews with my associate Les Whitten, the irreverent John Kelly, now an investigative reporter for CBS News in New York City, remembers the SOG as a sort of "Catch 22" outfit forever goofing up but occasionally achieving a triumph.

The SOG, of course, was obsessed with secrecy. It operated fleets of black-painted planes, jeeps, trucks and PT boats. Even the SOG's gates were sometimes painted black. It didn't take the Vietnamese, South and North alike, long to identify black as the CIA-SOG color. The black gates, therefore, may as well have been emblazoned with the CIA seal.

On one occasion, the CIA's secret identification was found scribbled on a latrine wall in a Saigon bar. Among the obscene inscriptions, a horrified CIA officer saw the equation, "CAS equals SOG equals CIA." CAS means "Controlled American Source," a euphemism for a CIA agent. In great alarm, the CIA officer dispatched two majors and a team of enlisted men to comb the men's rooms of Saigon in search of similar security violations hidden amid the graffiti.

The CIA brass went to such lengths to maintain secrecy that they held their most important conferences in a huge transparent box, constructed of inch-thick clear plastic walls resting on plastic beams, with a transparent plastic door, at the U.S. embassy.

One day, a CIA officer, peeping at the Italian embassy across the way, discovered the Italians




peeping back. He spotted a telescope lens aimed at secret maps on the CIA walls. With all the drama of a TV slapstick spy episode, his superior ordered the windows boarded up. This had scarcely been completed before another agent, missing the sunlight, tore down the boards.

Meanwhile, a terse security directive was issued by Washington after CIA agents in Nigeria were almost killed during a rebellion because their automobile was a "Rebel," a 1967 American Motors model. The CIA urgently ordered agents around the world to remove the "Rebel" insignia from their cars, Kelly was told.

When Kelly first arrived in Saigon under super-secret orders, he was greeted at Tan Son Nhut airport by a Eurasian, with a uniquely brawny build and a mouthful of flashing gold teeth. He turned out to be the official CIA greeter, who would have been hard to miss by the Vietcong agents lurking around the airport.

At SOG headquarters, Kelly found the CIA brass in a tizzy. One of his superiors had just been identified by French and West German intelligence as the naked American on vacation at the famous L'Île du Levant nudist camp off the coast of France. The CIA officer's girl friend had divulged his identity the moment he left the nudist camp for Saigon.

One of the CIA's great objectives was to get the North Vietnamese to listen to a CIA radio transmitter, which was disguised as a militant Vietnamese



By David Gunderson

peeping back. He spotted a telescope lens aimed at secret maps on the CIA walls. With all the drama of a TV slapstick spy episode, his superior ordered the windows boarded up. This had scarcely been completed before another agent, missing the sunlight, tore down the boards.

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One of the CIA's great objectives was to get the North Vietnamese to listen to a CIA radio transmitter, which was

nationalist underground station. To increase its Hooper rating, the CIA dropped tens of thousands of plastic transistor radios in styrofoam boxes on North Vietnam. The radios were locked upon a single frequency, so those who retrieved the radios could listen only to the CIA station.

To reach the Vietcong, whose jungle hiding places were difficult to locate for parachute droppings, the CIA strategists planned to bait the styrofoam radio boxes with food and float them down the Mekong River network. The hungry guerillas, it was suggested, would fish the food-laden radios out of the river. The plan was finally abandoned, however, because the CIA could find no foolproof flow charts for the Mekong. At last report, there were still two warehouses full of the little black radios.

The CIA, however, had its occasional successes. It was able to determine, for example, that 33,000 Saigon officials, from clerks to cabinet officers, were active Vietcong agents or Vietcong sympathizers. More dramatically, the SOG units equipped South Vietnamese troops with Vietcong-style black pajamas. The disguised troops were able to crash into a North Vietnamese encampment, firing machine guns and tossing grenades.

But the notorious Phoenix program, an assassination scheme run by present CIA director William Colby, was less effective. A report to the U.S. embassy revealed that the program was only one per cent effective.

Colby Against Declassifying Speedup

Associated Press

CIA chief William E. Colby yesterday said congressional efforts to speed the declassification of government documents would endanger the country's intelligence operations.

"I would find it very difficult . . . to urge a foreign intelligence service or a strategically placed individual in a foreign government or a foreign country to cooperate with this agency and to provide information in confidence if the law of this country required that such information be made available to the public two years later," Colby told a House Government Operations subcommittee.

The subcommittee is considering amendments to the Freedom of Information Act that would require all documents labeled secret and confidential to be declassified within two years.

THE WASHINGTON POST

A 6 Friday, August 2, 1974

U.S. Reported to Prohibit C.I.A. From Interference in Greece

Continued From Page 1, Col. 3

ures about two years ago, a high American official said.

The operative closest to General Ioannides was said to have been Peter Koromilas, a Greek-American who also went by the name of Korom. An American official said Mr. Koromilas had been sent to Athens to confer with General Ioannides shortly before the July 15 coup in Cyprus, which was headed by Greek officers.

'Papadopoulos is My Boy'

James M. Potts, the agency's station chief in Athens from 1968 to 1972, was described as having been on close terms throughout his stay there with Mr. Papadopoulos.

Mr. Potts was listed as a political officer in the American Embassy. He served earlier in Athens from 1960 to 1964 as deputy station chief of the intelligence agency.

A State Department official said that when Mr. Potts left Athens in August, 1972, his farewell party was attended by virtually every member of the military junta. The American Ambassador, Henry J. Tasca, seeing who was present, turned and walked out, the source said, after which he sent a cablegram to Washington protesting Mr. Potts's action.

Mr. Tasca had adopted a chilly attitude toward the Athens junta and was appalled that the C.I.A. station chief would give a party that contradicted the position the American Ambassador had taken.

State Department officials who have served in Greece commented in background interviews on what they de-

scribed as a negative role played in the past by the Central Intelligence Agency in Greek affairs.

One of them mentioned John M. Maury, the agency's station chief in Athens from 1962 to 1968.

"Maury worked on behalf of the palace in 1965," the official said.

"He helped King Constantine buy Center Union Deputies so that the George Papandreou Government was toppled."

Mr. Maury, 61, left the agency somewhat more than a year ago and is now Assistant Secretary of Defense for Congressional Relations.

Although generally leaning to Greek conservative politicians, the agency flirted briefly with the variant in Greek politics offered by George Papandreou and his Harvard-educated son, Andreas, in the early nineteen-sixties, a former Greek official said.

"In the beginning, say about 1962 or '63, the C.I.A. used Andreas as an agent, as a resource and supported him," the Greek said. "His buddy was Campbell," he added, referring to Laughlin A. Campbell, the C.I.A. station chief from 1959 to 1962.

Agent Reassigned After Protest

In his 1970 book, "Democracy at Gunpoint," Andreas Papandreou describes a scene in 1961 in which he had an altercation with Mr. Campbell.

Now retired and living in Washington, Mr. Campbell declined to talk with a reporter about his Greek service.

A knowledgeable Greek said that Stavros Milton, an operative who objected to the "cozy" relationship between the agency and the junta leaders over the last seven years, was moved

out of Greece and sent to Iran and later to the Far East.

Mr. Milton was described as one of numerous Greek-Americans recruited by the agency in the early days of its operations in Greece. Another was said to be Thomas H. Karamessines, a 57-year-old New Yorker who served in Athens from 1947 to 1948, during the Greek struggle against Communist insurgents, then again as station chief from 1951 to 1953.

Mr. Karamessines rose to be head of the agency's clandestine services before his retirement, recently.

The Central Intelligence Agency also used enterprises of Thomas A. Pappas, the 75-year-old Greek-American industrialist, as a cover for its operations in Greece, according to the Greek source.

A spokesman at the headquarters of the agency, in Langley, Va., said he had no general comment on the allegations. He did say, however, that C.I.A. agents follow orders approved at the highest level in Washington.

U.S. Said to Order C.I.A. To Curtail Role in Greece

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 1—The Central Intelligence Agency has reportedly been instructed by top officials of the Nixon Administration not to interfere in the internal affairs of Greece nor to play favorites among Greek politicians.

These orders, according to well-placed officials, reflect the current thinking of Secretary of State Kissinger and of the Director of Central Intelligence, William E. Colby—that Americans should keep out of the politics of other countries as much as possible. The C.I.A. is said to have been deeply involved in Greek politics for 25 years.

Until the last few weeks of the Athens military junta, according to high American officials and to Greek sources, American operatives remained quite close to the men in power in Greece.

A United States specialist on

Greece said that the C.I.A. continued to maintain about 60 full-time operatives in Greece and that some had been there 15 years or longer.

The agency, the specialist said, had close contact not only with George Papadopoulos, the Greek colonel who led the 1967 coup, but also with his successor, Brig. Gen. Demetrios Ioannides.

Mr. Papadopoulos, who was deposed last November, was among many Greek political and military figures who received personal subsidies over many years from the intelligence agency, two United States officials said. Another source said Mr. Papadopoulos had received money from the agency since 1952.

The C.I.A. stopped its subsidies for Greek political fig-

Continued on Page 3, Column 1

Washington Star-News
Saturday, August 3, 1974

A-5

Colby Hits Pentagon Plan

United Press International

CIA Director William E. Colby has warned Congress that permitting the Pentagon to go ahead with a major naval and air buildup on an Indian Ocean island almost certainly will provoke the Soviet Union to follow suit.

Colby's warning was delivered at a closed session of a Senate Armed Services subcommittee July 11. A "sanitized" version with classified material eliminated was inserted in yesterday's Congressional Record by Stuart Symington, D-Mo.

The subcommittee was considering a \$29 million Pentagon request for funds to deepen the harbor, install shore facilities and construct a 12,000-foot B52-capable runway on the British-owned island of Diego Garcia where the United States now has minimal facilities.

Colby assured the subcommittee that the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean, while it has grown slowly, is still minuscule and presents no real threat to Western interests.

He said Moscow assigns a lower military priority to the Indian Ocean than to the United States, China, Europe or the Middle East.

Nevertheless, he said, the Soviets do appear to feel they must compete with the United States in every area to maintain their superpower status.

As a result, they have matched the two crisis buildups of U.S. naval forces in the Indian Ocean of recent years—during the India-Pakistan and Middle East wars—and they can be expected to follow the same pattern if Washington decrees a permanent U.S. base on Diego Garcia.

Castro Says CIA Is Nixon Bane

Associated Press

MIAMI, Fla.—Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro said that CIA-trained agents have been more effective in jeopardizing the President of the United States than in overthrowing his government in Cuba.

In a nationwide broadcast Friday, Castro said, "Mercenaries trained by the CIA in espionage, sabotage and subversion were employed to spy and rob documents at the headquarters of the Democratic Party of the United States."

"This action, and the scandal it has occasioned, the complications which it originated, demonstrate that the CIA and its mercenaries were much more capable of ruining the presidency of the United States than defeating the Cuban revolution."

POST

Sunday 29 July 1974

HS/HC-950

The Washington Post

JULY 21, 1974

Parade

on the cover:

William Colby, New Director of the CIA,
and Wife Barbara—

He's Changing the Agency's Image
by Lloyd Shearer


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HS/HC-952

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William Colby and his wife Barbara are the only children in their respective families. As a result of childhood loneliness, they opted

for a large family. They had five children, four of whom are still living: Jonathan, 27; Carl, 23; Paul, 18, and Christine, 14.



William Colby, New Director of the CIA

He's Changing the Agency's Image

by Lloyd Shearer

WASHINGTON, D.C.

The Central Intelligence Agency is suffering from a badly tarnished image, and its new director, William Egan Colby, 54, is charged with turning it.

This is no easy job, since over the years the CIA has generated on the domestic front a closed, mysterious, excessively secretive and sinister image. It has also violated the legislation of its origin.

Created in 1947 specifically to gather "Foreign Intelligence," it has intervened in American student organizations. It has trained about 50 police officers from a dozen American cities in

intelligence theory and technique.

And worse yet, from a public relations viewpoint, it has stupidly involved itself in the domestic scandals of the Nixon Administration by furnishing equipment to E. Howard Hunt Jr. to help break into and burglarize the Beverly Hills office of Dr. Lewis Fielding, psychiatrist of Daniel Ellsberg of Pentagon Papers notoriety.

The CIA also provided Hunt with false identity equipment so that he could fly to Denver and try to talk Dita Beard into denying that she ever wrote the infamous ITT memo, coupling a favorable anti-trust Justice Department

ruling with the promise of a \$400,000 contribution to the Republican campaign fund of 1972. Moreover, it allowed its personnel to prepare a psychological profile on Ellsberg for the White House.

Leading participants

And two of its former employees, E. Howard Hunt and James McCord, were leading characters in the Watergate fiasco, to say nothing of the four Cuban-Americans who were hired to do the actual dirty work.

Overseas, of course, where most of its clandestine as well as overt activities

take place, the CIA has hired mercenaries in Southeast Asia, overthrown the Soviet Union, dropped agents into Red China, structured its own ailing puppet of Taiwan, conspired to overthrow various regimes in various parts of the world from Iran to Cambodia to Cuba and in general, has consistently intervened in the domestic affairs of foreign nations.

With that agency background of controversial hits and misses, Director Colby has his image-changing work cut out for him. He is approaching it with care and vigor. He is inviting newsmen to lunch with him, to ask questions, to visit CIA headquarters in Langley, Va.,

where the access road now bears a sign, plainly lettered CIA. It used to say Bureau of Public Roads. He even allowed PARADE to interview his wife, the former Barbara Heinzen, a delightful woman with printer's ink in her blood who helped put him through Columbia University Law School by working as a department store copywriter and editor of New York State labor publication. Speaking and low-key, Colby, a 24-year unpretentious veteran of the spy business, believes in opening up the CIA without disclosing its secrets. He is allowing the TV networks to tag a guided tour of the agency. He is permitting his men to identify themselves over the telephone instead of switching the caller to an extension number. He is preparing succinct intelligence summaries instead of ponderous, bulky reports and forwarding them to interested parties with a phone number to call in case they need more detailed information.

Conscious of public opinion

He is aware of the mounting public criticism which holds that his 16,000-man agency is spending approximately \$750 million of the taxpayers' money each year without enough public accountability through the various Congressional subcommittees charged with tracking the CIA. And he is mindful of inadequacies in the agency's recruiting program, especially of minorities.

"What we're looking for," he explains, "are young men and women who are interested in intellectual and technical pursuits. Intelligence is technical these days. We're in the market for something like 130 specialist disciplines, running all the way from nuclear physicists to financial economists. We

tivist than student, those who are more the engineer than liberal art buff. We're wide open for the person who believes we have an essential function to perform."

According to Colby, the primary function of the CIA is apple-pie simple: "We gather information from all over the world in order to learn as much as we can about foreign problems so that we can decide what to do about them."

"We have various ways of gathering information—reading newspapers, taking photographs, listening to electronic noises in the atmosphere, and employing clandestine activity where it's essential. We gather the information, analyze it, think about it, come to some judgment or estimate the situation and relay it to the national leadership, executive, legislative, and indirectly, even to the public so that the U.S. can make informed judgments and decisions."

Colby, who will finish his first year as director of the CIA on Sept. 4 this year, believes the agency is indispensable, "because I do not think the U.S. today can afford the luxury of being blind in the world or of hoping to learn enough of what's going on through the public press and other media."

He knows, he says, that the U.S. has no intention of invading the Soviet Union and is sure the Soviet Union has no intention of invading us. "But I think the Soviet Union has a philosophy which holds that America is run by an

imperialist conspiracy, a class society and that there must be, according to their doctrine, a revolution, a change in our society."

"It's a religious belief, and from time to time the Soviets have engaged in the process of trying to encourage it along."

"America has gotten into several wars in this century, started by people who thought we either would not or could not stand up to them. Kaiser Wilhelm thought we would not join World War I. Adolf Hitler was quite certain that we would stay out of World War II. Josef Stalin thought we would not fight in Korea and Ho Chi Minh certainly felt we could not stop his effort to take over South Vietnam. Where people realized we not only could but would fight—for example, in the Berlin Crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis—we have had no war. Having a CIA is like having insurance. You pay for it, but hopefully it's worth it."

Head of 'black operations'

Bill Colby, 5 feet 11, thin, trim, with pale blue myopic eyes helped by glasses, is a lawyer by training. He looks like a lawyer, also like a teacher, a minister, a banker, a doctor, anything except what he is—the nation's chief spooksmen who for years was deputy director of the CIA's clandestine or "black operations" directorate.

He was born in St. Paul, Minn., in

1920, the only child of Elbridge Colby, an Army officer. He was reared at various Army posts, spent three years of his youth (1929-32) in Tientsin, China, entered Princeton in 1936 and was graduated four years later. He entered Columbia University Law School but left after his first year to join the parachute corps.

"He had to memorize the eye chart in order to get in," his wife recalls. "But he memorized one line backwards. When he took the eye test, he cited the letters incorrectly. He wanted so badly to get in, however, that they looked the other way and the examining officer said, 'So long as you can see the ground we'll take you.'"

Colby served as a staff lieutenant in the 462nd Parachute Artillery Battalion (he had attended the ROTC at Princeton) and was fired when a new commander joined the 462nd and replaced the old staff with a new one. Lieutenant Colby found himself in a replacement pool, which he didn't like. When an officer came through, looking for volunteers for an overseas operation, code-named JEDBURCH, he quickly volunteered, thus becoming a member of Gen. William Donovan's intelligence service, the Office of Strategic Services. As a member of the JED's, Colby parachuted in uniform to help resistance groups in France during the war following the Allied landing.

continued

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"What we're looking for," he explains, "are young men and women who are interested in intellectual and technical pursuits. Intelligence is technical pursuits. Intelligence is technical pursuits. We're in the market for something like 130 specialist disciplines, running all the way from nuclear physicists to financial economists. We need every kind of specialty to help in our total intelligence process."

"We especially need women and blacks. We don't have enough of them as professional intelligence officers. A few months ago I gathered together all the middle managers in the agency and I gave them a very direct talk. I told them I wanted to see the number of blacks and the number of women in responsible jobs rise sharply."

Opportunity and challenge

"We also need," Colby concedes, "one fellow who will run some clandestine operations for us. They have to be fellows with a little bit of adventure in their spirit and frequently quite a lot of courage. But I'm not going around saying, 'Join the CIA instead of the Fish and Wildlife Service.' And I'm not going around saying, 'Join the CIA and save the world.' People who want an interesting, fascinating challenging career can find it in the CIA, and that includes those who are more student than activist, those who are more ac-

believes the agency is indispensable, "because I do not think the U.S. today can afford the luxury of being blind in the world or of hopping to learn enough of what's going on through the public press and other media."

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
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continued



Colby was sworn in as director of the CIA on Sept. 4, 1973. He is the second career intelligence officer to achieve that rank. The first was Richard Helms who is now our ambassador to Iran. Looking on at the


White House ceremony are President Richard Nixon, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Thomas Moore, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, and Colby's wife.

UNIT

CONTINUED

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When Charles Tripp, "Armless Wonder,"
and "Legless Wonder," rode their bicycle



Daughter of a Ringling Brothers
fat lady, Baby Ruth Pontleo
weighed 815 pounds.

Phs of Human Oddities

John Merrick, the grossly deformed
"Elephant Man," was deserted by his
heartless manager. Befriended by a
kindly doctor, Merrick became quite
famous and was frequently visited
by Royalty.

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ferent from everyone else.

VERY SPECIAL PEOPLE will
also teach you one of the most im-
portant lessons that life has to offer:
the incredible ability of man's mind,
soul, and spirit to overcome any

ideal imperfection...no matter how hopeless
they appear. Read this book and you'll never
be in self-pity again.

ages, 67 photographs.

(GARANTEE) -----

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adway Bookfinders, 1973

He was so cool and outstanding in
action that he was chosen despite his
young age, 24, to command a group
of Norwegian-American paratroopers
charged with sabotaging German rail-
way operations in Norway. According
to Harris Smith, an historian of the OSS:
"The drop was finally made from Amer-
ican aircraft staffed by inexperienced
crews in late March, 1945. Two of the
planes crashed and ten OSS men were
killed. Colby and those OSS men who
did reach their destination were forced
to operate with a minimum of supplies;
the American planes had dropped their
equipment a bit off target—in Sweden."

College sweetheart

Discharged from the Army as a ma-
jor, young Colby married Barbara
Heinzen whom he'd dated in 1941
when she was a junior at Barnard Col-
lege and he a first-year law student at
Columbia.

They were married in St. Patrick's
Cathedral on Fifth Avenue, and then
Colby reentered Columbia Law. Before
he was graduated he went to work for
Maj. Gen. Bill Donovan's prestigious
New York law firm, Donovan, Leisure,
Newton, Lombard and Irvine, many of
whose members had served with him in
the OSS.

In 1949 after a two-year stint with the
Donovan firm, Colby joined the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board in Wash-
ington. He wasn't particularly happy or
fulfilled as a lawyer, and one evening
he remarked to his wife, "I don't know.
I just don't want to go through life sav-
ing \$100,000 a year for American Can
—or some other corporation."

Call of the CIA

When the Korean War broke out, Bill
Colby, an adventurer by heart, joined
the Central Intelligence Agency. Under
one guise or another he has been with
the agency ever since, generally fighting
communism.

In Stockholm from 1951 to 1953 he
was listed as a foreign service attaché.
In Rome from 1953 to 1958, where he
was unofficially known as "one of Clare
Booth Luce's boys," he was officially
carried as "first secretary and special
assistant to the ambassador." In Rome
where his wife recalls, "we lived five
of our loveliest years," Colby worked
underground to prevent the Italian
government from withdrawing its
majority in Parliament. /

Came next his first three-year stint in
Vietnam, ostensibly as first secretary of
the American Embassy in Saigon, his
first assignment in Asia. Colby was, of
course, much more than that. He was
probably the shining light of the intelli-
gence community, performing so well
in his situational assignments and vari-
ous cloak-and-dagger assignments that
he was brought back to CIA headquar-
ters in Washington and appointed chief
of its Far Eastern Division.

The most controversial segment of
William Colby's intelligence career
concerns his involvement in the Viet-
namese pacification program known as
"CORDS," an acronym for "Civil Oper-
ations and Revolutionary Development
Support." One part of this program was
the operation code-named Phoenix.

Just as he was about to become chief
of the CIA's Soviet operations in 1968,
Colby was sent back to Vietnam on the
request of Robert Komer, a former CIA
man, and given ambassadorial rank. He
was placed in charge of South Vietnam's
overall pacification program, sup-
posedly designed "to win the hearts and
minds of the people."


Abuses during Phoenix

The Phoenix portion of the program,
which aimed to neutralize the Vietcong
infrastructure, involved the capture,
imprisonment, defection, and murder
of the Vietcong. There were abuses in
its execution, and as Colby conceded
in February, 1970, to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, "... I would not
want to testify that nobody was killed
wrongly or executed in this kind of a
program. I think it has probably hap-
pened, unfortunately." But there are
excesses in all wars, and it seems mani-
festly unfair to brand Colby a "mass
murderer and war criminal" which was
done by those in the intelligence com-
munity who last year opposed his ap-
pointment as CIA director. No one ever
called him such names in World War II
when he was killing Germans. And few
people realize how chaotic "Phoenix"
was until he took it over.

Legendary on posters

Colby does not look or act like an
exquisitely sensitive man, but during
the period of his Senatorial confirma-
tion, when posters bearing his photo
with the legend, "mass murderer and
war criminal," were stuck to posts and
walls in Washington, D.C., he was

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Colby served two tours of duty in Vietnam. There, his involvement in the pacification program turned out to be the most controversial segment of his intelligence career.

deeply hurt. One night he drove home to the unpretentious house he owns in Springfield, Va., a capital suburb, plaintively asked his wife, "How does it feel being married to a war criminal?"

A wife's feelings

"My heart went out to him," Barbara Colby recalls, "because if ever there was a good, decent man who has served his country and his family—Bill has served every President from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Nixon—well, it's Bill."

Although Colby is a Nixon appointee, he, unlike so many others, is not about to follow orders blindly or to traffic with White House types like Ehrlichman and Dean who sought to compromise the CIA in the Watergate coverup.

"I will do the proper and legitimate things under the statute that CIA has been charged to do," he says. "And if I'm asked to do something beyond that legal authority, then I won't do it. I'll resign."

In line with that, Colby recently supported an amendment to the National Security Act of 1947 which originally authorized the founding of the CIA. The amendment was introduced by Sen. William Proxmire (D., Wis.) to protect the CIA from abuses emanating from the political system. It limits the CIA to its basic mission of collecting foreign intelligence and closes a loophole in the 1949 law which permitted the agency to get itself so disastrously involved in domestic intelligence.

Under Colby's regime the CIA is not only projecting a more open and candid image, it is undergoing a structural transformation. Colby has abolished the 10-man Board of National Estimates founded in 1950 and replaced it with a group of national intelligence officers, each charged with preparing a series of short-term intelligence assessments of their special areas. He has reduced the number of covert, so-called "black operations" largely because satellite equipment is so sophisticated today that it can photograph and relay far more reliable information than that provided by an agent dropped by plane or landed by submarine on foreign land.

A practicing Roman Catholic, a pillar in community affairs, a hard-working (Saturdays until 3 p.m.) civil servant who earns \$42,000 a year, a good and understanding father to his four surviving children—a fifth died early this year of epilepsy—a loving and dutiful husband, William Colby has been a professional intelligence officer for half his adult years.

No flag lapel pin

The United States is indeed fortunate in having him. As a lawyer he could be earning three times in civilian life what he earns in government service. "But it wouldn't give me the satisfaction," he says, "that I find in this job." Colby onstrate his patriotism. It goes much deeper than that.

TWIC ANY

- INSTANT PR ANYWHERE, DAY OR NIG
- SAVES ON P
- SAVES TIME

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Washington Star-News

Thursday, July 25, 1974

A-15

Colson on CIA

SIR: Even in the July doldrums, Tom Dowling's view that Charles Colson's charges against the CIA bear further investigation comes off as a rather irresponsible bit of column-filling.

The Colson suggestion that there was a CIA conspiracy against the President stands reason on its head. It is quite clear that what discomfiture the agency suffered from Watergate-related events resulted precisely from too much deference to White House wishes. What really requires investigation still is the White House effort to use CIA for its own illegal purposes, whether in the Ellsberg case or in covering up the laundering of Watergate funds through a Mexican bank transfer.

A conspiracy needs a head conspirator. If President Nixon were a helpless victim of CIA, how is it that he was able to install two men personally known to and trusted by him, Generals Cushman and Walters, as successive deputy directors of CIA, and to fire—without any recorded opposition—the director, Richard Helms, who had

served presidents of both parties as a non-partisan career official?

Dowling's view in this case gives aid and comfort to the violators of law and the Constitution, who are still trying to spread false scents and cover up their tracks.

Arthur W. John.

HS/HC-950

The Washington Merry-Go-Round**THE WASHINGTON POST** Wednesday, July 24, 1974 **B 15**

Greek Army Weak, NATO Memo Says

By Jack Anderson

Behind the Greek military posturing in the Mediterranean, the Greek armed forces are so divided and weak they couldn't whip the Turkish army in a badminton match, confidential NATO documents warn.

A May, 1974, draft report to the North Atlantic assembly bluntly declares: "The effect upon the (Greek) armed forces of almost seven years of dictatorship, accompanied by periodic upheavals and a succession of savage purges, has been severely to distort their command structure and to create an atmosphere of suspicion and antagonism among factions of the officer corps with differing political views and sharply divided loyalties."

Nevertheless, the Nixon administration has insisted on backing the Greek junta. As late as June 26, Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger testified before the Senate that "as far as the military side of the alliance is concerned, Greece remains an effective member."

This is disputed by confidential NATO information, which is available to Schlesinger. States one document: "There are growing doubts about the extent to which the Greek armed forces as a whole, disunited as they are and dissipated by police and supervisory functions, are capable of playing their part in the NATO defense strategy."

From other classified docu-

ments and confidential sources, we have gleaned the following intelligence items about the explosive situation in the Mediterranean:

- The Nixon administration, in the language of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, is "tilting" toward the Greek officers who overthrew Archbishop Makarios in Cyprus. Kissinger realized this was an unpopular position among State Department bureaucrats and European allies. Indeed, he had already started leaking stories about how agonized he was by the necessity to support military dictators. But he saw the now-deposed junta leader, Nikos Sampson, as preferable to Makarios.

- The ruthless Sampson, formerly a guerrilla assassin, has been receiving secret CIA financial support for years. Our CIA sources say this is merely the intelligence agency's standard hedge of supporting both sides in a dispute. But Sampson, now a rich newspaperman, received money to support his publishing empire through Savvas Konstantopoulos, publisher of the Athens Free World. Konstantopoulos, say our sources, has long been on the CIA payroll.

- For that matter, Archbishop Makarios also collected CIA cash. Extremely reliable sources told us Makarios simply blackmailed the CIA. If the

agency wanted to keep its extensive facilities on Cyprus, Makarios allegedly told them, they had to pay for the privilege.

- President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger appeared to be the last holdouts in the free world in their support of the Greek and Cyprus juntas. According to one confidential NATO document, our European allies have been eager "to hasten the transfer of power from unsophisticated and parochial military men . . . to a political government enjoying the confidence of the people."

- Sources who have been reliable in the past say even the CIA has given up on the Greek junta and is secretly pulling its main facilities out of Greece. The CIA reportedly is transferring many important functions from Athens to Tehran, in the apparent belief that the Shah of Iran is a safer bet than the Greek military dictatorship.

Hays Hollers—The terrible-tempered Rep. Wayne Hays (D-Ohio) has tried to kick muckraker Ralph Nader's reporters out of public hearings. "You're nothing but a crummy thieving bunch of liars," roared Hays at a Nader reporter after a recent hearing. "If I'd known you were in there, I would have thrown you out." The Nader news bureau's stories about Hays have so infuriated him that he asked two subscribing papers to can-

cel the service, he told us. From here on, he'll try to bar them from the press tables.

Indiscreet Memo—Housing Undersecretary Floyd Hyde recently picked up his papers and left the government to join McManis Associates consulting firm. Not long afterward, his subcabinet colleague, Transportation Undersecretary John Barnum, sent a memo to his underlings suggesting that they keep Hyde in mind "in case you have any problems for consultants that he might be able to help you with." In bureaucratic Washington, this is practically an order to hire Hyde's firm. Cautioned about the impropriety, Barnum hurried off a second letter nine days later saying he feared the first one "may be misconstrued," thus, in effect, withdrawing it.

Sex Appeals—The brass hats at Ft. Hood, Tex., recently advertised for "go-go dancers" to perform in their 12 clubs for officers and non-coms. A spokesman assured us that the bikini-clad girls are paid from club profits. Not to be outdone, Wurtsmith Air Force Base, Mass., placed an ad for a belly dancing instructor. "It's for a physical education class for women," said a spokesman. "There's quite a bit of physical fitness required for the fine art of belly dancing."

• 1974, United Feature Syndicate

HS/HC-950

A-6

Washington Star-News

Monday, July 8, 1974

DISENCHANTED WITH CIA **Ex-Agent Writing Book**

By Michael J. Sniffen
Associated Press

The former Central Intelligence Agency employee whose trips to Cuba led the CIA to rearrange some operations in this hemisphere is Philip B. F. Agee, who quit the agency in 1969 and is now living in Great Britain, where he is writing a book about the agency, according to a source outside government.

This source, who has been associated with intelligence activities, said that Agee worked as a deep cover agent in Ecuador, Uruguay and Mexico from 1960 until 1969.

In the book "he's going to let it all hang out," according to this source, who has corresponded with Agee. Agee has written that his trips to Cuba were to do research for the book, the source said.

An official source had said earlier this week that, an agent who became disenchanted with the CIA sometime after leaving it more than five years ago had

made three trips to Havana and was "determined to do, say or write things to expose agency activities."

THE CIA has told congressional committees that the incident threatened to compromise Western Hemisphere operations. CIA also has said that it moved "to terminate projects and move assets subject to compromise" as a result of the contact. Assets refer to undercover people or arrangements used by the agency.

The nongovernment source said Agee was "a nuts and bolts man. He knows names or places, and dates, and individuals and organizations. He can really nail down operations in specific numbers."

Agee spent 14 years with the agency devoting the years before 1960 to training and building a cover, this source said.

"He plans to write about what he thinks is worth communicating to the public, about what he thinks is

wrong with secret government practices," this source said.

IN A RELATED development, the Washington Post reported yesterday that among the rearrangements CIA made after Agee's trips to Cuba was to terminate a cover operation in Mexico City run by Robert R. Mullen & Co., a Washington-based public relations firm.

The incident surfaced last week in a report by Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr., R-Tenn., vice chairman of the Senate Watergate committee. In a report on possible CIA involvement in Watergate, he wrote that a CIA official had mentioned a "WH flap" in memo written July 10, 1972, on a report about the Watergate break-in by Robert Bennett of the Mullen firm.

The agency has said the term refers to a Western Hemisphere flap unrelated to Watergate, but Baker wrote that Bennett thought it referred to a White House flap.

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST

Monday, July 15, 1974 B15

Colson Bugged in Talk to Private Eye

By Jack Anderson

In an ironic twist, the White House's high priest of snooper, Charles W. Colson, was himself bugged recently as he uttered some of the Watergate scandal's most indiscreet confessions.

Colson, when he was the top White House hatchet man, was fond of flipping a switch and tape recording friends and enemies alike. A few days before he went to prison for obstructing justice, however, he was secretly recorded as he bared his soul to Washington businessman and sometime private eye Richard Bast.

Colson went to Bast to interest him in investigating the Central Intelligence Agency which Colson felt had set him up for all his troubles with federal prosecutors. We have now heard the taped conversations.

Unaware of the turning reels, Colson speculated that the CIA planned a "Seven Days in May" type of takeover of the government. He also asserted that the Pentagon practiced extortion to keep President Nixon from arresting military men who stole his secrets.

In sometimes hostile, sometimes contrite language, Colson described President Nixon behind his back as being short on

"guts." Behind Colson's back, Mr. Nixon had been equally critical of Colson, the White House tapes show.

Colson complained to Bast that the President was always on the verge of coming down hard on the CIA. But, Colson groused, Mr. Nixon was talked out of it by presidential staff chief Al Haig who feared it would "take down the whole intelligence community."

"That's where I got to be critical of Tricky Dick with this kind of lack of guts here," commented the tough-talking Bast.

Sadly, Colson agreed: "I criticize him along with you. For that reason."

Sitting beside Bast's swimming pool, whose fountain made background water music over a "mike" secreted among poolside flowers, the two men discussed how Mr. Nixon could rid himself of CIA and military spying on the White House.

"He's got the message," brooded Colson. "And he's thinking about it. He's got a helluva problem . . . Nobody understands this . . . He can't do it himself." Colson explained that Mr. Nixon could not fully trust anyone in the White House to carry out his orders, and "he can't just sit in there with a machine gun."

The skeptical Bast asked why Mr. Nixon didn't simply order arrests if his National Security Council was being spied on by the military, as recent testimony has confirmed.

"If he tried to do anything about it," sighed Colson, "they would have disclosed a lot of his documents that he was worried about protecting, that they had been stealing . . . right from Kissinger's briefcase."

"In other words," replied Bast, "they practiced extortion on him."

"Subtly," agreed Colson.

"And the President let them get away with it?"

"Yeah," the former White House confidant conceded.

As to the CIA, Colson said that one of its former agents, E. Howard Hunt Jr., while in the White House, was in contact directly or indirectly with CIA clandestine bigwigs.

Colson said he never knew whether the CIA infiltrated the White House "to knock (Nixon) off"—figuratively speaking—"or whether they were in there just to spy . . .

"Maybe they were trying to pull something similar to a 'Seven Days in May' deal (a fictional military coup)," suggested Bast.

"Could have been, could have been," mused Colson. "I can't say there was a conspiracy to do it, but I will say that was the practical consequence of their actions."

Mr. Nixon's theory, said Colson, "was that the CIA were coming in to spy . . . Who knows what they want . . . The whole house of cards collapsed and maybe that's what they wanted."

"Right now the frightening thing is that there is no one controlling the CIA. I mean nobody . . ."

Footnote: Haig told us there was "no way" he was working for the CIA, but refused comment on his talks with Colson. The CIA denies it was spying on the White House.

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Former Agent Tells of C.I.A.'s Interest in His Diary Disillusion

By RICHARD EDER

Special to The New York Times

LONDON, July 11—"I did not write this book for the K.G.B. I wrote it for revolutionary organizations in the United States, in Latin America and everywhere else. I wrote it as a contribution to the socialist revolution."

Philip Agee, a graduate of a Jesuit school and Notre Dame University and for 12 years an agent for the Central Intelligence Agency, was explaining why, after resigning from the agency six years ago, he had decided to write a book describing its operations in the three countries where he was stationed—Ecuador, Uruguay and Mexico.

The book, a lengthy work written in the form of a diary, is to be published in Britain by Penguin. No publication date has been set, but Mr. Agee expects it to appear next spring.

U.S. Influence the Target

The New York Times published an article last week quoting reliable sources in Washington as having said that the C.I.A. had reorganized its operations in the Western Hemisphere after one of its agents, when drunk, had disclosed aspects of the organization to agents of the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence agency. No specific C.I.A. agent was named.

A few days later, however, it was reported that the C.I.A. reorganization was the result of concern that Mr. Agee would reveal information about the agency's operations in Latin America, but his possible involvement with the K.G.B. remained unclear. Mr. Agee denied yesterday that he had ever given information to the K.G.B.

Mr. Agee's book recounts in specific detail his experiences with the C.I.A., including his recruitment and his training, and the operations he knew of at his three posts. The book's detail is extensive; it includes names of agents and contacts.

But Mr. Agee says that his main target in writing the book was not so much the C.I.A. as what he holds to be the destructiveness of American influence around the world.

"I didn't want to write just a bunch of spy stories," he said this week. "I wanted to put the C.I.A. in the context of the political and economic reality of Latin America. I wanted to show how, by beating down anything to the left, we just reinforce the status quo, the hold of the oligarchy on the great mass of people."

In brief, as Mr. Agee told it, his quarrel was less with the C.I.A.'s methods than with the political purposes for which they were used. His book was the product of eight years of radicalization, from his arrival in Latin America as an idealistic young spy, believing in reform and the Alliance for Progress, to his departure from the agency in 1968, convinced of the need for socialist revolutions and some eventual form of communism.

Wary of Bird Watchers

Mr. Agee talked for several hours, sitting in the garden of his rented cottage on the Cornwall coast. Just below, thousands of birds dabbled on the tidal flats, and throughout the overcast afternoon cars drove up, discharging relays of bird watchers with field glasses. And from time to time Mr. Agee, a tanned, dark-haired man of 39 years, would get up, peer over the bushes at them, then resume his seat.

He has felt under pressure since he began his book. Part of this has come from what he is convinced was C.I.A. surveillance; another part he is more hesitant to discuss, but, essentially, it amounts to a concern that persons involved in operations he knows about will try to get to him before the book comes out.

This concern has lent a guarded quality to his life while he has been writing his book, over the last four years—first in Mexico, then in Paris, then in Britain, with three short trips to Cuba. It is also one of the reasons for refusing, in the interview, to describe the episodes he re-

lates in the book.

He did tell, however, of the C.I.A.'s effort to recruit him in the nineteen-fifties

when he was in college, the recruiting officer offering a package plan by which young men could combine their draft duty with joining the agency.

"I turned it down at Notre Dame," he recalled, "but later at Florida Law School I was about to be drafted so I wrote in asking if it was still open."

The C.I.A. draftees were not identified in any way, he said, and went through basic training in the regular fashion:

"It was for maturing, they said. We were just like everyone else except that in the orders our names had three X's in front of them. The agency made sure we were selected for Officers' Candidate School and then sent on to duties as intelligence officers."

He also spoke briefly of his last C.I.A. post, in Mexico.

"I was in Washington on the Mexico desk," he said. "It was the time of the Olympics, and we got a message that the Ambassador wanted an Olympics attaché, and that it would be a good spot for someone in the agency to fill."

"I cut my orders for it, you might say, and went."

When Disillusion Came

As Olympics attaché Mr. Agee said, he had a special opportunity to mix widely. There was a big national effort in Mexico to promote the games, and many people the agency was interested in were involved: Professionals, artists, politicians.

"It was a good time to recruit locals," he said. "It was especially useful for bringing in Mexican politicians."

But even before he went to Mexico, Mr. Agee had become disillusioned with his work. When the Olympics were over, he resigned, and went to work in a small business with some Mexican friends.

"My only thought at first was to forget the agency," he said. "But there was Vietnam, and I realized that what we were doing on a big scale in Vietnam I had been doing on a lower scale in Latin America."

"The agency's job was to keep the lid on. All we had been doing in Latin America was to keep insurgency down at a lower level than in Vietnam. But the principles were the same. It was American imperialism."

'Reform Just Rhetoric'

What had brought him, he was asked, to this extreme-left analysis of America's role?

"When I went to Ecuador in 1960 it was the time when democratic reform seemed to be the way out for Latin America," he said. "It was the time of the reformers: Betancourt in Venezuela, Muñoz Marín in Puerto Rico, Figueres in Costa Rica, Kubitschek in Brazil."

The methods we used in the agency were rationalized as buying time for the moderate reformers to make the reforms that were needed. But the longer I was there, the more I felt that liberal reform was a contradiction, that it was just rhetoric. I realized that society was not getting integrated, that the oligarchies and the masses were as far apart as ever. I realized that the Alliance for Progress was just a subsidy program for U. S. business."

This disillusion, he continued, made him realize that the far left, which he was professionally dedicated to fighting, in fact stood for what he believed in. And it concluded that only some form of socialist revolution could bring about genuine change.

To Paris and a Publisher

Mr. Agee began work on his book in Mexico in 1969. The next year, he moved to Paris, where he met the publisher François Maspero. Mr. Maspero, who will publish the book in French, gave him an advance that supported him for a while.

In 1971, he said, the C.I.A. became aware of what he was doing. He had committed "the mistake" of writing to a Uruguayan magazine, identifying himself as a former C.I.A. agent; he warned that the agency was likely to intervene in an election campaign then going on, and revealed that he was writing a book on the sub-

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Not long afterward he was visited in Paris by a C.I.A. man whom he knew and who questioned him about his plans. It was after this, he said, that something odd began. It amounted—as he sees it—to the C.I.A. subsidizing his book. A wealthy American girl of Venezuelan origin moved into the small hotel where he was living and befriended him.

Something in a Typewriter

"She took a great interest in the book," he said. "I was out of money by then. It got to the point where I had to return my rented typewriter for the sake of the deposit. She and another American who moved in at the same time began giving me money."

Mr. Agee said he had some suspicions about her. These, he said, grew to certainty after she lent him a typewriter and seemed upset when, because he was using tapes at the time rather than of writing, he did not use the typewriter.

He began to notice that his radio made peculiar sounds when the typewriter was moved close to it, examining the typewriter's case, he found a piece of plywood. When he removed it, he said, he found a complicated assemblage of miniature electronic devices in it. He is not certain whether this was used simply to provide a directional signal, or for something more complicated.

Although he was now certain that the girl was an agent, he continued to see her: "I needed the money."

He said that C.I.A. representatives also visited his estranged wife—they are now divorced—in the United States, and told her that they would pay Mr. Agee if he would abandon the book.

In 1972 Mr. Agee moved to London to see the British Museum's newspaper library. His book, he said, will take the form of a diary in which his own recollections are set against the background of events taking place in Latin America at the time. In London, he obtained an advance from Penguin, which allowed him to discontinue his less orthodox form of support.

Mr. Agee expects to remain in Britain until his book comes out. He has been assured, he said, that there is no legal way that publication of it can be stopped here. If he moved to the United States he could be subject to the kind of legal action that the CIA took against another forthcoming book by a former employee, Victor L. Marchetti. A number of passages in the book, "The C.I.A. and the Cult of Intelligence," which Mr. Marchetti wrote with John D. Merks, a former State Department intelligence analyst, were deleted by court order.

A Look Homeward

Once the book is published, Mr. Agee said, he will move back to the United States. "I want to join a political group," he said. He added that he belonged to no party now and was not certain which group he would try to join. Asked whether he was a Communist, he replied:


"Not if you mean by that a person who has joined the Communist party. But if you speak of a socialist revolution, to which I hope to contribute, you're speaking of the construction of a socialist society and eventually of Communism. Communism is not a matter of belonging. It is a way of living."

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BOOKS

June 11
Hampers



UP FRONT FOR THE CIA

by Robert T. Wood

Without Cloak or Dagger, by Miles Copeland. Simon and Schuster, \$8.95 (July).

MILES COPELAND is an old whore. This is not the libelous statement it seems, as anyone with Mr. Copeland's background well knows. In the Central Intelligence Agency, "old whore" is a term used to describe an officer so experienced, so devoted to his trade, so loyal to his organization, and so accustomed to following orders that he will accept and do a creditable job on any assignment without regard for moral, ethical, or possibly even legal considerations. Within the Agency, it is a

high compliment to professionalism.

No outsider can be sure Mr. Copeland qualifies for the title, of course, because the most ambiguous aspect of this latest book on the CIA is the status of its author. An alumnus of the wartime OSS, Mr. Copeland claims he served as a consultant to the newly formed CIA and was called back from time to time thereafter to review the systems he had devised. He never claims to have been a staff employee of the Agency, yet he says that espionage has occupied most of his working life. In 1957 he established himself in Beirut as a security consultant, which, he alleges, is still his occupation today. At his knowledge of the Agency and its workings is both intimate and up-to-the-minute.

To ask Mr. Copeland when, exactly, his employment with the CIA ended might be a little like asking David Eisenhower how much rent he pays.

The temptation to compare Miles Copeland to Victor Louis is irresistible. A mysterious Russian who began as a small-time black marketeer moving about on the fringes of the foreign community in Moscow, Louis landed an assignment as correspondent for a London newspaper and made several trips outside the Soviet Union, rushing in to places, like Taipei, where Russian diplomats feared to tread. The speculation, which will probably never be confirmed, is that he obtained his unusual privileges and freedom of movement by virtue of his relationship with the KGB department of misinformation, whose mission it is to mislead the rest of the world concerning Russian capabilities and intentions. Like Victor Louis, Miles Copeland is a highly visible and easily accessible person of nebulous status who can go places and say things that responsible officials cannot. Mr. Copeland, who on at least one occasion has said things about CIA activities that responsible officials later had to deny, has been described by one journalist as "the only man I know who uses the CIA as a cover."

MR. COPELAND has written this book, he says, to counter a flood of misinformation on spies and counterspies that appears on television, in movies, books, magazine articles, and newspapers. To give him his due, there is more inside information on the subject presented here than has probably ever appeared publicly in one place. To begin with, Mr. Copeland makes it clear that espionage is a relatively minor source of intelligence, although the clandestine services often seem to be the tail that wags the dog, and of course

the descriptions of them make the best reading. His explanations of planning and organization of a penetration operation and of the procedure for developing, recruiting, and handling an agent are in some cases overelaborate and in others oversimplified, but generally they are accurate. The account of the position and operation of the CIA field station, cataloguing many of the problems faced by a CIA officer serving overseas, will be new to most readers and might even be instructive for foreign-service officers and foreign correspondents who thought they knew all there was to know. Add to this a text liberally salted with footnotes—most of them fascinating anecdotes in their own right—and the result is an interesting and readable book.

Unfortunately, the large quantities of good information in *Without Cloak or Dagger* serve as a vehicle for an equal amount of misinformation on the Agency, more misinformation, in fact, than all that's been produced by the movies, television shows, or publications that Mr. Copeland complains of. Moreover, the misinformation is presented very authoritatively, with no hint to enable the uninitiated to distinguish the true from the false. His intent, in a great many instances, is clearly to mislead the reader and give a totally false impression of Agency capabilities and performance.

In describing field operations, Mr. Copeland stresses their defensive nature, stating, with a certain candor, that "the mission of the CIA station is . . . to stay out of trouble." Most of the sixty or so stations around the world have, he says, no more than two or three case officers,* and, ideally, a case officer is responsible for no more than one operation. Contrasted with this low-profile view of the CIA overseas are his assertions of an impressive amount of successful activity. He claims that "over the years, there have been literally thousands of CIA agents in the U.S.S.R., Red China, Cuba and other communist

countries," and that both agents and American personnel move easily and seemingly in and out of these "denied areas." The implication is that both Peking and Moscow are swarming with CIA spies and that no state secret is safe from them.

The facts as I was exposed to them were vastly different. In the days before I began to worry about becoming an old whore myself, I served for several years at a station with considerably more than three case officers. During one particularly hectic summer, I met regularly with and handled no fewer than twenty agents, one of them with an additional five subagents. My workload had been expanded by taking on handholding chores for some operations of my colleagues who were on home leave, but the average load for case officers is, I suspect, closer to twenty than to one. Even after I had achieved the relative luxury of handling only one fairly high-level agent, I continued to manage four or five other agents in support of my operation and other station operations, and I considered myself underemployed at the time.

It's embarrassing to admit that China was my primary target and all my best efforts resulted in not one penetration of the Chinese military, party, or government above the village level. The other case officers at the station were similarly unsuccessful, as had been every other case officer who had worked on the target for the previous twenty years. We consoled ourselves only with the knowledge that our colleagues in the units working against the U.S.S.R., with more personnel and more money and, presumably, more urgency, would have fared just as miserably but for the greater tendency of Russians to defect. Their one outstanding agent was not developed through any positive effort on their part; he had sought them out.

Early in the book, Mr. Copeland describes the CIA's arrest and physical elimination of a headquarters employee who had served for years as an agent for the Russians. If he expects anyone to believe this story, it must have occurred to him that he is confessing to a role as accessory to an administrative murder. The CIA has no police powers, let alone

an execution if ordered, but it is incredible that there is a single administrator at any level of the Agency who would take the responsibility of ordering it. Although the Phoenix program, a wholesale assassination of key insurgent leaders in Vietnam, was directed by then Ambassador William Colby, it was carried out principally by the Vietnamese themselves, not by CIA officers. Phoenix had the full approval of higher authority, so the burden of Agency responsibility was minimal. It was not at all equivalent to the secret liquidation of one renegade staff employee in the basement of the Langley headquarters. If this incident had really happened, it would be foolhardy in the extreme for anyone involved ever to mention it; a second execution would be far more likely than the first was.

THE MOST IMAGINATIVE invention of the whole book is the cabal, or inner circle of Agency old-timers, who pop up to illustrate a point now and then. Known only by exotic names like "Mother," "Kingfish," "Jojo," and "Lady Windemere," they go on about the business of making the Agency run, regardless of changes in administration or policy. The last three of those mentioned, on the basis of their described responsibilities, appear to be no more than specialists in a single unit that supports operations without getting directly involved in their execution or command; these positions would not account for the importance or influence Mr. Copeland ascribes to them. Mother is the *éminence grise*. Like the others, he was present at the birth of the Agency, and, faced with the frustration of wondering what decisions the Congress was making for the future of the fledgling Central Intelligence Group, he characteristically suggested, "Penetration begins at home," thus showing that intragovernmental spying was not an invention of the Joint Chiefs. It was also Mother who fabricated a complete espionage operation in those early days just to expose the gullibility of a unit competing with his for influence in the new Agency.

In spite of his early start and undoubted talents of maneuver, Mother somehow never made it to the top, but he enjoys a certain amount of autonomy today as head of the Agen-

* Mr. Copeland corrects a popular misconception by explaining that staff CIA employees are almost never designated as agents, in the sense that FBI officers are known as "special agents." In intelligence an agent is someone, usually a foreign national, hired to provide information or perform other services. The staff employee who contacts and directs him, and in general handles his "case," is known as a "case officer."

counterterrorist effort, a huge computerized data bank storing background information on millions of persons, both American and foreign, who could conceivably become involved in terrorist activity, as well as millions more who could not. Mother is, of course, an imaginary character, but, aside from that, there is no way for an outsider to judge the truth of the Agency's so-called counterterrorist activities. It is not legally authorized to keep files on American citizens. The significant thing is that the author wants his readers to believe it is doing so.

The CIA may well become the world's most powerful government agency, according to Mr. Copeland, because it has access to the most knowledge. Removing the dangers inherent in a powerful government agency, he adds, is not a matter of decreasing the power, but of ensuring that those who exercise it are incorruptible and truly responsive to public interest. "CIA officials believe that their agency is already incorruptible and . . . as responsive to public interest as any other agency." Interestingly enough, he does not claim anywhere that the Agency is responsive to higher authority. On the contrary, he gives examples where it has specifically been unresponsive and implies that it will continue to be so in cases where higher authority is in conflict with its own particular view of the public interest.

The overall picture that emerges from this book is of a Central Intelligence Agency enormously competent, frighteningly ruthless, spectacularly successful, terribly powerful, and absolutely trustworthy, the sort of ideal government organization that only a fool or a charlatan would tamper with. The author has composed a presentation that could completely revamp the Agency's image.

It has been apparent that ever since his days as executive director, William Colby has been trying to renovate his organization's image. The impression he wanted to project, as a friend of mine put it, seemed to be "something like a cross between General Motors and the League of Women Voters." There is an ominous implication in this book that, by improving the Agency's image, Colby intends to enhance its power and independence as well.

A great many people are going to take *Without Cloak or Dagger* se-

riously, but I doubt that anyone with the necessary authority will ask the Agency how much they had to do with it, or precisely what their relationship with Mr. Copeland is. Unlike the general run of Walter Mittys who claim to have some intimate relationship with the CIA, Miles Copeland clearly has one, but neither he nor the Agency is going to define it voluntarily. In the foreword, Mr. Copeland says, "I must make it clear, however, that no one at CIA . . . or any other official agency has 'cleared' this book or in any other way implied approval of my writing it." In early November of last year, I wrote a letter to Angus Thuermer, assistant to director William Colby, asking several very specific questions about the clearance of a magazine article that appears, in somewhat different form, as chapter nine, of the book. Mr. Thuermer's reply was unequivocal. "All Agency employees," he said, "sign secrecy agreements, and the federal courts have determined that the secrecy agreements are enforceable contracts." The actual review of manuscripts is a security function, and on that basis he declined to answer my questions, but if the man who sits next to the director of Central Intelligence admits he had the machinery to stop publication of this book and didn't, that should be approval enough for anyone. □

CURSING THE DARKNESS

by Nelson W. Polsby

The American Condition, by Richard N. Goodwin, Doubleday, \$10.

EVER SINCE Richard Goodwin entered public life, in the early 1960s, a certain moral urgency has surrounded his every move, whether it was coining stirring phrases for Presidential speeches ("Alliance For Progress," "The Great Society"), keeping the "authorized" account of the Kennedy assassination within guidelines set out by the family,

Nelson W. Polsby, a political scientist, currently teaches at the University of California, San Diego. His forthcoming book of essays is entitled *Political Promises* (Oxford University Press).

switching sides from Eugene McCarthy to Robert Kennedy during the 1960 primary season, or whenever. This same electric quality of absolute rightness pervades *The American Condition*, a lengthy essay on the evils that accompany the concentration of power, and on the consequent need for Americans to rediscover the basic harmonies of a simpler, more communitarian existence as a way of exercising their individualism, reducing alienation, and thereby finding freedom.

The steps by which this quintessential New Frontiersman has come to appropriate the rhetoric of the *National Review* are not spelled out, and that is a great pity. From all his fulminations against inflation ("a tax on the citizenry"), the "bureaucratic spirit," and "coercion," are we to infer a repudiation of Goodwin's earlier commitments? It is hard to say: in a single page he suggests the nationalization of the major sources of capital and that "economic relationships should be decentralized," the two seemingly contradictory imperatives to be reconciled by employing "the new technologies of control."

Goodwin locates much of the responsibility for the alienation of contemporary Americans in the domination by large bureaucracies of the economic life of the nation. Much of this argument is made with copious recourse to quotations from St. Paul and Nietzsche, Jefferson, Marx, and so on (but sparingly from John Kenneth Galbraith, whose analysis Goodwin's most resembles). It is an argument displaying so many of the furnishings of Goodwin's well-furnished mind that the reader may wonder if he has stumbled upon the intellectual equivalent of a garage sale.

The message of *The American Condition* is unrelentingly grim—even in a potentially whimsical moment when Goodwin spins out a fable about how cooking caused the fall of man. Moreover, as the testament of a man formerly engaged feverishly as a political activist, it is thoroughgoing in its rejection of politics. The role of politics in America, as Goodwin sees it, is not to advance human dignity, or even to share some goodies around, but principally to prevent "mortal clashes between powerful private interests. When this is not possible, as during the 1850s, force and not politics decides the issue."

The question is. How much of

WASHINGTON STAR - WED - 2 July 1979

Baker Report Details CIA Role

By Martha Angle
Star-News Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency had more extensive contacts with the Watergate burglars than it has previously acknowledged and failed to divulge all it knew to federal investigators, according to a Senate Watergate committee staff report.

A minority staff report released today was prepared at the direction of Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr., R-Tenn., committee vice chairman. It appears to raise more questions than it answers about the full extent of the CIA role in the Watergate case and in the burglary of the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

CIA Director William E. Colby protested that the Baker report "implies that there is reason to believe the agency and its officers and employees had prior knowledge of and were wittingly involved in the break-ins and the cover-up."

Such conclusions, Colby said in a letter to Baker, are "unjustifiable."

ACTUALLY, the Baker report draws no conclusions but rather emphasizes the difficulties the staff encountered in obtaining access to data sought from the CIA. It also is peppered with deletions demanded by the CIA to protect classified material.

The report stops far short of the sweeping allegations which former White House special counsel Charles W. Colson made to a private investigator last month.

In discussions with investigator Richard L. Bast, Colson charged that the CIA "deliberately assisted and helped carry out" the Ellsberg burglary, knew in advance of the plan to break into the Watergate and "engaged in one helluva good cover-up of their own."

ON THE BASIS of closed-door testimony and a review of some 700 documents supplied by the CIA, the committee probers reported that:

- The Washington public relations firm, Robert Mullen & Co., which Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr. joined after retiring from the CIA in 1970, was actually a front for the agency and provided a "cover" for CIA operatives in Europe and Asia.

- Robert Bennett, president of Mullen & Co. and son of Sen. Wallace Bennett, R-Utah, "reported detailed knowledge of the Watergate incident to his CIA case officer" on July 10, 1972, less than a month after the break-in, but the information was not relayed to the FBI.

- A March 1, 1973, memo by Eric W. Eisenstadt, chief of CIA's "central cover staff," notes that "Bennett felt he could handle the Ervin Committee if the Agency could handle Hunt," according to the Senate report. The memo also said Bennett was "feeding stories" to Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward, who was "suitably grateful" and was "protecting Bennett and Mullen & Co."
- The CIA has acknowledged paying one-half of Bennett's attorney's fee for his grand jury appearance.

- As early as June 1972 the CIA knew one of its paid operatives, Lee R. Pennington Jr., "had entered the James McCord residence shortly after the Watergate break-in and destroyed documents which might show a link between McCord and the CIA."

- When the FBI inquired about a "Pennington" in August 1972, the CIA furnished information about a former employee with a similar name, but obviously not the man the FBI was interested in.

- Information about the "real" Pennington was provided to the Watergate committee in February 1974 only after a low-echelon CIA employee protested an order to remove the material from the CIA's Watergate files to prevent its disclosure.

The unnamed "personnel security officer #1" informed his superiors, according to closed-door Senate testimony, that "up to this time

we have never removed, tampered with, obliterated, destroyed or done anything to any Watergate documents and we can't be caught in that kind of bind now."

The employee also said he "didn't cross the Potomac on his way to work in the morning and the agency could do without its own L. Patrick Gray." This was a reference to the former acting FBI director who was told to "deep six" documents from Hunt's White House safe and subsequently did destroy them.

- Tape recordings of room and telephone conversations by top CIA officials were destroyed on orders of former CIA Director Richard Helms approximately a week after he received a letter from Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield asking that no evidence relative to Watergate be destroyed.

Among the telephone tape transcripts destroyed were conversations with President Nixon and former White House aides H. R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman, according to the report. Helms and his secretary have testified these were not related to Watergate.

NEARLY one-fourth of the 43-page Baker report is devoted to an account of the assistance furnished Hunt by the CIA prior to the Sept. 3, 1971, break-in at the office of Dr. Lewis Fielding, Ellsberg's former psychiatrist, by members of the White House "plumbers" team.

The report says "documents and conflicting testimony of CIA personnel" raise questions about "whether the CIA had advance knowledge of the Fielding break-in," although the agency today again denied any such prior knowledge.

The Senate staff report notes that CIA assistance to Hunt — which including the furnishing of false identification papers, a voice changer, wig, camera, tape recorder and the like — was not terminated until Aug. 27, 1971, one week before the break-in.

Although top agency officials have testified publicly that the tie with Hunt was severed because he was making unreasonable demands on the CIA, the staff report suggests the real reason may have been that agency officials became suspicious of Hunt's intentions.

HUNT, AND "plumber" G. Gordon Liddy had entered Fielding's office to "case" the burglary job, and had taken photos with the camera provided by the CIA. The film was developed by the agency and reviewed before it was returned to Hunt.

"One CIA official who reviewed the film admitted he found the photographs 'intriguing' and recognized them to be of 'southern California,'" the staff report said. The official ordered a blow-up of one photo, which turned out to show Dr. Fielding's name in the parking lot next to his office, the report said.

"Another CIA official has testified that he speculated that they were 'casing' photographs," the report said. The contents of the photos were reported to then-Deputy CIA Director Robert Cushman, according to this official. Cushman has denied receiving such a report, the committee staff said.

The CIA, in a series of comments aimed at rebutting various portions of the report, said today that at the time the photos were developed, "the name of Dr. Fielding had no meaning to the agency personnel involved."

THE COMMITTEE staff report said that although public CIA testimony has claimed the agency had no contact "whatsoever" with Hunt after Aug. 31, 1971, the Senate investigation revealed at least a half-dozen later contacts going up to the spring of 1972.

In the period between March and May of 1972, the report said, Hunt contacted the CIA's External Employment Assistance Branch and "approached several active CIA personnel" seek-

ing a "retired lock-picker," an "entry man" and other operatives.

In March 1972, Hunt contacted Eugenio Martinez, a former full-time CIA employee then on retainer to the agency, who reported the contact to his CIA case officer. (Martinez subsequently joined the Watergate burglars and now is on trial in the Ellsberg case).

Somewhat cryptically, Martinez informed the CIA station chief in Miami that Hunt was employed by the White House "and asked the chief of station if he was sure he had been appraised of all agency activities in the Miami area."

THE STATION chief, according to the Senate report, sent a letter to CIA headquarters here and was told in reply that Hunt was on "domestic White House business of an unknown nature and that the chief of station should 'cool it,'" the staff report said.

"It is not explained why Hunt, who had 'used' the CIA, was not of more interest to the agency, especially when he was contacting a current operative, Martinez," the report said.

"The (Miami) chief of station was confounded as to why he was not told to terminate the Martinez relationship if the CIA headquarters suspected the involvement of Hunt in political activities," the report added.

The Senate probe, conducted by Minority Counsel Fred D. Thompson and two of his assistant counsels, Howard S. Liebengood and Michael J. Madigan, was initiated last November and completed by March of this year.

Ever since then, the Watergate committee has been attempting to persuade the CIA to declassify documents on which the report largely is based. The final version was "sanitized" by the agency, which also put out its own rebuttal comments simultaneously with the release of the staff report.

THE BAKER report includes an eight-page list of "action desirable to complete the Watergate-related CIA investigation" Baker said he will recommend that the suggestions "be carefully undertaken" by congressional committees responsible for "oversight" of CIA.

Among items requested by the Watergate staff — but not provided by the CIA — were an agency file on "Mr. Edward," (Hunt) which included all materials on the technical assistance provided Hunt by the CIA. The CIA rebuttal document said the Watergate committee "already possesses the relevant material" from this file.

The committee also sought, unsuccessfully, to gain access to a five-inch reel of tape labeled "McCord incident" and dated June 18-19, 1972, which did not turn up until March 1, 1974.

"It is not known what is contained in this tape, but its importance is obvious," the staff said. The agency memo said all relevant material from the tape has already been provided to the committee.

A-18 **Washington Star-News**
Wednesday, July 10, 1974

CIA Bid To Hush Critic Told

By Michael Sniffen
Associated Press

The CIA tried to lure an ex-agent who has written an expose of its operations back to the United States by interfering in his marriage, according to an American Civil Liberties Union lawyer.

Melvin L. Wulf, an ACLU lawyer who has corresponded with former deep-cover agent Philip B. F. Agee, said, "CIA tried to interfere in the settlement of the separation proceedings with his wife, to make it difficult to reach a settlement."

Wulf said the CIA wanted Agee, who is in Great Britain, to return to the United States where the agency could go into court in an effort to prevent disclosure in his book of secret information.

In a telephone interview Monday Wulf said that John Greaney, assistant general counsel of CIA, had talked to Agee's wife.

"I CONFRONTED him with the charge that CIA was trying to make trouble in this domestic matter to lure Agee back," Wulf said.

Wulf said CIA tried unsuccessfully to persuade Mrs. Agee not to let their children visit Agee.

Greaney refused to comment on Wulf's remarks.

Agee has told associates that he was involved in the assassination of locally employed CIA agents, known in the agency as contract employees, the New York Times reported yesterday.

Agee told friends that the assassinations were not official CIA policy, but rather local options taken in the field, according to the Times.

The Times said that Agee related at least one incident involving the use of a truck to run over a recently utilized local CIA operative whose mission had been completed.

WULF is representing two other former intelligence officers, Victor Marchetti and John Marks, in a court battle with the CIA over publication of secret information in a book they have published. The CIA filed civil suit against them, forcing deletions in the book.

Agee said in an interview he has completed a 220,000-word book on the CIA's Latin American operations. Wulf said the book will be published by Penguin in Great Britain in the fall and that Penguin is seeking an American publisher.



SEN. HOWARD H. BAKER JR.
... probes CIA involvement

Baker to Say CIA Helped Hunt Get Job

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

Testimony indicating that a Central Intelligence Agency official recommended the employment of Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr. by a Washington public relations firm which has served as a CIA "cover" will be released today by Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.).

The public relations firm is Robert Mullen & Co., whose relationship with the CIA forms a central theme of the Baker report cleared by the CIA for release last weekend.

Hunt was recommended to the Mullen firm at the time of his retirement from the agency in 1970 by a CIA official identified as Frank O'Malley. There have been unsubstantiated allegations in the case that Hunt was recommended to Mullen by former CIA Director Richard M. Helms.

Both the CIA and officials of the Mullen company have acknowledged their mutual ties, which included providing a corporate cover for CIA operatives in Mullen & Co. offices in Singapore and Amsterdam.

Sources who have examined the report say it provides no conclusive links between the CIA and the original Watergate break-in such as have been hinted by former White House aide Charles Colson and by Baker.

However, it includes documentation in the form of three CIA memoranda

A 8

Tuesday, July 2, 1974

THE WASHINGTON POST

Baker to Issue Report

CIA, Watergate Tie Probed

BAKER, From A1

which point to covert efforts by officials of the agency to minimize its involvement in the Watergate investigation.

There is also some evidence that Robert F. Bennett, president of Mullen and son of Sen. Wallace F. Bennet (R-Utah), was tipped off prior to the Watergate burglary that a White House break-in team was targeting McGovern campaign headquarters for a political intelligence raid.

Bennett has privately acknowledged that he was given advance knowledge of the operations of the burglary team. But it was unknown whether he passed this information on to the CIA.

The memos upon which Baker drew in the preparation of his report were drafted by Eric W. Eisenstadt, chief of the central cover staff for the CIA's clandestine directorate; Martin J. Lukasky, Bennett's "case officer" within the agency, and subordinates of former CIA security director Howard Osborn, who recently took an early retirement from the CIA.

The Eisenstadt and Lukasky memos recount the CIA's relationships with Mullen & Co. and recount claims by Bennett that he planted unfavorable stories in Newsweek and The Washing-

ton Post dealing with White House aides, including Colson. The object of these stories, the Baker report will indicate, was to draw attention away from CIA involvement in the Watergate case.

The Osborn material, as presented by Baker, suggests that the former CIA security director provided misleading information to the FBI on the identity of a former federal investigator who helped Watergate burglar James W. McCord Jr.'s wife destroy CIA records at their home immediately after her husband's arrest in the Watergate break-in case.

Osborn's retirement, according to one official familiar with the handling of the case, was an outgrowth of the internal memorandum prepared in Osborn's office which resulted in the transmission of misleading information to the FBI.

Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi (D-Mich.), who has reviewed a draft of the Baker report, said Sunday on the CBS program "Face the Nation" (WTOP) that it contained "no bombshells." Nedzi, chairman of the House Armed Services Intelligence Subcommittee, has taken testimony from CIA officials on a number of allegations made in the

draft version of Baker's report.

The Michigan Democrat is said to be in contact with the CIA's congressional liaison office on an almost day-to-day basis as new allegations have arisen suggesting new involvements by the agency in the Watergate scandal.

Some of Baker's colleagues on the Senate Watergate committee, of which he served as co-chairman, have charged that Baker has sought to implicate the CIA in the scandal to divert attention from the White House role in the break-in and ensuing cover-up.

The report also questions why photographs found in the CIA file taken by members of the White House "plumbers" team during the Ellsberg break-in were not turned over to the FBI, even though agency officials were aware of their evidentiary significance.

By and large, the Baker report reaches no definite conclusions but it suggests continued investigation of the relationships between the CIA and Watergate and names prospective witnesses to be examined.

The Senate Watergate committee has gone out of existence but will issue its final report next week.

Editorials

Washington Star-News

Opinion

A-14 •

TUESDAY, JULY 2, 1974

Vic Gold:

On The Latest CIA 'Plot'

Former White House aide Charles W. Colson has developed a detailed theory — which he says is generally shared by President Nixon — that the Central Intelligence Agency is implicated in the Watergate scandals to a far greater extent than has ever been disclosed. — News report

Jim Garrison, Mark Lane, Norm Mailer: where are you now, when your President needs you?

All you true believers in the omni-malevolence of the Central Intelligence Agency — are you ready for another Conspiracy Theory? Good, because this one is wild. Almost as wild as the one Norm was handing out last year about the mystery of Marilyn Monroe's death.

Yes, indeed, there's a fresh CIA plot just waiting to be stirred. One that cries out for experienced hands. You've all been the route, from How-the-CIA-Killed-John-Kennedy to How-the-CIA-Caused-Hurricane-Agnes. So it figures that if Chuck Colson and Howard Baker are going anywhere with their theory of How-the-CIA-Is-Responsible-for-Watergate, they could use your help.

THAT'S SEN. Howard Baker, of course, who was Sam Ervin's sidekick last summer during the Senate Watergate hearings. Baker has been trying to sell his CIA's-the-One line around Washington for the past six months, but with no success. He says it's because the CIA won't cooperate. If you ask me, though, Jim/Mark/Norm, it's because the Tennessee senator keeps talking in parables. Stuff about "animals crashing around in the forest," and the like.

Now, Jim, you know, from your experience gulling the voters of New Orleans (until they finally tired of your act), that talking in parables isn't the way to get a good conspiracy theory going. No, to sell a CIA scenario that people will listen to, a man's got to lay it

on the line. The way Colson did last week.

And let me tell you, gentlemen, when Chuck Colson runs a CIA conspiracy theory up his greased flagpole, folks stop, look up and listen. Because Chuck was right there with the President himself. And the way he tells it, the Old Man was fairly quaking over the possibility that the CIA might succeed in a major *putsch* to take over White House operations.

NIXON, said Colson, is "convinced the CIA is in this up to their eyeballs." Sound familiar, Jim/Mark/Norm? Why, it's practically a line taken straight from one of your left-wing texts about the John F. Kennedy assassination. Except, Mark, whereas you titled your book on that subject "Rush to Judgment," I think what we have here is more like "Rush Away from Judgment."

It's as if they sat around the White House one afternoon, the Old Man and Chuck, and thought: The liberal media want a scapegoat for Watergate. O.K., give 'em the CIA. But what could the CIA have in mind, getting "up to their eyeballs" in this sort of mess?

Well, says Colson, the President's theory is "they were coming in . . . to spy and they wanted to get enough on the White House so they could get what they wanted."

And what do they want? That's where we're counting on you, Jim/Mark/Norm. Because, you see, Chuck can only go so far elaborating on a CIA conspiracy. Beyond a certain point, he lacks your experience filling in outlandish details about such things. That is, in explaining to the American people that what the CIA really wants — in league with its allies, the FBI, the Pentagon, those Texas oil millionaires, Burt Lancaster, Kirk Douglas and the rest of the cast from "Seven Days in May" — is absolute power. Nothing less.

HS/HC-950

SUNDAY WASHINGTON POST
30 June 1974

Break-ins For CIA Alleged

By Richard M. Cohen
Washington Post Staff Writer

The lawyer for Watergate conspirators Bernard Barker and Eugenio Martinez revealed yesterday that the two had previously engaged in a series of illegal activities for the Central Intelligence Agency, including a "penetration" of the Radio City Music Hall by Barker in the mid-1960s.

The Radio City Music Hall entry, the lawyer said, was apparently a "CIA training session" to see if Barker could accomplish his mission satisfactorily. Other missions, the lawyer said, included the burglary of the Miami home of a boat crew member who was making trips for the CIA to Cuba and a similar break-in of a Miami business office.

The lawyer, Daniel Schultz, revealed some of Barker's and Martinez' past CIA escapades during opening arguments for their trial, along with former top presidential aide, John D. Ehrlichman and Watergate conspirator G. Gordon Liddy, on charges stemming from the 1971 break-in of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office.

A CIA spokesman said yesterday the agency would not comment on Schultz's statement because the matter is now before the court. "Our legal guys are very concerned about the propriety of this," the spokesman said.

By the 1947 act of Congress that created it, the CIA is forbidden to engage in domestic intelligence operations. However, the agency is permitted to conduct domestic operations to protect its foreign activities — a loophole that could cover the alleged Miami break-ins by Barker.

Those break-ins and those at the Watergate and at the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist are just a few to have gained public attention. Some, such as the illegal entry into Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office, involved the use of CIA equipment and facilities. Others, such as the break-ins at Chilean government offices here and New York in 1971 and 1972 remain unexplained and no agency role has ever been proven.

In addition, antiwar groups have frequently complained of break-ins, sometimes alleging government attempts to obtain information. None of

See BREAK-INS, A12, Col. 2

Break-ins Sponsored by CIA Laid to 2 Ellsberg Defendants

BREAK-INS, From A1

these claims has been substantiated."

Schultz refused to expand upon his courtroom remarks other than to say that additional details would be made public as the trial progressed.

Nevertheless, it was the second time in a week that a report of a CIA role in the Watergate affair has come to public attention.

Earlier this week, a Washington-based former private detective, Richard Bast, said former presidential aide Charles Colson suspected that the CIA planned both the Watergate break-in and the entry of Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office, and that President Nixon, to an extent, shared Colson's suspicions of the agency.

Bast said he interviewed Colson on two occasions before Colson was sentenced a week ago to a one-to-three-year jail term and a \$5,000 fine for attempting to influence the outcome of the Ellsberg trial by leaking derogatory information about Ellsberg to the press.

Colson, according to Bast, also said that Senate Watergate committee investigators were informed of the times and places of at least 300 other break-ins conducted by Martinez. Senate committee sources have denied they have such information.

Neither Barker nor Martinez has made any secret of their past work for the CIA, which the two have said was limited to operations against the regime of Fidel Castro in Cuba. Barker and Martinez

also were among five men arrested in the Watergate offices of the Democratic National Committee and were subsequently convicted of burglary.

Barker, a bespectacled undercover operative, was born in Havana and grew up both in the United States and Cuba. He was a captain in World War II in the Army Air Corps and was shot down over Germany where he was held prisoner for 17 months. In the late 1950s, he joined the Castro guerrilla movement but he became disillusioned and fled to Miami in 1959.

Thereafter, Barker worked against Castro and is said to have been one of the organizers of the Bay of Pigs invasion. From that time, until 1966, Barker worked for the CIA. Until his arrest at the Watergate, he ran a real estate agency in Miami.

Like Barker, Martinez originally worked for Castro but later turned against him. He, too, participated in the Bay of Pigs invasion, later worked for the CIA and joined Barker's real estate firm as a salesman.

According to an informed source, Barker and Martinez met during the planning and execution of the Bay of Pigs invasion and later worked for the CIA in operations directed against the Castro regime. Martinez, according to the source, was the captain of a boat used by the CIA to ferry supplies and personnel to Cuba and to take refugees back to Florida. Martinez, according to this source, participated in occasional raids against the Castro regime.

In these capacities, the

source said, Martinez engaged in the activities that Schultz mentioned in court yesterday—destruction of foreign property, possession and distribution of firearms, and falsification of income tax returns to hide the CIA as a source of income.

As for Barker, his entry into the Radio City Music Hall, the source said, was a CIA test to see if he could accomplish the mission successfully and retain details of what he had seen. The break-in site was the theater's "monitoring office", which contained closed-circuit television cameras. When Barker returned from his mission, he was debriefed to see if he had actually been in the room.

The source close to Barker said that Barker presumed the Radio City Music Hall break-in was a training operation because of the nature of the questioning he underwent upon his return.

The source said the illegal entry into the Miami home of a crew member of a boat used in forays against Cuba was ordered because the man was suspected of talking about the Cuban operations—"not keeping security." The other Miami break-in Schultz mentioned yesterday was also connected to the CIA's Cuban operations, the source said.

Barker, for one, has acknowledged his participation in anti-Castro activities, maintaining before the Senate Watergate Committee that he believed the Watergate break-in was ordered to determine if the Democrats were receiving money from the Castro regime.

C-6

Washington Star-News

Thursday, July 4, 1974

Fears of CIA On Blown Latin Cover Disclosed

Associated Press

A disgruntled Central Intelligence Agency operative in Latin America passed information to a Soviet KGB agent two years ago that the CIA says threatened its Western Hemisphere operations, an informed official source says.

The agency's concern of compromised operations were relayed to the Senate Watergate committee in closed session, according to a committee minority staff report issued earlier this week by Sen. Howard Baker, R-Tenn.

The source said last night that the CIA agent talked with a known agent of the KGB, or (Soviet) Committee of State Security, in 1972 and that the revelations he is believed to have made were considered very serious by the CIA. The KGB is in charge of Soviet internal security and foreign intelligence.

The source said the CIA agent "has not defected in the classical sense. He has not gone physically to the other side, but he has certainly quit." It could not be learned what information he gave the KGB.

THE CIA man was "despondent," "disgruntled" with the agency and "in his cups" at the time of his outpouring to the Soviets, the New York Times quoted sources as saying.

The agent now is believed to be writing a book about his knowledge of the CIA, the source said. The Baker report said the committee learned of the CIA's concern from the CIA's deputy director of plans.

Baker's report, devoted to possible CIA involvement in Watergate, said that the agency had described the affair for the committee but that description was deleted from his public report at agency request.

THE AFFAIR came to Baker's attention through what he called a mysterious reference in a CIA memo to a "WH flap." The memo was written July 10, 1972 by Robert Bennett of the Washington office of Robert Mullen & Co., an international public relations firm then under contract to provide cover for CIA agents abroad.

The Mullen firm hired convicted Watergate burglar E. Howard Hunt in 1970 after he left the CIA and before he went to work for the White House as a consultant.

According to the Baker report, Bennett's memo to his CIA case officer, Martin Lukasky, in 1972, reported detailed knowledge of the Watergate incident which had occurred the previous month.

Baker wrote that the Bennett memo "suggests that the agency might have to level with Mullen about the 'WH flap.'"

The CIA told Baker that reference was to a Western Hemisphere flap, but Baker wrote that Bennett thought the reference concerned a "White House flap."

THE AGENCY, however, was reluctant to tell Bennett that WH stood for "Western Hemisphere" because it did not want to let on that it knew of the contact between its agent and the Russians, the Times quoted one source as saying.

Former CIA director Richard Helms told a Senate committee last year that on June 23, 1972 White House chief of staff H. R. Haldeman asked CIA to keep the FBI from delving into some Mexican angles of the Watergate affair which might disclose CIA's operations there.

The source suggested that the disgruntled agent's book might trigger another court battle similar to that being waged by the agency over publication of the book "CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," by former intelligence officers Victor Marchetti and John Marks.

The agency brought a civil suit to gain 339 deletions from that book before publication. This effort was based on oaths of secrecy that the authors took.

HS/HC-950

A 10 Wednesday, July 3, 1974 THE WASHINGTON POST

Few Conclusions Given by Baker on CIA, Watergate Tie

By Laurence Stern

Washington Post Staff Writer

Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.) once likened the role of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Watergate scandal to "animals crashing around in the forest—you can hear them but you can't see them."

This Aesopian image still fits notwithstanding Baker's release yesterday of a 43-page report which is rich in insinuation, long on footnotes but short on substantive findings.

Baker drew the bottom line on his case involving the agency in a letter Monday to CIA Director William E. Colby. Neither the report, nor the decision to release it, said Baker, "should be

viewed as an indication that either the committee or I have reached conclusions in this area of investigation."

If anything, the Baker report strongly suggests that some CIA officials engaged in cover-up maneuvers designed to minimize the agency's exposure in the Watergate investigation.

Baker did unearth the case of Lee R. Pennington Jr., a \$250-a-month CIA contract employee who acknowledged that he witnessed the destruction of Watergate burglar James W. McCord Jr.'s records by his wife at their home after McCord's arrest in Watergate.

CIA's then-Director of Security Howard Osborn, no

longer with the agency, fed files on a different Pennington to the FBI when agents made inquiries about the incident — presumably to throw the bureau off the track. Columnist Jack Anderson reported the incident several months ago.

A central figure in the report is Washington public relations executive Robert F. Bennett of Robert Mullen & Co., which has provided "cover" for CIA operatives in two of its overseas offices.

The report claims that on July 10, 1972, Bennett reported "detailed knowledge of the Watergate incident to his CIA case officer." This conforms with Baker's gen-

eral suspicion that the agency knew far more about the circumstances of the break-in than it has ever admitted.

Bennett took issue with the report yesterday. "What I reported to the CIA at the time," he said, "was what

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I had already told the U.S. attorney. I didn't know anything about the break-in. I reported my speculation that Howard Hunt had been involved. I find it astonishing to see this characterized as 'detailed knowledge'."

Sprinkled through one portion of the report are references to Howard Hughes, Clifford Irving, Dita Beard and the Chappaquiddick in-

vestigation, all in connection with Bennett's various activities.

The CIA, in commenting on these allusions, said: "The testimony of agency witnesses indicates that the agency had not interest or involvement in any of the aforementioned activities of Mr. Bennett and no evidence to the contrary has been made available to the agency."

The theory of CIA involvement in the Watergate case stems from President Nixon who said on May 22, 1973, that within a few days of the Watergate arrests "I was advised that there was a possibility of CIA involvement in some way."

Acting on this suspicion he

issued instructions, shortly after the arrest of the burglary team, which delayed for more than two weeks the FBI's investigation of the laundering of Nixon re-election funds through a Mexican bank account. The President publicly acknowledged that his fears of exposure of covert CIA operations were, after all, unfounded.

Baker, however, has been pressing for months after evidence that the CIA was implicated in, or had advance knowledge of, the Watergate break-in and bugging. Critical colleagues on the Senate Watergate committee, of which Baker was co-chairman, have charged his objective was to divert attention from the role of top White House officials in approving the

break-in and the elaborate and costly cover-up campaign which ensued.

One of the byproducts of the Baker report, however, was to impugn the national security rationale by which White House officials have repeatedly justified the burglary of the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist, Dr. Lewis Fielding.

Quoting from closed session testimony by CIA psychiatric advisers, the report says E. Howard Hunt Jr. and G. Gordon Liddy Jr. of the White House "plumbers" unit said they wanted to "try Ellsberg in public" and render him "the object of pity as a broken man."

This testimony tends to support the view that Ellsberg was a political rather

than a national security target of the White House.

The strongest indication that the CIA has emerged from the Baker inquiry without serious bruises was given yesterday by CIA Director Colby.

In a June 28 letter to Baker, Colby warned that if the report were made public in the form it was then presented to him, "I may feel it necessary to take an appropriate public position to assure that the conclusions from my investigation and the results of other investigations are also known."

But after the report was released yesterday Colby said so dire a step as open confrontation with a member of the Senate would be unnecessary.

HS/HC-950

Report Critical Of CIA

Baker Hints Agency Knew Of Break-in

By Lawrence Meyer
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency may have known in advance of plans for break-ins at the offices of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist and the Democratic National Committee's Watergate headquarters, a report released yesterday by Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.) suggests.

Baker's report, accompanied by CIA comments and denials, provides a rare, if incomplete, glimpse into the activities of the CIA that are, by design, normally secret.

Among other things, the report describes how the CIA used a Washington public relations firm as a cover for agents operating abroad, asserts that the CIA destroyed its own records in direct conflict with a Senate request to keep them intact, asserts that a CIA operative may have been a "domestic agent" in violation of the agency's charter and recounts how one CIA employee fought within the agency against withholding information from the Senate committee and other congressional committees.

The report recites several instances in which it says CIA personnel whom the committee staff sought to interview were not made available by the CIA. In addition, the report lists several other instances in which it says the CIA either ignored, resisted or refused requests for information and documents by the committee.

Although the report raises "questions" about the involvement of the CIA in the Watergate and Ellsberg break-ins, Baker said in a letter to present CIA Director William E. Colby that was also released yesterday, "Neither the select committee's decision to make this report a part of our public record nor the contents of the report should be viewed as any indication that either the committee or I have reached conclusions in this area of investigation."

The report by Baker, vice chairman of the Senate select Watergate committee, is the long-awaited product of several months of investigation

conducted primarily by the Republican minority staff of the Senate Watergate committee.

Although the report is implicitly critical of the CIA, it does not radically alter what is already known about the general outlines of the planning and implementation of the Ellsberg and Watergate break-ins. Remarks by the CIA accompanying the 43-page report reject the suggestion that the agency knew in advance about either of the two burglaries.

The CIA also disagrees with a number of allegations in the report that it has not made information available to the committee. In addition, the report contains numerous deletions of names and descriptions, made at the request of the CIA on the grounds of national security.

One of the central figures who is named in the report is convicted Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr., a former CIA agent who continued to seek assistance from the CIA even after he left the agency in 1970.

In three of the six areas that the report discusses, Hunt emerges as a principal actor. These areas include the activities of Robert R. Mullen and Co., a Washington public relations firm; the providing of technical services by the CIA that Hunt used for the Ellsberg break-in, and the activities of Watergate conspirator Eugenio Martinez, who was recruited by Hunt for the Ellsberg and Watergate break-ins.

the CIA in that connection are already known.

At the request of the White House and with the permission of CIA Director Richard M. Helms, Hunt was supplied with a wig, voice alteration devices, fake glasses, falsified identification, a miniature camera and other gear.

The report recalls that before the Ellsberg break-in, the CIA developed photographs for Hunt that he had made outside the Beverly Hills, Calif., offices of Dr. Lewis Fielding, Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

"Not only was the film developed, however, but it was reviewed by CIA supervisory officials before it was returned to Hunt," the report states. "One CIA official who reviewed the film admitted that he found the photographs 'intriguing' and recognized them to be of 'Southern California.' He then ordered one of the photographs blown up. The blowup revealed Dr. Fielding's name in the parking lot next to his office. Another CIA official has testified that he speculated that they were 'casing' photographs."

According to the report, "recent testimony" showed that the CIA official who reviewed the photographs "immediately" reported their contents to Deputy CIA Director Robert Cushman and his assistant. The report says Cushman and his assistant denied ever having been told of the photographs by anyone.

The report asserts, and the CIA denies, that it was only when these photographs were developed that assistance to Hunt by the agency was terminated. According to the CIA, "The decision to cut off support to Hunt was made in the face of escalating demands and was not based upon the development of the photographs."

The report also challenges "previous public CIA testimony" that claimed that the CIA had no contact with Hunt at all after Aug. 31, 1971. The Ellsberg break-in occurred Sept. 3, 1971.

According to the report, "recent testimony and secret documents indicate that Hunt had extensive contact with the CIA after" Aug. 31, 1971, that Hunt played a "large role" in the development of a logical profile of Ellsberg that was completed in November,

In introducing the section on Hunt and his receipt of technical support from the CIA in connection with the Ellsberg break-in, the report states, "In light of the facts and circumstances developed through the documents and conflicting testimony of CIA personnel adduced by this committee... the question arises as to whether the CIA had advance knowledge of the Fielding (Ellsberg's psychiatrist) break-in."

The report asserts that the committee gathered "a wealth of conflicting testimony among CIA officials" when it investigated the Ellsberg break-in.

Much of what the report cites about the Ellsberg break-in and Hunt's approaches to

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periors that Hunt was in Miami in early 1972. The response from the CIA to Martinez's superiors, according to the report, was that Hunt was involved in domestic White House business and to "cool it."

Attempts to examine some CIA reports concerning Martinez by the committee have been frustrated by the CIA, the report asserts.

"Because of Hunt's close relationship with Martinez at a time when Martinez was a paid CIA operative, the basic question arises as to whether the CIA was aware of Hunt's activities early in 1972 when he was recruiting Cubans to assist in the Watergate break-in," the report states.

In response, the CIA asserts, "There is no evidence within CIA that the agency possessed any knowledge of Hunt's recruitment of individuals to assist in the Watergate or any other break-in."

The report also discusses the destruction of records by the CIA about one week after the agency received a letter from Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) in January, 1973, asking that "evidentiary materials" be retained.

Helms, the report asserts, ordered that tapes of conversations held within offices at CIA headquarters be destroyed. In addition, the report states, "on Helms' instruction, his secretary destroyed his transcriptions of both telephone and room conversations" that may have included conversations with President Nixon, White House chief of staff H.R. (Bob) Haldeman, top Presidential domestic adviser John D. Ehrlichman and other White House officials.

Helms and his secretary have testified that the conversations did not pertain to Watergate, the report states, adding, "Unfortunately, any means of corroboration is no longer available."

summaries of agency logs of conversations held within the CIA, but "it is impossible to determine who was taped in many of the room conversations. In this regard, even the CIA's analysis does not provide this vital information. There are several references to a 'Mr. X.' The CIA has not produced the actual logs for our examination. However, we were informed that there are 'gaps' in the logs."

The Pennington information may have been "extremely sensitive" for two reasons, the report states—first, because the CIA misled the FBI when it earlier tried to investigate Pennington by diverting the FBI to another man named Pennington; and second because Pennington may have been a "domestic agent," operating in the United States in violation of the CIA charter, which generally limits the agency to intelligence activities abroad.

The report states that an unnamed CIA personnel officer became concerned that the CIA was trying to withhold information about Pennington from the Senate Watergate committee. The report says this personnel officer testified in closed session before the committee that he told a superior, "Up to this time we have never removed, tampered with, obliterated, destroyed or done anything to any Watergate documents, and we can't be caught in that kind of bind now. We will not do it."

The report also discusses
2 The CIA-RDP84-00499R00
nnett, president of Robert R.

Mullen and Co. was used as a "front" for CIA agents overseas. Bennett, according to the report, kept his CIA contact informed of his efforts to give information to interested parties in an effort to avoid involving the Mullen firm in news stories and legal actions, stemming from the Watergate break-in.


Williams said yesterday that he never received any information directly from Bennett and was not aware that information received from Taylor—which Bennett said was "useless"—had come from Bennett.

Bennett confirmed that he had never met Williams. "The description of what I did with regard to Williams is not an accurate characterization," Bennett said in a telephone interview yesterday, "but I simply don't know where to start with regard to this report."

Underground news = Rolling Stone, June 1974

MORE FUNDS IS DISCLOSED IS

The CIA Went Quite Go Public



Jim Harter

For the last 20 years, the CIA has been using ostensibly private organizations to carry out personality studies of potential and actual espionage agents, according to several psychologists who have been directly involved. John W. Gittinger acknowledges that his own Washington-based firm, Psychological Assessment Associates, Inc., is almost totally dependent on CIA contracts; he describes the work as "indirect assessment — how you evaluate people by watching them from a distance."

At first, Gittinger talked relatively freely in a short telephone interview, emphasizing that none of the studies have been targeted against American citizens. But two days later when a reporter came to his Connecticut Avenue offices at his invitation, he said the CIA had forbidden him to discuss Psychological Assessment's relationship with that agency. "I was given no explanation," said an obviously disturbed Gittinger. "I'm very proud of my professional work and I had looked forward to being able to

explain it."

Gittinger is quite disturbed that publication of his connection with the CIA might damage his professional reputation. "Are we tarred by a brush because we worked for the CIA?" he asks. "I'm proud of it." He sees no ethical problems in "looking for people's weaknesses," if it helps the CIA obtain valuable information. He adds that for a long time, most Americans thought this was a useful process.

Now, at 56 years old, after nearly 25 years of working for and with the CIA, Gittinger is faced with a switch in the rules: Journalists are now willing, and even eager, to write about matters that the John Gittingers of America feel affect the "national security." And as much as he would like to justify his work, given these circumstances, the CIA insists that he keep silent.

Yet in 1974, with memories still fresh of abuses carried out in the name of "national security," the idea of the CIA carrying out secret psychological re-

search into human behavior patterns is repugnant to many people. It smacks of 1984, even if, as Gittinger firmly maintains, no assessments are made of American subjects. Although Gittinger asserts that he and his firm were not involved in any way, only three years ago CIA psychiatrists used many of the same techniques to prepare a psychiatric profile on Daniel Ellsberg, an American citizen.

For its part, the CIA's official position is that "we don't have anything to say about alleged or real relationships with outside groups." Nevertheless, it is possible to piece together the story from Gittinger's initial comments and from statements by other sources familiar with the CIA-sponsored research.

The CIA apparently first became involved in funding outside psychological research during the early Fifties when its personnel were instrumental in setting up a New York foundation called the Human Ecology Fund. According to a source who worked there, the Fund was virtually a CIA "proprietary," i.e., a supposedly private organization which is, in reality, controlled by the CIA. This same source recalls that while the Fund received some money from universities and legitimate foundations, most of its operating capital flowed in through the same kind of dummy foundations that served as CIA funding conduits for the National Student Association and similar groups (as exposed by *Ramparts* magazine in 1967).

The Human Ecology Fund's main purpose was to promote academic research into human behavior. Some of this research was of no interest to the CIA, but was, from the agency's point of view, worthwhile because it provided the fund with a "cover." What most interested the agency was behavior that could tip off the CIA that a foreigner might be induced

into becoming a spy; behavior that could show that an already recruited agent was not telling the truth; or behavior that might be exploited in making sure that a spy stayed under firm CIA control.

The Fund also provided a "legitimate basis to approach anyone in the academic community anywhere in the world," said two former colleagues. Also, that while recipients of Fund grants were never asked to do anything but legitimate psychological research, American professors were sometimes not informed (and foreigners never were) that they were working with CIA funds.

In 1960, for example, Dr. Herbert Kelman of Harvard University received a Human Ecology grant of \$1000 to help publish a book he was editing called *International Behavior*. He did not learn until seven years later -- and then by accident -- that the money had come from a CIA-supported group. Among those who never found out that their work was funded by the CIA were European scientists who did extensive studies on alcohol. "We financed them quite legitimately the way any foundation would," states a former employee.

Even those American psychologists, who were -- as intelligence professionals say -- "witting" to the CIA's involvement, found it a "comfort-producing arrangement" to deal with a foundation instead of the agency itself, one source said. He also recalls that Fund psychologists sometimes traveled overseas to make secret psychological assessments of foreign leaders, accompanied by CIA operatives who used the Human Ecology Fund as a cover.

The Human Ecology Fund was disbanded in the mid-Sixties. Several of its former employees -- including John Gittinger -- had already started to work for Psychological Assessment Associates, the consulting firm that Gittinger and two other ex-CIA psychologists had founded in 1957. Gittinger denies that the company was started at the agency's request or that it is under CIA control, although he admits that most of its business comes from agency contracts. Unlike the Human Ecology Fund, Psychological Assessment is a profit-making corporation, and it has tried -- not too successfully in recent years -- to sell its services to private companies, especially those with overseas operations.

Working under contract to the CIA's Clandestine Services, the firm has mainly applied the Gittinger-invented Personality Assessment System to espionage work. Gittinger's work is based on his own largely intuitive theory of human personality, namely that "most individual behavior may be regarded as an attempt on the part of the person to minimize the significance of his weaknesses." He has written that his system "makes possible the assessment of fundamental discrepancies between the surface personality and the underlying personality structure -- discrepancies that produce tension, conflict and anxiety." While few in the psychological community accept Gittinger's premises or even are familiar with his work, the CIA has obviously been impressed with its possibilities for evaluating the personalities of foreigners and identifying their strengths and weaknesses.

Gittinger states that his company has done extensive research for the CIA to develop psychological tests free of cultural biases. This has, of course, necessitated work with foreign control groups who apparently had no knowledge that they were being tested for the benefit of the CIA. Gittinger admits that "we didn't get far in terms of culture-free tests" but states that he and his associates have been more successful in developing a system to train people (CIA field operatives) in making useful observations about

foreigners' behavior.

Gittinger believes that he has come up with a "formula" that can turn seemingly superficial observations into relatively accurate assessments of personality and motivation. While he would not explain what data are plugged into his "formula," another source familiar with his work says that the trick is for an observer to note variables -- how a person knots his tie, combs his hair and ties his shoelaces -- that somehow correlate with other nonobservable traits like honesty and dependability. Gittinger says the system can be used to give a "pretty good guess" about a person's vulnerabilities and to answer questions like, "What will someone do if he gets drunk?" or "Is he more interested in women than money?"

At a time when U.S. satellites and other electronic spying devices collect virtually all the necessary military intelligence on the Soviet Union and China (the only countries that even potentially pose a threat to the United States), secret studies of European alcoholics and Asian schizophrenics seem at best anachronistic vestiges of the Cold War. It is difficult to conceive how the "national security" would be affected if word got out that certain behavior traits show a person is lying or has a weakness for women. If the work has any validity, it should be exposed to outside scrutiny.

Even today, when Gittinger asserts that all the firm's researchers are aware of Psychological Assessment's CIA ties, there still is an unwarranted and unneeded degree of deception by not publicly stating that the work is for the CIA, and not informing everyone who comes in contact with the firm of that fact. There is just no longer any reason why an agency that is supposed to be primarily concerned with coordinating foreign intelligence should subsidize companies like Psychological Associates within the United States or use such a company with outwardly legitimate ties to the academic community to provide cover for CIA work overseas.

The writer is a Washington-based freelancer and co-author with Victor Marchetti of 'The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence' (Knopf, 1974).

THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, July 8, 1974 A 3

Peace Promises Oversold, Ex-Intelligence Official Says

By Marilyn Berger

Washington Post Staff Writer

In the aftermath of the Moscow summit, a leading analyst of Soviet affairs has expressed concern that the promise of "a generation of peace" is being oversold to the American people as an accomplishment rather than a hope.

The Soviet Union, meanwhile, maintains its goals of expanding its economic and political power in the world, he said.

The Soviets, according to Ray S. Cline, the former director of intelligence and research at the State Department, "use the circus and theater of summitry in their own world strategy of peaceful coexistence. Richard Nixon appears to be using it to make domestic political gains.

"The administration is confusing the American people because it is talking about the prolonged reduction of international tension and a generation of peace. In the American view this means an absence of conflict, but in the Soviet view it means only no nuclear war while the 'class struggle' continues economically and politically around the world."

The Soviet Union, Cline said, believes that the "correlation of forces" in the world—especially the weakening of the United States as a result of its internal economic and political problems—will inevitably lead to the victory of Soviet power.

Cline was the chief of the analytical staffs on the Soviet Union and China in the Central Intelligence Agency and later deputy director of the CIA before he went to the State Department.

He is now director of studies at the Georgetown University Center for Strategic Studies.

Cline said the experts in government are well aware of what is happening and are reporting fully on the Soviet policy and attitudes. Numerous outstanding Sovietologists have been making the same points in scholarly journals, books and congressional testimony.

"But," Cline said, "I think the cautionary aspects of this experiment in the diplomatic approach toward the Soviet Union—and toward China—may have been submerged in the need for domestic political triumph."

These were strong words coming from Cline, who has refused to let himself be quoted on government policy since he resigned from the State Department nine months ago. At that time it was clear that he was concerned that the problems of Watergate were interfering in the orderly process of conducting foreign policy.

Cline admitted that there was some irony in the fact that Mr. Nixon was now using cooperation with the Soviets when he had built his early political career in the 1940s and 1950s on Cold War rhetoric and virulent anti-communism.

Summit conferences like the one just completed, Cline said, tend to create an atmosphere of improved relations, but they also create the illusion that the Soviet Union and the United States share the same goals of seeking détente.

Actually, Cline said, what the Soviet Union, in an effort

to obtain Western technology and consumer goods, is seeking, is peaceful coexistence—in Moscow's lexicon the avoidance of war, the support of world revolutionary forces, the shrinking of capitalist resources and the "class struggle."

"Détente," according to Cline, "is defined by most Americans as peace, stability, international cooperation, tolerance and convergence."

"One of the things that bothers me," he said, "is that we've got ourselves pretty well convinced that basic formulations of national purpose don't mean anything. Obviously ideolog-

"I think the cautionary aspects of this experiment in the diplomatic approach toward the Soviet Union . . . may have been submerged in the need for domestic political triumph."

ical statements are not simple blueprints for future action, but they mean something."

He said, "This problem has been around a long time. I believe we tend to ignore ideology completely, just as we refused to believe what Hitler said about Germany in the 1930s."

Cline made his rather pessimistic remarks during a lengthy interview in his office in the quiet of a fourth of July weekend.

The paradox, he said, "is that if détente were really to succeed in our sense of the world, of opening meaningful contacts inside Soviet society, the Soviet internal control system would feel so threatened it would destroy those contacts. Therefore our concept of détente can continue only so long as it doesn't succeed."

President Nixon's description of a web of relationships drawing the Soviet Union into a détente that is irreversible, in Cline's view, is thus probably not in the cards.

"The kind of peaceful coexistence and détente which we do in fact have, a strong mutual interest in avoiding nuclear war, was established not by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger but by Jack Kennedy as a result of the education in international affairs he gave Nikita Khrushchev during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962," Cline said.

The basic outlines of present Soviet strategy, Cline said, was decided at that time. A very high Soviet leader came to the United States shortly after that crisis and told an American official that there would never again be a conflict on those unequal terms. The Soviet leaders decided then to have no more missile gaps, on land or sea. It was then that Moscow started investing in its big missile build-up toward a parity of forces with the United States.

"What we've had since, but without the hoopla surrounding détente," Cline said, "is the successful deterrence of nuclear war. Everyone has struggled since then on how to translate this into international cooperation and understanding—our concept of détente as a process of continued, bitter struggle based on class and the need to support world

revolutionary forces wherever they are."

At this point Cline pulled out a recent article from the influential Soviet journal *Problems of Peace and Socialism* to make his point. It said: "Peaceful coexistence is a specific international form of class confrontation, linked to the peoples' struggle not only for peace but also for the revolutionary transformation of society, to the strengthening of the socialist community and to mass actions against imperialism."

It is Cline's view that the American people must be educated about the Soviet perception of what is happening. Cline quoted from a recent monograph by for-

mer U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Foy Kohler and others.

He noted that after the 1972 Moscow summit meeting Soviet spokesmen said the Soviet Union does not view the U.S. policy of détente as reflecting a change of heart but as a policy forced upon it by what the Soviets call "the social, economic and ultimately, military power of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries."

The quote continues: "The standard Soviet line has been, and continues to be, that 'the real alignment of forces in the world arena has shifted against the United States.'"

Exaggerated hopes from summitry, Cline said, "create an illusion that tends to divide and confuse and produce apathy, not only at home but among our allies."

In Europe, he said, there is "fear that a new Soviet-American relationship will lead to a diminution of the U.S. commitment to NATO, that there will be a withdrawal of U.S. forces and a lessening of economic cooperation, and hence increasing pressure on them to enter into long-term understandings with the Soviet Union which, in time, would neutralize them politically and strategically and, even sooner, provide opportunities for united front governments, getting Communist parties into power through the 'parliamentary road to socialism.'"

Cline noted that this almost happened in France and could very likely occur in Italy within the year.

Thus the Soviet Union, Cline said, is using the atmospherics of summitry for its own ends. "Just as the Chinese saw the Peking summit of 1972 in the same terms as a thousand years ago they saw the arrival of delegations from tributary states to bear gifts to the emperor—first kowtowing nine times—the Russians, with a different psychology, out of their sense of insecurity, take pride that Nixon was coming to seek a modus vivendi with their now powerful state—and that when problems build up in the Middle East they can summon Soviet Communist Party chief Leonid I. Brezhnev is using summitry for his own

purposes. He has, Cline said, "identified himself with peaceful coexistence of a kind which will permit the gradual growth of what he calls the socialist world, without serious danger of war with the United States, the only adversary the Russians fear."

Cline's concern is, first of all, that the American people be made aware of what is going on. "There is a need for what these days we call 'consciousness raising,'" he said.

They should be urged, he said, "to focus on the economic and political conflict which continues, and not be misled by diplomatic speculations."

The Soviets, he stressed, "have shown no interest in creating any web of relationships because they fear the penetration of Soviet society by hostile Western ideology." Instead, he said, they point to this desire for a "web of relationships" as demonstrating American weakness.

Cline's prescription for dealing with the Soviets entails first of all understanding what we are about. The United States, he said, should remain strong militarily, preserving its deterrent "whatever it costs."

It should trade with the Soviet Union, but on non-concessional terms. He has no objection to granting most-favored-nation status, which would only put the Soviets on a par with other nations. But he thinks credits should be limited only to those deals that would be economically beneficial to the United States.

"We should take care not to export our most advanced technology but to trade the products of that technology for Soviet raw materials," Cline said.

Finally, "we should make no large, long-term investments in capital unless there is no other opportunity for the development of those same resources," he said. This would mean that we should avoid investments in developing things such as Siberian oil and natural gas because of the uncertainties of long-term access to the products.

"We should offer concessions in limited fields," Cline said, "if and when, through quiet diplomacy, we can make progress in opening Soviet society to foreign contacts, which is, after all, what we have advertised détente diplomacy is all about."

Washington Star-News

Saturday, June 29, 1974

A-5

Hunt Details Break-in Plot

E. Howard Hunt Jr. gave a detailed, first-person account yesterday of how White House officials sat in a basement office at the Executive Mansion in 1971 and coolly plotted a burglary designed to discredit one of President Nixon's political opponents.

Hunt, already convicted in the original Watergate case, testified under a grant of immunity from further prosecution that the burglary was planned with CIA assistance obtained by former presidential assistant John D. Ehrlichman.

Although Hunt's testimony did not implicate Ehrlichman in a crime — and, according to one defense attorney, will not — the day began with the Watergate special prosecutor's office vowing to prove Ehrlichman guilty of conspiracy, lying to the FBI and three counts of perjury.

Ehrlichman and his co-defendants — G. Gordon Liddy, Bernard L. Barker and Eugenio R. Martinez — are under indictment on charges arising from the 1971 burglary of the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

Hunt and four other men have been named as unindicted coconspirators in the case.

HUNT'S ICY RESERVE broke down only occasionally, as when U.S. District Judge Gerhard A. Gesell interrupted to ask pointed questions, and Hunt appeared extremely uncomfortable when forced to read a memorandum he had written in which he discussed a

plan to "destroy" Daniel Ellsberg.

Under questioning by Asst. Special Prosecutor Charles Breyer, he was "tentatively" hired on July 6, 1971 by Charles W. Colson. Colson called him back the following day because "as he said it, he wanted to run me past John Ehrlichman." The three men met for several minutes, he said, an Colson introduced Hunt as the man "of whom we've been speaking . . . about matters we've been discussing."

One of those "matters," a response to a question by Gesell indicated, was an investigation Ehrlichman and Colson ordered into the Chappaquiddick accident of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, D-Mass. However, Hunt continued, he was soon assigned to an already started investigation of Ellsberg.

This project, Hunt said Colson told him, "would have to be carried out on a non-traceable basis; that is, my connection with the White House was not to be known."

Hunt said he told Colson he would need certain items for disguise, and asked if either the Secret Service or FBI could help. Colson told him the project was "too sensitive," he said, and suggested that Hunt contact some of his old CIA compatriots on a "man-to-man" basis.

HUNT SAID he countered that this would be impossible, but told Colson "that calls from the White House to the Central Intelligence Agency were almost immediately acted upon."

When he met with Gen. Robert Cushman, then deputy director of the CIA, on July 22, he said, he learned that on July 7, the day of his meeting with Ehrlichman, Ehrlichman had personally called Cushman to request the assistance.

With his false identification, a wig and other CIA items in hand, Hunt said, he was put in touch with the three men with whom he would work on the unit later known as the "plumbers": Egil Krogh Jr., Ehrlichman's chief assistant; David R. Young, and Liddy.

Hunt, Krogh, Young, Colson and Felipe DeDiego are on the unindicted coconspirator list.

Around the time he joined the White House staff, Hunt said, he and Colson exchanged concern that the indictment charging Ellsberg and an associate after they gave the Pentagon Papers to the press that spring was "loosely drawn" and "faulty."

They were afraid that Ellsberg might be acquitted and be "martyrized," he said, and he and Colson agreed that that would be "unfortunate."

He recounted how Ellsberg's psychiatrist, Dr. Lewis J. Fielding — who preceded Hunt to the stand yesterday — had refused to provide the FBI with information about Ellsberg. Therefore, Hunt said, he arranged for the CIA to do a psychiatric "profile" on Ellsberg.

BUT THE PROFILE was "superficial," he said, and

he arranged for a CIA psychiatrist, Dr. Bernard Malloy, to meet with the plumbers. He told Malloy, he said, that he wanted an adequate job done.

Asked by Gesell if he had mentioned the reason for the profile, Hunt reluctantly said he had suggested to Malloy that "if he (Ellsberg) couldn't be tried in court, it would be a fine idea to try him in the press." Malloy, Hunt testified, said he would have to pass the request on to two of his superiors.

At this point, in early August, Hunt said, the idea of the burglary came to him. Because of Fielding's refusal to cooperate, and because of the inadequate CIA profile, "it seemed to me, at least, that a bag job was in order."

Hunt said the original idea was for him and Liddy to carry out the burglary alone, but Krogh and Young vetoed the idea. "Because of our connection with the White House, a plausible denial would have to be maintained" if the burglars were caught, he said.

He therefore called upon "old and close friends in the Miami area . . . who might be called upon to perform a patriotic service."

BARKER, he said, was given reason to believe that "this was a White House operation."

The first job, Hunt continued, was to do a "vulnerability and feasibility study" of Fielding's office — in other words, case the joint.

Barry Kalb

Ellsberg Break-In Called 'Arrogant'

The Ellsberg break-in began as a carefully nurtured operation supported by the CIA and ended as a crude, unsuccessful burglary, according to testimony offered to the jury in the plumbers trial.

Among the witnesses in the first day of testimony Friday were Dr. Lewis Fielding — Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist and the victim of the illegal search — and one of its principal planners, E. Howard Hunt Jr.

In his opening statement, Assistant Special Watergate Prosecutor William H. Merrill said the Sept. 3, 1971, break-in "was the willfully arrogant act of men who took the law into their own hands because they thought they were above the law."

IN FLAT unemotional terms, the prosecutor said the four defendants were guilty of a crime "against one of our most cherished rights," the right to be free from an unlawful search.

The four defendants are John D. Ehrlichman, until last spring among the closest of President Nixon's inner circle; and convicted Watergate conspirators G. Gordon Liddy, Bernard L. Baker and Eugenio R. Mar-

tinez. They are accused of violating Fielding's rights.

A lawyer for Ehrlichman told the jury his client never approved anything illegal. A lawyer for Liddy said the onetime FBI agent believed he acted with the authority of the President. An attorney for Martinez and Barker said the break-in was nothing more than an extension of more than 10 years of clandestine work for the CIA in the minds of his clients.

Merrill told the jury of six men and six women that as late as three or four days before the break-in at Fielding's office, Ehrlichman discussed plans for the operation by phone with two of the White House plumbers, David Young and Egil Krogh Jr.

HE SAID the government will offer testimony showing that Ehrlichman, after being assured the operation could not be traced to the White House, said, "Okay, let me know what they find there."

on the Fielding break-in and asked Young if he knew about the plot in advance. Young, Merrill said, replied, "Well yes, I knew of it in advance and so did you . . . and there are

The prosecutor said further that one March 27, 1973, Ehrlichman asked Young to bring him the files memos in the files that show this."

Later, Merrill declared, Ehrlichman told Young that he had removed those documents from the files. Merrill said Young will testify about his meetings with Ehrlichman and that copies of the documents, which Young made without Ehrlichman's knowledge, will be introduced at the trial.

Henry H. Jones, one of Ehrlichman's attorneys, countered that Young had framed Ehrlichman "to save his own neck." He said the defense would show that Young somehow had altered the documents to implicate Ehrlichman.

"Nothing in his life would ever suggest that he (Ehrlichman) would do anything to violate the law, the spirit or the letter of the Constitution," Jones said. "He would not trample on anyone's rights."

LIDDY'S attorney, Peter L. Maroulis, defended his clients as "an authorized officer of the president of the United States" who "merely took his orders from others."

"Approval for this project came through the lips of Young and Krogh," Maroulis said. "They provided him with cash funds. He didn't know where the money came from."

Attorney Daniel E. Schultz said Barker and Martinez were told that Ellsberg was a traitor and the operation was a legitimate operation. The evidence, Schultz said, will

show that Barker and Martinez took part in the burglary "solely for the purpose of intelligence gathering relating to this purported traitor."

Schultz told the court that the two Cuban-American defendants participated in a series of illegal activities for the Central Intelligence Agency prior to the Fielding office break-in. One, he said, was a "penetration" of the Radio City Music Hall in New York City which Schultz said was carried out as CIA test to see if Barker could accomplish such a mission successfully.

HUNT TESTIFIED he was hired July 7, 1971, on the recommendation of former White House Special Counsel Charles W. Colson and the approval of Ehrlichman. Merrill said Ehrlichman was "keenly aware and interested" in Hunt's 21 years as a covert CIA agent.

Within a few weeks, Hunt said, he had joined the White House plumbers, a White House investigative unit set up to close leaks of national security information to the new media.

Hunt said a decision was made to obtain psychological information about Ellsberg, in part because of White House fears that he would become a national martyr.

Ellsberg, who leaked the Pentagon papers study of the Vietnam war to the press, was at the time the subject of federal prosecution.

Washington Star-News

Sunday, June 30, 1974

HS/HC-950

WASHINGTON STAR

Friday 28 June 74

Carl T. Rowan:

'Hook the Spooks' Theory

Once again, in banner headlines, we are slapped with the theory that the Watergate burglary and the Ellsberg break-in were part of a plot conceived and executed by the cloak-and-dagger boys of the Central Intelligence Agency.

This time we get a really wild fourth-hand version where reporters are told by a former private eye, Richard L. Bast, who allegedly was told by former White House aide Charles Colson, that President Nixon felt the CIA was even scheming to "get something" on the White House.

This "hook the spooks" theorizing may be swallowed whole by some of those Americans who believe that the CIA is a government unto itself, with far-flung agents who murder unfriendly politicians, organize coups, rig foreign elections and topple democratic regimes in favor of dictatorships — all without the President, the secretary of State or other American officials either approving or knowing anything about it.

The CIA has engaged in all the activities mentioned above, but you can wager that the overall CIA actions had the sanction of whomever was President — or of top officials giving approval in the President's behalf.

LOOKING AT ALL the Watergate evidence, I became convinced months ago that the CIA was more deeply involved than the public or the Congress knew. In my column of May 11, 1973, I told of a conversation in which former CIA Director Richard Helms casually mentioned to me that minutes after the burglars were seized inside the Watergate someone at CIA awakened him to tell him of the arrests.

I raised the question of why anyone at CIA would awaken the director in the wee hours just to inform of what at the time seemed to be "a third-rate burglary" — unless the caller knew of potential serious embarrassment to CIA.

As far as I can determine, none of the investigating units has bothered to ask Helms who telephoned him. Or why anyone would feel compelled to awaken the CIA director because of that burglary.

Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1

the Watergate and Ellsberg burglaries had previously been involved in numerous CIA ventures. We know that the CIA was still providing disguises and other help to E. Howard Hunt, Jr., a leader of the Watergate burglary and accused of being a principal in the Ellsberg break-in. But we have testimony that CIA cooperation was requested by the White House, and this seems to shoot holes in the theory that the CIA was out to subvert the President and make the White House bend to its will.

COLSON HAS denied telling Bast that President Nixon thought of firing current CIA Director William E. Colby because of the President's suspicion that CIA was up to some dirt in the Watergate and Ellsberg matters.

It wouldn't have made sense anyhow. Helms, not Colby, was CIA boss at the time of, and long after, the Watergate burglary.

During four and a half years in government I got to know Richard Helms pretty well. I found him to be a professional whose integrity I never saw cause to question.

I can conceive of Helms agreeing, under pressure from the White House, to cooperate with Hunt and his crew, or with the White House plumbers, out of a belief that they really might be uncovering information vital to national security. I can't believe that Helms would knowingly make CIA part of burglaries designed simply to serve the partisan political interest of the party in power.

I find it beyond either acceptance or speculation that Helms would use the CIA, or let it be used, to undermine the President and his White House staff.

Either Colson got suckered by the President, or Bast got suckered by Colson, or the press got taken in by all of them.

There is reason to ask a lot more questions about the CIA's involvement, for it appears that the CIA was used and abused in a shocking way. But there is no evidence of any substance that the whole dirty business was a CIA plot, with Richard Nixon targeted as a major victim.

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CIA Is Accused Of Gagging Firm

Associated Press

The Central Intelligence Agency requested last year that a public relations firm which had employed one of the original Watergate conspirators not disclose that it provided cover for CIA agents abroad, according to an informed official source.

On Feb. 28, 1973, then-CIA director James R. Schlesinger met with a representative of Robert R. Mullen & Co., an international public relations firm, the source said last night.

"Schlesinger told them to keep their mouths shut about their relation with the CIA, because several people overseas as Mullen representatives were CIA people," the source said.

THE MULLEN firm employed E. Howard Hunt Jr., the convicted Watergate break-in conspirator, after he left the CIA and at least parttime while he was a member of the White House special investigations — or plumbers — unit.

Earlier this week, private investigator Richard L. Bast said that former White House special counsel Charles W. Colson had told him that the Mullen firm was a CIA front and that the Mullen firm was directed to lie if necessary in denying any CIA association.

Meanwhile, ABC News reported last night that documents in possession of the Senate Watergate committee show that Schlesinger

agency files turned over to the Mullen firm for use in planting cover stories.

ABC said the Mullen firm planted an erroneous story in the March 5 edition of Newsweek magazine asserting that Colson was in charge of political dirty tricks during the 1972 presidential campaign. It was learned that the CIA was prepared to deny having had any hand in the Newsweek story.

THE CIA's purpose in planting stories, ABC said, was to divert newsmen from discovery of its relationship to the Mullen firm and to a law firm, which ABC also said was under contract to provide cover for CIA agents.

A major concern was that newsmen would trace CIA connection to Paul L. O'Brien, a counsel to the Committee for the Re-election of the President, ABC said.

WASHINGTON STAR

Friday 28 Jun 74

The Washington Post

BOOK

Sunday - 23 June 1974

The Joy of Snooping

THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE. By Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks. Knopf. 398 pp. \$8.95

By LAURENCE STERN

THERE WAS A PERIOD last year when the timing seemed right, when Congress finally had political grounds to conduct that long-overdue examination of the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency.

High-ranking CIA officials were trooping up to Capitol Hill in frequency and numbers approaching the level of high school seniors at Easter recess. Agency men who not long ago would have rather swallowed the pill than be caught within sight of still cameras were suddenly pironetting before four separate congressional committees.

The men from the agency came with their impassive faces and sharply circumscribed testimony designed mainly to "distance" their place of employment from the political crimes of Watergate. But as soon as senatorial questioning began blundering into the CIA's own busi-

ness the answers trailed off into calculated obscurity, as a visiting homicide squad detective might be rebuffed for asking the price of the house.

What was the extent of the CIA's role in the Chilean coup? Was it involved in the junta's take-over in Greece? Is there any prospect of more large-scale CIA operations such as the war in Laos? What is the extent of the agency's domestic operations?

The answers came back, engraved with politeness, but ungriving: "To the best of my knowledge, Senator, no." "I would be happy, Senator, to go into that a little more in closed session." "We have no evidence of that, sir."

And yet these questions were all symptomatic of the need for a serious and comprehensive oversight job on what the CIA is up to, what sort of checkreins there are to its covert operations targeted within the United States as well as abroad. The need has existed. The political opportunities are rare.

This is not to question the legitimacy of intelligence gathering or the need for forms of state security in the American government, consistent with what we consider to be the base price that must be paid for maintaining an open society. The requirement for review applies most urgently to the operational programs of the CIA's clandestine services which are conducted beyond the

(Continued on page 4)

LAURENCE STERN is a reporter on the national staff of The Washington Post.

HS/HC-950

property. Holt, Rinehart & Winston will be signing the contract. The advance will be well over \$50,000 in an auction situation that started with 38 editors at 28 publishing houses and ended in a final round of bidding from four houses.

Bach says Richardson's book was sold from a very long, detailed outline and that it will concentrate on the power problems of government and on isolation of the individual citizen.

Richardson said that he will be writing about a subject he's been thinking about for a long time: "The preservation and the sense of significance for the individual in the face of all of the forces in modern society that tend to submerge people and make them feel helpless and unable to effectively control the forces that influence their lives."

JOYCE ILLIG reports frequently on the publishing scene for Book World.

The Joy of Snooping

(Continued from page 1)

pale of public assent to serve often questionable interests in achieving dubious goals by illicit means.

What we are talking about is United States financial manipulation of foreign elections and domestic political processes, the mounting of coups, toppling of governments, bribery of public officials, clandestine programs of political control through blackmail, terrorism, murder, sabotage and "psywar." We are talking about programs of disinformation (a term of the art for counter-propaganda) directed against United States audiences, as well as manipulation of the news media.

and to subdivide it and to make its exercise more accessible to people. For me, the subdivision of power, the reliance on state and local government is one of the ways in which to deal with the overall problem."

When asked if his book would include any of his personal experiences during the time that he was attorney general, Richardson replied, "There may be some material drawn from my period of service at the Department of Justice, to the extent that that helps to bear on either problems of power or confidence in government. If you begin with a conservative individual as I do, then that takes you not only to the question of the individual sense of effectiveness but of confidence. And of course Watergate is central to all of that. The problems of the centralization of power lead to the potentials of the abuse of power, and Watergate is illustrative of the kinds of dangers inherent in that. So,

The Watergate scandal has shown us that the CIA, for all its vaunted acumen at the intelligence game, was played for a patsy (and that is the charitable view) by the White House to help stage a disinformation and espionage operation against Daniel Ellsberg at a time when he was campaigning against the resumption of bombing of North Vietnam.

The presumption of innocence on the part of the CIA shrinks considering the behavior of CIA Director William E. Colby in the fall of 1972 upon being questioned by former Watergate Prosecutor Earl J. Silbert about the identity of the White House official who first requested CIA assistance for E. Howard Hunt. Colby's response, at first, was evasive. He "danced around the room for ten minutes," by his own admission, before Silbert finally pinned him to the wall with a direct question. The answer was John D. Ehrlichman. Colby explained afterwards that he was reluctant to inject a name so controversial as Ehrlichman's into the case.

In doing so, he came within a hairline of obstruction of justice. Had it not been for Silbert's persistence--and perhaps

into the book. But there won't be a description of the week that was, leading up to my resignation. And it's not a book of reminiscences."

Richardson's subject is an important one, and he plans to have the manuscript completed by March 1. "I've got to try to make it readable and interesting," he concluded. "I may move out of here though, just to get away from the telephone."

BARBARA HOWAR's novel *Making Ends Meet*, about a Washington woman "getting it together," will be published by Random House next year. It's reported that Random House paid a \$100,000 advance.

Three other publishers were in on the bidding, with one of them offering a larger advance. Howar, who had the final say-so, will be working with an old friend at Random House, Bob Loomis, one of their top editors. □

the fact that Silbert knew the answer to his own question--Colby might have succeeded in willfully concealing information from a government prosecutor in a pending criminal case.

Watergate must indeed have brought a special anguish to the CIA. For the White House, in trying to put the Watergate monkey on the agency's back, used some of the same techniques that have been employed by the CIA in its own operations. There was the diffuse charter of "national security" through which the White House operatives sought to stall the FBI investigation of Nixon campaign funds through Mexico, to arrange for covert payoffs of the Watergate suspects, to disseminate a cover story that the Watergate burglary was a CIA operation, and so forth.

The agency was, in effect, being tarred as a decoy by the president's office which was dipping into the classic black bag of dirty tricks.

Hunt and his Cuban proteges, then in the pay of the Committee for the Re-Election of the President (CRREEP) were so ingrained in the ways of their alma mater at Langley, the Clandestine Services,

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and his Cuban proteges, then in of the Committee for the Re-Elec- he President (CREEP) were so in- l in the ways of their alma mater- gley, the Clandestine Services,

that they seemed to be genuinely incapa- ble of drawing the distinction between the United States government and carrying out the sleazy schemes of the White House-CREEP Politburo.

As an example of what they call the "clandestine mentality" John Marks and Victor Marchetti cite this exchange be- fore a federal grand jury between Hunt and Assistant U.S. Attorney Silbert. Sil- bert has asked whether Hunt was aware that he had participated in "what might commonly be referred to as illegal activi- ties."

HUNT: I have no recollection of any, no, sir."

SILBERT: What about clandestine activities?

HUNT: Yes, sir.

SILBERT: All right. What about that?

HUNT: I'm not quibbling, but there's quite a difference between some- thing that's illegal and something that's clandestine.

SILBERT: Well, in your terminology, would the entry into Dr. Fielding's (Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist) office have been clandestine, illegal, nei- ther or both?

HUNT: I would simply call it an entry operation conducted under the aus- pices of competent authority.

These are the values of the appar- atchik, which had become pervasive among the sad young men of the Nixon White House. It is the moral code of the black side of most espionage services as well as, we must reluctantly conclude, the top side of the CIA.

Congress has had the chance to bite at the apple and run the risk of corrupting its own innocence. But no one was willing to take on a confrontation with executive authority. No one even was able to formu- late the right questions other than those bearing on the extrication of the CIA from Watergate.

And so the function of oversight contin- ues to be abdicated to daily journalists and writers of books. It is not an alto- gether fruitful alternative. Books rarely generate legislation. Daily journalists are not equipped to penetrate the rein- forced armor of secrecy by which CIA is shielded from public scrutiny.

Leaks from within are self-serving. What passes for candor by top CIA offi- cials in the congressional hearing room is the frankness of the schoolboy standing before the brained canary and denying all, with his sling shot in his back pocket.

The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence is a welcome addition to the body of litera- ture which constitutes the only form of genuine oversight being currently prac- ticed. Both Marchetti and Marks are for- mer practitioners of the intelligence trade and were privy to some of its se- crets. Hence the book is a valuable and an- alyst against the dirty tricks boys.

John Kennedy learned the dismal les- son in the Bay of Pigs 13 years ago that CIA tends to operate within its own narrow world of assump- tions and political theology. The atmos- phere of the clandestine shop is conspira- torial, paranoid and action-prone. It reeks with suspicion of social and politi- cal change on the left.

Marks and Marchetti take us through the sometimes familiar, sometimes new, sometimes deleted catalogue of covert in- terventions and patterns of secret propri- etorships and domestic activities which have flourished in a vacuum of resound- ing public indifference since the agency became a major instrument of executive power in the early 1950s.

The book represents a triumph of de- termination by its authors, the publishing house of Knopf and the American Civil Liberties Union, which defended the manuscript against a partially successful effort to censor it. Melvin L. Wulf, legal director of the ACLU, notes in the intro- duction that co-author Marchetti was the first American writer to be served with an official censorship order issued by a United States court.

His case, along with that of Marks, raises two interesting constitutional issues: (1) the power of the government to abridge by a contractual oath of secrecy, the First Amendment rights of govern- ment employees; and (2) the authority of an executive agency to classify information by mere post facto declarations that it is classified. In the battle of the book the CIA was able to produce no proof that much of the material it wanted to excise was in fact classified.

At this point in the still-pending appel- late court fight the government has pre- vailed on the first question and the au- thors prevailed on the second issue.

One of the consequences of the Mar- chetti-Marks case is that William Colby has asked for new authority to bring crim- inal charges against any government em- ployee authorized to receive classified information. The proposed legislation also would empower the CIA director to define what is classified—thereby cir- cumventing the district court's ruling in the matter of Marchetti and Marks.

An indicator of the quality of that judg- ment is that when the CIA's original 339 deletions in the manuscript were submit- ted to a test of classification they were reduced to 168 by negotiation and then to 27 by judicial review. Unfortunately the book went to press before the judge's fi- nal decision and so *The Cult of Intelli- gence* is adorned throughout with that tal- ismanic word of our time—(deleted)—to tantalize the curious and bolster the sales.

If the Colby proposal were in effect at the time Marchetti and Marks had under- taken publication of their manuscript this review would never have been writ- ten. Both would probably be in jail. □

THE WASHINGTON POST

Friday, June 21, 1974

A 3

Behind Psychological Assessments' Door, A CIA Operation

By Laurence Stern

Washington Post Staff Writer

At first glance the interior of the room on the fourth floor of the Van Ness Shopping Center office building looks like the many dozens of private consulting firms scattered in their smartly appointed quarters throughout Washington.

The neat lettering on the door says: "Psychological Assessments Associates, Inc." Admission is gained by pushing a buzzer and waiting for someone to unlock the door from the inside.

But Walter P. Pasternak, the operating head of Psychological Assessments, is not anxious to see unscheduled visitors. "We have nothing to say," he told a visiting reporter in terse and angry tones, moving immediately toward the door.

The reason for Pasternak's reticence is that Psy-

chological Assessments is unlike most other businesses. From the time of its incorporation in 1965, its principal source of funding has been the Central Intelligence Agency, which is what Pasternak does not want to talk about.

"We could never have existed without this support," acknowledges the firm's retiring president, John W. Gittinger, who founded it with two other former CIA psychologists after they left full-time employment with the agency.

Gittinger is less reluctant to talk because he is disassociating himself from Psychological Assessments on July 1 and is proud of the work it has done as well as his long years of service to the CIA, to which he is still personally under contract as a consultant.

The company won an ob-

scure and perhaps unjustified mention in the case of former White House special counsel Charles Colson, who pleaded guilty on June 6 to an obstruction of justice charge growing out of his role in the Daniel Ellsberg break-in case.

Colson had asked the office of the Watergate special prosecutor to provide "documents or records concerning the psychological profile of Dr. Ellsberg compiled by Psychological Assessments, Inc., for the CIA."

Gittinger heatedly denies any association with the Ellsberg profile or, indeed, any involvement with the White House on Watergate or national security matters. "It's an absolute, positive lie," said the 57-year-old psychologist of Colson's implication of the company's involvement in the 1971 "plumbers" break-in of Dr.

Lewis Fielding's office in Los Angeles. Fielding was Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

A CIA spokesman said yesterday the agency will not comment on whether it has financial or operational relationships with Psychological Assessments. The CIA has a policy of saying nothing about its links with U.S. domestic concerns.

Gittinger acknowledges that the company behind the unobtrusive door at 4301 Connecticut Ave. NW has conducted training programs for CIA operatives abroad and performed psychological evaluations for overseas employees of American firms with foreign-based offices or subsidiaries.

The rubric of "psychological assessments" covers a variety of services which both the firm and Gittinger, in his private consulting role, have provided the CIA.

It covers the study of brainwashing techniques by foreign intelligence organizations that was carried out by a New York-based predecessor organization to PAA called the Human Ecology Fund.

It also provides training to CIA employees for assessing the credibility of foreign intelligence informants. "It's a question of trying to understand whether someone is lying or telling the truth when he comes through the door and says he wants to give you information," Gittinger explained.

The beginning of the psychological assessment program, Gittinger related, goes back to the early 1950s when former CIA Director Allen W. Dulles sought neurosurgical treatment for his son, Allen M., who was seriously injured in Korea, from a New York neurologist, Dr. Harold G. Wolfe.

Dulles became interested in Wolfe's research into Chinese indoctrination of captured American pilots during the Korean war. CIA began financing the research work through first the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology, with which Wolfe was associated, and then the Human Ecology Fund, according to Gittinger.

Both operated a private research organization with headquarters in New York and with branches overseas.

"This whole project was Allen Dulles' baby," Gittinger explained. "It grew out of his son's injury in Korea."

Because of the growing controversy over CIA financing of private organizations in the mid-1960s, the Human Ecology Fund was abandoned. The controversy was touched off by disclo-

sure that the agency was funding activities of U.S.-based student, labor, journalistic and cultural organizations.

The Human Ecology Fund was spared public mention during the furor over clandestine CIA financing. It folded quietly after Gittinger moved to Washington to start Psychological Assessments Associates Inc.

Current programs, by PAA, said Gittinger, are strongly pointed toward Soviet, Chinese and Arab cultural training. He declined to discuss the specific nature of the programs or whether PAA carried out such programs for foreign intelligence or security organizations.

The commercial side of PAA's activities—screening foreign employees of American firms—has shrunk in recent years, making the com-

pany almost wholly dependent on its CIA contracts.

He emphasized that the company has never taken a government or private contract which involved the "assessment" of an American citizen. "We do absolutely no domestic advising," Gittinger said. "We have never been asked to evaluate an American."

Gittinger and the two other ex-CIA founders of PAA, Robert E. Goodnow and Samuel B. Lyster, have ended their active association with the company. It was understood that the new operating group is seeking to divest itself of the CIA financial sponsorship. "I am very proud of what I have done for the agency over a long period of time in the assessments field," said Gittinger. "There is nothing I am ashamed of, nothing I have to hide."

THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, June 21, 1974

A3

Behind Psychological Assessments' Door,

A CIA Operation

By Laurence Stern
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At first glance the interior of the room on the fourth floor of the Van Ness Shopping Center office building looks like the many dozens of private consulting firms scattered in their smartly appointed quarters throughout Washington.

The neat lettering on the door says: "Psychological Assessments Associates, Inc." Admission is gained by pushing a buzzer and waiting for someone to unlock the door from the inside.

But Walter P. Pasternak, the operating head of Psychological Assessments, is not anxious to see unscheduled visitors. "We have nothing to say," he told a visiting reporter in terse and angry tones, moving immediately toward the door.

The reason for Pasternak's reticence is that Psy-

chological Assessments is unlike most other businesses. From the time of its incorporation in 1965, its principal source of funding has been the Central Intelligence Agency, which is what Pasternak does not want to talk about.

"We could never have existed without this support," acknowledges the firm's retiring president, John W. Gittinger, who founded it with two other former CIA psychologists after they left full-time employment with the agency.

Gittinger is less reluctant to talk because he is disassociating himself from Psychological Assessments on July 1 and is proud of the work it has done as well as his long years of service to the CIA, to which he is still personally under contract as a consultant.

The company won an ob-

scure and perhaps unjustified mention in the case of former White House special counsel Charles Colson, who pleaded guilty on June 6 to an obstruction of justice charge growing out of his role in the Daniel Ellsberg break-in case.

Colson had asked the office of the Watergate special prosecutor to provide "documents or records concerning the psychological profile of Dr. Ellsberg compiled by Psychological Assessments, Inc., for the CIA."

Gittinger heatedly denies any association with the Ellsberg profile or, indeed, any involvement with the White House on Watergate or national security matters. "It's an absolute, positive lie," said the 57-year-old psychologist of Colson's implication of the company's involvement in the 1971 "plumbers' break-in of Dr.

Lewis Fielding's office in Los Angeles. Fielding was Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

A CIA spokesman said yesterday the agency will not comment on whether it has financial or operational relationships with Psychological Assessments. The CIA has a policy of saying nothing about its links with U.S. domestic concerns.

Gittinger acknowledges that the company behind the unobtrusive door at 4301 Connecticut Ave. NW has conducted training programs for CIA operatives abroad and performed psychological evaluations for overseas employees of American firms with foreign-based offices or subsidiaries.

The rubric of "psychological assessments" covers a variety of services which both the firm and Gittinger, in his private consulting role, have provided the CIA.

It covers the study of brainwashing techniques by foreign intelligence organizations that was carried out by a New York-based predecessor organization to PAA called the Human Ecology Fund.

It also provides training to CIA employees for assessing the credibility of foreign intelligence informants. "It's a question of trying to understand whether someone is lying or telling the truth when he comes through the door and says he wants to give you information," Gittinger explained.

The beginning of the psychological assessment program, Gittinger related, goes back to the early 1950s when former CIA Director Allen W. Dulles sought neurosurgical treatment for his son, Allen M., who was seriously injured in Korea, from a New York neurologist, Dr. Harold G. Wolfe.

Dulles became interested in Wolfe's research into Chinese indoctrination of captured American pilots during the Korean war. CIA began financing the research work through first the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology, with which Wolfe was associated, and then the Human Ecology Fund, according to Gittinger.

Both operated a private research organization with headquarters in New York and with branches overseas.

"This whole project was Allen Dulles' baby," Gittinger explained. "It grew out of his son's injury in Korea."

Because of the growing controversy over CIA financing of private organizations in the mid-1960s, the Human Ecology Fund was abandoned. The controversy was touched off by disclo-

sure that the agency was funding activities of U.S.-based student, labor, journalistic and cultural organizations.

The Human Ecology Fund was spared public mention during the furor over clandestine CIA financing. It folded quietly after Gittinger moved to Washington to start Psychological Assessments Associates Inc.

Current programs by PAA, said Gittinger, are strongly pointed toward Soviet, Chinese and Arab cultural training. He declined to discuss the specific nature of the programs or whether PAA carried out such programs for foreign intelligence or security organizations.

The commercial side of PAA's activities—screening foreign employees of American firms—has shrunk in recent years, making the com-

pany almost wholly dependent on its CIA contracts.

He emphasized that the company has never taken a government or private contract which involved the "assessment" of an American citizen. "We do absolutely no domestic advising," Gittinger said. "We have never been asked to evaluate an American."

Gittinger and the two other ex-CIA founders of PAA, Robert E. Goodnow and Samuel B. Lycerly, have ended their active association with the company. It was understood that the new operating group is seeking to divest itself of the CIA financial sponsorship.

"I am very proud of what I have done for the agency over a long period of time in the assessments field," said Gittinger. "There is nothing I am ashamed of, nothing I have to hide."

Cushing's World, may go with him.

The residents of this coastal community have been "bitter" toward the famed painter, his wife said, since the Olson farmhouse had become a tourist attraction.

"I had a hard time convincing Andrew to come back to Cushing this summer," said Mrs. Wyeth, "and we are thinking of leaving permanently."

The Olson farmhouse had been purchased by Joseph E. Levine, the movie producer, through his foundation and had been turned into a museum. The museum was opened to the public in 1971, but local residents since then have strongly objected to it because of the summer traffic it generated. Townspeople said it made their rural roads "Hollywood free-ways."



The Olson farmhouse, in the background of Andrew Wyeth's "Christina's World," may be moved from Cushing, Maine, to a tourist site in New Jersey.

Levine said the famed farmhouse may be moved to Waterloo Village, a restored pre-revolutionary town in Stanhope, N.J. He said the owners of the New Jersey tourist attraction had made him an offer to move the house there.

Levine said there should be no problem moving the farmhouse to New Jersey.

"They moved London Bridge to Arizona, didn't they?" he observed.

One Cushing resident termed the Wyeth reaction

"paranoid" since the Wyeth family always had sought anonymity while summering here.

"The thing they always appreciated most was that they could come in here and just be regular people in the town with no one coming

down their driveway and bothering them," said the resident, who asked not to be identified.

"I know that I and a lot of other people here have protected Andy by lying and telling tourists we didn't know where he lived."

angry, brush off Lenya, Weill's wife, Grete Keller would be such haunting W as "Surabaya Joh as "The Bilbao So much alive, but it until two years ago American adaptation chael Feingold of itself was introduced Yale Repertory Theatre's is American look at Feingold's End."

A yarn about gangsters and the Army, the attitude cal throughout a male, like all of V hert's, is ironically so that the title is. Inevitably, American think of "Guys and that amalgam of D nyon characters dents so neatly gether by Jo Swer Burrows and Frank Not surprisingly and Dolls" is infinitely rior, but this does that "Happy End" appreciated and Brecht assigned to line to his secretar both Hauptmann, gether they claim "and a short story the Lane published in Weekly, Saint which was little Later, it would be the Salvation Army to St. John of the yards" and of co cago gangland also setting for his late 111-Hillier parallel, sistible Rise of An Runyon began y gangster yarns in and though his "Guys and Dolls" pear until three y "Happy End, Army heroines ha early in the ce Shaw's "Major

Cavett and the CIA: 'Routine' Clearance

By Michael Kernan

Nervous legal advisers for the American Broadcasting Company managed to hold up a controversial Dick Cavett show about the Central Intelligence Agency long enough to thwart national press prescreening, Cavett said yesterday in New York.

The 90-minute program — scheduled to be aired at 11:30 tonight (Channel 7-WMAL) — features debate between Victor Marchetti, co-author of "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," and two former CIA officials.

"The legal department kept wanting to know if the show was balanced," Cavett said, "and I kept telling them that that was the whole point of it: It was a

debate of the pros and cons."

Three months ago ABC-TV refused a Cavett talk show involving several radical leader of the '60s but later rescheduled it with an added 12 minutes of comment by some conservatives as "balance." And Tuesday, when the new show was being taped, ABC legal experts were on hand.

"They said they thought it was okay," noted Cavett, "but they wanted to talk to some higher-ups first. But the higher-ups were at lunch — why didn't they watch it themselves if they were worried? — and finally they managed to diddle around until it was too late for a screening."

A belated screening was held yesterday for the New

York press, according to Herbert Wirth of the publicity department. Wirth added that the show would go on as taped, that there were no serious problems, that getting legal clearance on shows of this nature was "a routine matter."

The two ex-CIA men were Robert Komer, former ambassador to Turkey, head of the Vietnam pacification project and now a Rand Corp. consultant, and Ray Cline, now executive director of studies for the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University. Though considerable tension was generated during the show, Cavett said, when it was

over the participants seemed jovial enough.

One question was whether the CIA liquidates used up agents, as claimed by a Marchetti source from Latin America. After listening to Marchetti's second hand version of how a man died in a fake truck accident just after being retired from the CIA, Cline denied that liquidation was CIA policy.

Another issue was the extent to which the Soviet KGB may have penetrated the CIA, and Marchetti, challenged to name the high CIA official he believed to be a double agent, refused to divulge it for TV.

There were also some exchanges about the purpose of CIA, Cavett added, with the ex-agents pooh-poohing "all this cloak-and-dagger

stuff" which they said accounted for only a tiny percentage of agency work.

Cline, asked if President Nixon and Henry Kissinger would have made good spies, did say that both men appear inclined toward the covert and secret and that Kissinger probably would have liked to be the CIA director.

The Marchetti hook was the subject of a landmark ruling in U.S. District Court this spring. Although 339 deletions had been made by the CIA before publication, the court restored all but 27 of the excisions. The deleted sections were not discussed on the TV show.

Cavett said he does not plan more controversial shows in the immediate future.

Media

Joseph Kraft

THE WASHINGTON POST, THURSDAY, JUNE 27, 1974

Where Is the Conservative Outrage?

It's exit snarling once again for Richard Nixon. As he goes down, the President is spewing out libels about this country's national security apparatus which Pravda, on its worst day, would have blushed to publish.

In the process he is doing damage to vital national institutions. But where, one wonders, are the protests of the principled conservatives who ought to be morally offended?

The freshest evidence of what the President is doing and thinking comes from Charles Colson, the former White House aide sentenced to a year in prison after copying a plea on charges of throwing out of the burglary of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist. Colson is now talking through a private investigator, Richard Bast.

But Colson's present stories have a detail about them which rings absolutely true. They fit the basic White House-cum-Henry Kissinger argument that Mr. Nixon is a peace-lover now being thwarted, not to say martyred, by hardliners. Moreover, honorable men in the White House, the Pentagon and the State Department report that the President is indeed thinking along the lines sketched out by Colson.

One feature of the Colson report is that Mr. Nixon believes the CIA launched the whole Watergate affair in order to get back at the President for cutting down the agency's clout.

"Mr. Nixon is spewing out libels about this country's national security apparatus . . . Where are the protests of the principled conservatives?"

"His theory," Colson told Bast about the President, "is that they were coming in (to the White House) to spy and they wanted to get enough on the White House so they could get what they wanted" in the way of bureaucratic recognition from the President.

According to Colson, the President's anger was especially directed against the present director of the agency, William Colby. Colson said that at one point the President was "going to remove the head of the CIA, bring his own people in, investigate internally and announce everything he had discovered to the American people."

In similar vein are accusations now launched about the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. According to Colson, the President was "systematically excluding the Central Intelligence Agency and the Joint Chiefs of Staff from a lot of foreign policy deliberations."

The chiefs, in Colson's version, moved to spy on the White House through the so-called Pentagon spy ring which surfaced when some Na-

tional Security Council documents were leaked to the columnist Jack Anderson. Mr. Nixon, according to Colson, would have prosecuted the chiefs except that he was afraid the military men would retaliate by leaking state secrets.

Colson said: "If he had tried to do anything about it, they (the Joint Chiefs) would have disclosed a lot of documents he was worried about protecting that they had been stealing, rifling from, (Henry) Kissinger's briefcase."

Now all of this is truly perfidious nonsense. I don't think Mr. Colby is a great man. But he is a very good bureaucratic manager, intelligent, responsible, resourceful and articulate. All his professional life he has been giving devoted and risky service to what he thought were the best interests of the United States.

Similarly with Adm. Thomas Moore, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Nobody ever confused him with Horatio Nelson. But he is a truly loyal officer who wanted only to

serve his President. Now he is learning the high price of loyalty.

But it's not for me to defend the CIA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Properly that should be the office of self-proclaimed conservatives. Attacks on the institutions of national security violate the first principles of the conservative creed.

So it would be nice to hear Barry Goldwater roaring treason about what the White House has been saying and thinking instead of attacking The Washington Post. It would be heartening to hear some conservative "thinkers" knocking the latest enemies list instead of picking on the House Judiciary Committee.

Unfortunately, and it is a true weakness for our country, principled conservatives hardly exist in the U.S. Those who glory in the conservative label, when they are not merely self-promoters, are usually only interested in balancing the budget or putting down unions.

With one exception. The Supreme Court remains an essentially conservative institution, elitist in composition and bound to care about respect for truth and order. And more and more it becomes clear that if this country is going to do the right thing in the case of Richard Nixon, if we are going to unload a President who has assaulted every canon of the political order, it will be thanks to the Supreme Court.

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HS/HC-950

A 14 Wednesday, June 26, 1974 THE WASHINGTON POST

CIA Seeks New Power to Halt Leaks

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

Legislation that would significantly broaden the government's power to bring criminal sanctions against employees or government contractors for disclosure of intelligence secrets is being circulated within the Nixon administration.

The measure, proposed by Central Intelligence Agency Director William E. Colby, could also empower him to seek injunctions against news media to prevent them from publishing material he considers harmful to the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

Colby's draft would give the CIA director more statutory muscle to define national security secrets and punish transgressors than ever before.

Its appearance comes against a background of court battles on national security secrecy issues ranging from the Ellsberg case to the book, "CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," written by former government intelligence officers Victor Marchetti and John Marks. The book, the first to be published in the United States after pre-publication censorship by the federal government, went on sale yesterday.

Had Colby's proposal been law a year earlier the book might well have never seen the light of day and the two authors would have been subject to 10-year prison sentences and \$100,000 fines.

CIA Seeks Power To End Data Leaks

CIA, From A1

Under existing law, however, the best the CIA was able to do was invoke the secrecy oaths signed by both men as grounds for a civil action requiring them to submit their manuscripts in advance for government clearance.

The government won the first round in the courts when the blinding nature of the secrecy oaths was upheld. But Marks and Marchetti challenged the CIA's demand on some 350 deletions in the manuscript. After adjudication of their countersuit before U.S. District Court Judge Albert V. Bryan Jr., in Alexandria, the number of deletions was reduced to 27.

Bryan required the agency to go beyond the mere assertion by Colby and four CIA deputy directors that material in the book was classified. He asked the CIA to demonstrate in each instance the basis for classification. Much of the trial was held in a closed courtroom.

Under Colby's proposed amendment to the National Security Act of 1947, the CIA director would be empowered to determine the ground rules for classification under a general grant of responsibility for protecting "intelligence sources and methods."

The Colby proposal would exempt news media from the criminal provisions of the law. But the draft language could, according to informed officials, enable the CIA director to trigger injunctive action by the Attorney General against "any person" — presumably including journalists — before or after an act of disclosure.

In the Pentagon Papers case, several Supreme Court justices, particularly Thurgood Marshall, cited the absence of any statutes to support the government's effort



WILLIAM E. COLBY
... proposes bill

to prevent publication of the Vietnam documents. Colby's proposal would strengthen the government's hand in this respect.

Colby submitted the draft measure to the Office of Management and Budget to circulate through the bureaucracy for comment before it is introduced in Congress. In a transmittal letter to OMB Director Roy L. Ash, Colby observed that in "recent times, serious damage to our foreign intelligence effort has resulted from unauthorized disclosure of information related to intelligence sources and methods."

He did not specify what that damage was.

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

THE WASHINGTON POST, WEDNESDAY, JUNE 26, 1974

Colson's Watergate Confessions: Adding to the Chaos

Just as the Watergate prosecutors expected, Charles W. Colson's testimony since his guilty plea has provided more confusion than important new information without removing doubts about how valuable a witness he will prove in the long run.

His revelations of giving early Watergate warnings to President Nixon in January 1973 only slightly expanded what he was saying publicly a year ago. His courtroom accusation that he committed his crime at Mr. Nixon's personal initiation is considered mainly an unsuccessful ploy for a reduced sentence and of no great impact on impeachment proceedings. Colson's bizarre charges tying the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to Watergate dust off old and almost entirely discredited accusations.

The confessions of Colson will provide some helpful new information to both special prosecutor Leon Jaworski and the House Judiciary Committee. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether that information is significant enough to warrant the committee, which is failing dangerously behind schedule in its impeachment proceedings, summoning Colson for protracted testimony as it now plans. Thus, even as he awaits federal prison, Chuck Colson remains controversial, disruptive and ambiguous, just as he was in the White House.

Indeed, public relations gimmickry by Colson and his lawyer, David Shapiro, prior to his sentencing last Fri-

"Contrary to what Colson told the prayer group, he was never offered the option of pleading guilty to a single misdemeanor."

day are strikingly similar to Colson's White House operations. Although there is no reason to question the sincerity of Colson's religious conversion, there is reason to question how much it has changed the way he approaches a problem.

Shapiro contacted the Special Prosecutor to negotiate Colson's guilty plea before, not after, the widely publicized meeting of Colson's prayer group that allegedly led him to confess. Contrary to what Colson told the prayer group, he was never offered the option of pleading guilty to a single misdemeanor.

The outraged prosecutors blamed the crafty Shapiro for planting the misdemeanor story in the press, attempting to generate public opposition to a prison sentence on grounds that Colson had "voluntarily" pleaded guilty to a felony instead of a misdemeanor. The prosecutors came to regard Shapiro as the most annoyingly troublesome defense lawyer they have encountered.

Nor has Colson faintly resembled the prototype of the thoroughly cooperative prosecution witness, John W.

Dean III. Nor has he even approached the less knowledgeable Herbert Kalmbach, Mr. Nixon's former personal attorney, who has proved most helpful to the prosecutors.

The prosecutors have always viewed any possible information gleaned from Colson as an unexpected bonus. Expecting no great dividends, they have received none. That is particularly true of Colson's widely-publicized statement to the prosecutors and the House Committee that he warned President Nixon in January 1973 that John Mitchell and other re-election campaign officials probably were implicated in Watergate.

The stir caused by these statements underscores Washington's collective short memory. In June 1973, long before his religious conversion and while enthusiastically defending the President, Colson told essentially the same story publicly. Just as he tells investigators now, Colson then declared the President replied he would not challenge Mitchell's sworn testimony just because Colson suspected him. Net gain in information over one year: about zero.

Nor do lawyers put much value on Colson's courtroom charge that Mr. Nixon had "urged me to disseminate damaging information about Daniel Ellsberg," causing Colson's obstruction of justice felony. To some lawyers, this was a ploy for the sympathy of Judge Gerhard Gesell, infuriated by the President's cavalier attitude toward court subpoenas. Unless bolstered by future testimony, it scarcely seems to affect the impeachment case.

Colson's accusations of sinister CIA participation in Watergate duplicate what he has privately told Sen. Howard Baker of Tennessee, charges long since written off as groundless by a House investigation. But Colson's picture of the President as a terrified captive of the CIA could lead the impeachment proceedings into a trackless and time-consuming wasteland.

On balance, Colson's new portrait of Richard M. Nixon contrasts sharply with his former sycophancy toward the President. But unflattering portraits of Mr. Nixon abound, thanks to his own secret tape recordings, and are not grounds for impeachment.

Beyond the President, Colson is further confusing the chaotic Watergate picture by describing the CIA as an outlaw band of conspirators and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger as a demonic evil influence on the President. Colson's new religiosity seems so deep that this quite probably is his sincere vision of the truth. But Colson's vision of the truth as Mr. Nixon's fanatically loyal lieutenant was uniquely distorted. What he says now should be judged accordingly.

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D-6

Washington Star-News

Tuesday, June 25, 1974

Colson Qualifies Accounts of His CIA Plot Theory

Former White House aide Charles W. Colson has qualified—but not denied—published accounts of two discussions he had with a private investigator in which he outlined his views on CIA involvement in both the Watergate and Ellsberg break-ins.

Colson said yesterday in a statement on those conversations that he and the investigator, Richard L. Bast, "talked in an offhand fashion, exploring theories for which I have been unable to obtain factual support," according to the Associated Press.

He said the talks were not for public consumption and "should not therefore be read into any other context."

ON A REPORTED conversation with President Nixon in which Nixon is alleged to have considered taking action against the CIA, Colson told the New York Times the President "expressed concern" but failed to act because "I don't think he felt that there were enough facts for him to act on it in any way."

The new focus on a possible CIA involvement in the Watergate affair emerged in the wake of Bast's pub-

lished statement that Colson talked to him on May 13 and 31.

Bast said Colson told of Nixon's considering the possibility of firing CIA Director William Colby, and that Colson suspected the role of White House employe E. Howard Hunt, a former CIA man convicted in the break-in.

Meanwhile, Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr. said he has been trying for months to have the secrecy stamp lifted from documents on which Colson apparently bases his theory of deep CIA involvement in Watergate and related cases.

"I DOUBT that this will become a dead issue," the Tennessee Republican said, "I don't expect it to."

Because the CIA refuses to declassify the documents, Baker said he cannot confirm or deny the accounts given yesterday by Bast.

A source close to the Senate Watergate Committee investigation said all of Bast's specific allegations from a CIA document are supported, except one—that Watergate burglar Eugenio R. Martinez conducted at least 300 break-ins. AP said.

Editorials

Washington Star-News

Opinion

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TUESDAY, JUNE 25, 1974

Colson's Watergate Whodunit

We don't like to take issue with a man who has just donned sackcloth and taken the vows of truth, honesty and Christian brotherhood, but the latest Watergate tale spun by former White House aide Charles Colson is a bit hard to swallow.

That isn't to say that it cannot be true, for there have been such weird things revealed in Watergate that almost nothing is beyond possibility. But Colson, or someone, is going to have to come up with something more than theory before many people are going to believe that Watergate was a Central Intelligence Agency plot from beginning to end. According to Colson's theory, which for some strange reason he imparted to a private detective, the CIA was behind the Watergate and Ellsberg break-ins and has been furiously and successfully engaged in covering up its involvement.

Colson claims that President Nixon feels the same way and believes CIA got into it "to get enough on the White House so they (the CIA) could get what they wanted" from the President. While Colson said he and Mr. Nixon discussed this at great length last November, he didn't come in with

an explanation of exactly what it was that the CIA might have wanted.

If Mr. Nixon does hold such a view, it is rather odd that there is nothing about it on the tape transcripts the President released. They disclose a frantic effort by the President and his aides to keep the Watergate investigation from closing in on the White House but there is no suggestion of blaming the whole thing on the CIA. To accept Colson's theory, one would have to believe that the CIA is so all-powerful that it can prevent even a president from exposing its operations, even when that president is in danger of being impeached for activities that Colson alleges to the CIA.

This latest Colson gambit smacks of an attempt to draw a red herring across the impeachment inquiry, but the House Judiciary Committee undoubtedly has the good sense not to let itself get sidetracked.

Yet, the Colson accusations probably should not simply be rejected out of hand. If Colson is called to testify in the impeachment inquiry, the Judiciary Committee undoubtedly will question him about his CIA story. Colson claims that the chairman of the Senate

Watergate Committee is "sitting" on a 35-page report that says something about CIA involvement, and perhaps it would be well to expose that to the light of day, if there is such a report. Special Watergate Prosecutor Leon Jaworski might also want to say something about the matter.

It always has been difficult to get much of anything about CIA operations into the public record because of the cloak of national security that surrounds it. But the CIA should not be so sacrosanct that its full and complete role in the biggest political scandal of the century should not be disclosed — if it has a role beyond the minor one its officials have claimed. In clarifying the CIA's involvement, some light might also be shed on Colson's motive for his latest maneuver.



'Could that be a red herring, Chuck?'

THE WASHINGTON POST

Friday, June 21, 1974

A 3

Behind Psychological Assessments' Door, A CIA Operation

By Laurence Stern

Washington Post Staff Writer

At first glance the interior of the room on the fourth floor of the Van Ness Shopping Center office building looks like the many dozens of private consulting firms scattered in their smartly appointed quarters throughout Washington.

The neat lettering on the door says: "Psychological Assessments Associates, Inc." Admission is gained by pushing a buzzer and waiting for someone to unlock the door from the inside.

But Walter P. Pasternak, the operating head of Psychological Assessments, is not anxious to see unscheduled visitors. "We have nothing to say," he told a visiting reporter in terse and angry tones, moving immediately toward the door.

The reason for Pasternak's reticence is that Psy-

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scure and perhaps unjustified mention in the case of former White House special counsel Charles Colson, who pleaded guilty on June 6 to an obstruction of justice charge growing out of his role in the Daniel Ellsberg break-in case.

Colson had asked the office of the Watergate special prosecutor to provide "documents or records concerning the psychological profile of Dr. Ellsberg compiled by Psychological Assessments, Inc., for the CIA."

Gittinger heatedly denies any association with the Ellsberg profile or, indeed, any involvement with the White House on Watergate or national security matters. "It's an absolute, positive lie," said the 37-year-old psychologist of Colson's implication of the company's involvement in the 1971 "plumbers' break-in of Dr.

Lewis Fielding's office in Los Angeles. Fielding was Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

A CIA spokesman said yesterday the agency will not comment on whether it has financial or operational relationships with Psychological Assessments. The CIA has a policy of saying nothing about its links with U.S. domestic concerns.

Gittinger acknowledges that the company behind the unobtrusive door at 4301 Connecticut Ave. NW has conducted training programs for CIA operatives abroad and performed psychological evaluations for overseas employees of American firms with foreign-based offices or subsidiaries.

The rubric of "psychological assessments" covers a variety of services which both the firm and Gittinger, in his private consulting role, have provided the CIA.

It covers the study of brainwashing techniques by foreign intelligence organizations that was carried out by a New York-based predecessor organization to PAA called the Human Ecology Fund.

It also provides training to CIA employees for assessing the credibility of foreign intelligence informants. "It's a question of trying to understand whether someone is lying or telling the truth when he comes through the door and says he wants to give you information," Gittinger explained.

The beginning of the psychological assessment program, Gittinger related, goes back to the early 1950s when former CIA Director Allen W. Dulles sought neurosurgical treatment for his son, Allen M., who was seriously injured in Korea, from a New York neurologist, Dr. Harold G. Wolfe.

Dulles became interested in Wolfe's research into Chinese indoctrination of captured American pilots during the Korean war. CIA began financing the research work through first the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology, with which Wolfe was associated, and then the Human Ecology Fund, according to Gittinger.

Both operated a private research organization with headquarters in New York and with branches overseas.

"This whole project was Allen Dulles' baby," Gittinger explained. "It grew out of his son's injury in Korea."

Because of the growing controversy over CIA financing of private organizations in the mid-1960s, the Human Ecology Fund was abandoned. The controversy was touched off by disclo-

sure that the agency was funding activities of U.S.-based student, labor, journalistic and cultural organizations.

The Human Ecology Fund was spared public mention during the furor over clandestine CIA financing. It folded quietly after Gittinger moved to Washington to start Psychological Assessments Associates Inc.

Current programs, by PAA, said Gittinger, are strongly pointed toward Soviet, Chinese and Arab cultural training. He declined to discuss the specific nature of the programs or whether PAA carried out such programs for foreign intelligence or security organizations.

The commercial side of PAA's activities—screening foreign employees of American firms—has shrunk in recent years, making the com-

pany almost wholly dependent on its CIA contracts.

He emphasized that the company has never taken a government or private contract which involved the "assessment" of an American citizen. "We do absolutely no domestic advising," Gittinger said. "We have never been asked to evaluate an American."

Gittinger and the two other ex-CIA founders of PAA, Robert E. Goodnow and Samuel B. Lyerly, have ended their active association with the company. It was understood that the new operating group is seeking to divest itself of the CIA financial sponsorship.

"I am very proud of what I have done for the agency over a long period of time in the assessments field," said Gittinger. "There is nothing I am ashamed of, nothing I have to hide."

Ex-Aide Made Claim to Private Eye

Colson: Nixon Suspected CIA

By Rudy Maxa
Washington Post Staff Writer

In the days before he walked into a federal courtroom to enter a guilty plea early this month, Charles W. Colson made a startling series of statements about President Nixon's fears of a Central Intelligence Agency involvement in the Watergate scandal.

Colson, once among the President's most trusted White House aides, gave his account during two bizarre evening confessionals with Washington private investigator Richard L. Bast at Bast's home in McLean, Va.

In the course of the conversation Colson told Bast that President Nixon confided to him in January that he was on the verge of dismissing Cen-

tral Intelligence Agency Director William E. Colby because of suspicions that the agency was deeply implicated in Watergate.

He also told Bast that the President was finally dissuaded from launching a full-scale investigation of the intelligence community by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and White House chief of staff Alexander M. Haig Jr.

Colson portrayed the President as a virtual captive in the Oval Office of suspected high-ranking conspirators in the intelligence circles against whom he dared not act for fear of international and domestic political repercussions.

The former White House aide told Bast of a January phone call from President

Nixon after which Colson characterized Mr. Nixon as being "out of his mind over the CIA and Pentagon roles" in Watergate.

Colson's underlying suspicion, as expressed to Bast, was that the CIA planned the break-ins at Watergate and the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist. The motive: to discredit the President's inner circle of advisers.

Colson indicated that the CIA was concerned that it was being bypassed on policy matters and channels of information bearing on national security.

This could well be the main line of Colson's forthcoming

See COLSON, A4, Col. 1

Colson Said Nixon Suspected CIA

COLSON, From A1.

testimony to the House Judiciary Committee and the Watergate special prosecutor although he has yet to substantiate it with specific evidence.

Colson first went to Bast on May 13 on the recommendation of mutual acquaintances to discuss the possibility of a private investigation of the CIA's role in Watergate. He returned for another session beside Bast's lushly landscaped swimming pool on May 31—three days before he went before U.S. District Court Judge Gerhard A. Gesell to deliver his guilty plea to a charge of obstructing justice.

Bast, who has largely retired from private investigations to conduct a highly speculative commodity futures fund and other business interests, disclosed the substance of the conversations on the basis of his records and an understanding with Colson that Bast would be free to speak about it after Colson was sentenced.

Colson was sentenced last Friday to a one- to three-year jail term and \$5,000 fine.

Watergate investigators said that Colson had told them about some of the same allegations made to Bast. Some of these charges, they said, are being looked into.

Halt and Kissinger declined through spokesmen to comment on the Colson account.

One of the most detailed assertions Colson made to Bast concerned a March 1, 1973, memorandum by a high-ranking CIA official dealing with the agency's relationship to the Washington public relations firm of Robert R. Mullen & Co.

Mullen is the firm which employed Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr. after he left the CIA and before he was hired as a member of the White House "plumbers" unit.

Colson said he was allowed to read the 25-page memorandum drafted by Eric W. Eisenstadt, chief of the central cover staff of CIA's clandestine directorate, last December at the home of Sen. Howard Baker (R-Tenn.), vice chairman of the Senate Watergate committee.

The existence of the classified memorandum has been confirmed by Watergate investigators. Colson summarized the contents of the Eisenstadt memo for Bast as follows:



CHARLES W. COLSON



WILLIAM E. COLBY

... ex-aid said Nixon was on verge of firing CIA Director Colby last January.

- Robert Mullen, founder of the public relations firm, complained that former CIA Director Richard M. Helms "twisted my arm hard" to hire Hunt.

- Former CIA Director James R. Schlesinger, who succeeded Helms, now Defense Secretary, endorsed a suggestion by Eisenstadt that Mullen and Robert Bennett, an associate in Mullen's firm, be permitted to read FBI and CIA memoranda on witnesses who should not be interviewed in the Watergate case. The Mullen firm was directed to "lie if necessary" in denying any association with the CIA, Bast said he was told.

- The Senate Watergate committee was informed of the times and places of at least 300 break-ins conducted by convicted Watergate burglar Eugenio Martinez.

- Bennett, the son of Sen. Wallace Bennett (R-Utah), bragged to the CIA of favorable news treatment in the national media, including Newsweek and The Washington Post, for stories he planted to discredit the President's top White House advisers.

- A prominent Charlotte,

N.C., lawyer with CIA connections reported after a plane ride with Sen. Sam J. Ervin Jr. (D-N.C.), chairman of the Senate Watergate committee, that Ervin would steer clear of CIA involvement in Watergate.

(The lawyer named by Colson told The Washington Post he was indeed a friend of Ervin but denied either suggesting or receiving assurances described by Colson.)

- Bennett reported to the CIA that "through his father, Senator Wallace Bennett, he could handle the Ervin committee if the CIA could handle E. Howard Hunt." (Robert Bennett denies having told that to the CIA.)

Colson told Bast that he made the unusual approach to the private investigator in order to get proof of the extent of CIA's Watergate role on behalf of himself and H. R. (Bob) Haldeman, John D. Ehrlichman, John N. Mitchell, Robert C. Mardian, Gordon Strachan and Kenneth Parkinson, de-

fendants in the Watergate cover-up conspiracy case.

He also told the detective he wanted information on who was "financing" John W. Dean III and also a closer look at the circumstances of the plane crash which took the life of Hunt's wife, Dorothy, in December, 1972.

In explaining his motives in seeking the investigation, Bast related, Colson said: "I'm interested in getting out of my problems but I'm more interested in straightening out what's going on in the country right now."

The former White House aide who has recently proclaimed himself a witness for Christ spoke with high emotion of his concern over the CIA. "If this happens with us, it could happen to any President," he told Bast.

But Colson acknowledged that "what is exculpatory for me is if I am able to expose the fact that there was a major plot by the CIA and they were responsible for the

cover-ups throughout the investigation."

In the early days of the Watergate scandal President Nixon, through Haldeman and Ehrlichman, sought to delay the FBI's investigation of Nixon campaign donations funds funneled through Mexico on grounds that it might expose covert CIA activity and imperil national security. The President later acknowledged that his fears were groundless as far as the Mexican funds were concerned.

Bast said he would, under certain conditions, consider undertaking an investigation of alleged illegal CIA influence directed at the White House.

Those conditions, he said, included the authorization of grand jury subpoena power, full presidential backing and the appointment of an additional special prosecutor. But Colson found no takers at the White House, as far as could be determined, though Colson told Bast the President was "enthusiastic" about the idea.

During his two conversations, Bast said Colson portrayed the CIA as a "frighting" power operating with no congressional or executive branch control.

He disparaged the chairmen of the House and Senate CIA oversight subcommittees and told Bast that "almost everywhere you turn" the CIA has its "tentacles." Colson indicated his belief in the pervasiveness of the CIA encouraged him to ask acquaintances to recommend an incorruptible investigator.

Bast, 41, a child of Washington's Southeast blue-collar district, developed a reputation for flamboyance, toughness and blunt talk during his climb into diversified business activity from the ranks of private investigators. ("My fees start at \$100 an hour, I accept one case a year only if I find it interesting," he told Colson). Bast told Colson at the start of their conversations that the Nixon administration "tore the Constitution to shreds."

"I'm not saying that's not true," he quoted Colson as replying. "But I'm not sure that the guys who are going after us now aren't doing more disservice to the country," Colson was quoted.

Bast said he told Colson that "perhaps your whole crew maybe belongs in jail" but not if "they (the special prosecutor's staff) violated your constitutional rights."

"They've been violated several times," Colson replied glumly. He offered no specifics but commented on the overwhelming strength of Watergate Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski's prosecutorial staff against an individual defendant.

"You know how strongly I feel about all this?" Colson asked Bast three days before pleading guilty. "You're going to think I belong in an asylum when I tell you this: I've thought about walking into that courtroom Monday [June 3] before Gesell and saying 'I want to plead guilty.'"

"I told him in that case—he'd have to go to jail," Bast said.

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST

Tuesday, June 25, 1974

B15

CIA Front Man Knew of Watergate

By Jack Anderson

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But Gregory, a conscientious Mormon, became uneasy about his undercover work. He spoke to his bishop about it, who was concerned about the ethics of the job.

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But the prosecutors traced Bennett's long-distance telephone toll calls to Gregory. When Bennett learned this, he called the prosecutors and said: "Look, you've found Tommy. I'll tell you about Tommy."

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THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, JUNE 25, 1974

24

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COLSON SAYS C.I.A. CONCERNED NIXON

Says President Feared Role
by Agency in Watergate

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 24—Charles W. Colson said today that President Nixon "expressed concern" to him during a telephone conversation in January about the possibility that the Central Intelligence Agency had played a far greater role in the Watergate scandal than has been publicly revealed.

In a telephone interview, Mr. Colson said that the President had failed to take action against the C.I.A. because, "I don't think he felt that there were enough facts for him to act on it in any way."

Accounts of Mr. Colson's concern over the possible C.I.A. involvement in Watergate have been circulating for months throughout Washington, as well as the fact that he began discussion last month with a private detective about his concerns.

The New York Times, in an inquiry conducted last month, was unable to confirm that the C.I.A. had played a role in the planning of the Ellsberg burglary and Watergate break-in, as Mr. Colson is known to believe.

In addition, Mr. Colson has told associates and newsmen in recent months that he believes that E. Howard Hunt Jr., the Watergate conspirator who worked in his White Office office in 1971, was planted there by the President.

In a telephone interview, Representative Lucien N. Nedzi, Democrat of Michigan, chairman of the Intelligence Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, said that Mr. Colson's theories and materials "were nothing new."

"We've had all of this for months, and we have nothing to add to our original report," Mr. Nedzi said.

That report, filed after extensive closed hearings last summer, criticized the agency for allowing itself to be used by the White House in domestic intelligence activities, but cleared it of any active role.

"There's an implication [in the Colson theory] that Hunt was an active agent for the C.I.A. during these Watergate shenanigans," Mr. Nedzi said. "Of course that's not true."

Mr. Colson, who received a \$5,000 fine and a one-to-three-year prison sentence on an obstruction of justice charge on Friday, said that he believed the President had been dissuaded from taking any immediate steps to investigate the C.I.A. by Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr., the White House chief of staff.

"He was concerned," Mr. Colson added, "and he also had had other similar reports. But he also was very concerned about doing anything that would have damaged our national intelligence capabilities."

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HS/HC- 850

BOOKS

June 14
Hanger's



UP FRONT FOR THE CIA

by Robert T. Wood

Without Cloak or Dagger, by Miles Copeland. Simon and Schuster, \$8.95 (July).

MILES COPELAND is an old whore. This is not the libelous statement it seems, as anyone with Mr. Copeland's background well knows. In the Central Intelligence Agency, "old whore" is a term used to describe an officer so experienced, so devoted to his trade, so loyal to his organization, and so accustomed to following orders that he will accept and do a creditable job on any assignment without regard for moral, ethical, or possibly even legal considerations. Within the Agency it is a

high compliment to professionalism.

No outsider can be sure Mr. Copeland qualifies for the title, of course, because the most ambiguous aspect of this latest book on the CIA is the status of its author. An alumnus of the wartime OSS, Mr. Copeland claims he served as a consultant to the newly formed CIA and was called back from time to time thereafter to review the systems he had devised. He never claims to have been a staff employee of the Agency, yet he says that espionage has occupied most of his working life. In 1957 he established himself in Beirut as a security consultant, which, he alleges, is still his occupation today, but his knowledge of the Agency and its workings is both intimate and up-to-the-minute.

To ask Mr. Copeland when, exactly, his employment with the CIA ended might be a little like asking David Eisenhower how much rent he pays.

The temptation to compare Miles Copeland to Victor Louis is irresistible. A mysterious Russian who began as a small-time black marketeer moving about on the fringes of the foreign community in Moscow, Louis landed an assignment as correspondent for a London newspaper and made several trips outside the Soviet Union, rushing in to places, like Taipei, where Russian diplomats feared to tread. The speculation, which will probably never be confirmed, is that he obtained his unusual privileges and freedom of movement by virtue of his relationship with the KGB department of misinformation, whose mission it is to mislead the rest of the world concerning Russian capabilities and intentions. Like Victor Louis, Miles Copeland is a highly visible and easily accessible person of nebulous status who can go places and say things that responsible officials cannot. Mr. Copeland, who on at least one occasion has said things about CIA activities that responsible officials later had to deny, has been described by one journalist as "the only man I know who uses the CIA as a cover."

MR. COPELAND has written this book, he says, to counter a flood of misinformation on spies and counterspies that appears on television, in movies, books, magazine articles, and newspapers. To give him his due, there is more inside information on the subject presented here than has probably ever appeared publicly in one place. To begin with, Mr. Copeland makes it clear that espionage is a relatively minor source of intelligence information, although the clandestine services often seem to be the tail that wags the dog, and of course

the descriptions of them make the best reading. His explanations of planning and organization of a penetration operation and of the procedure for developing, recruiting, and handling an agent are in some cases overelaborate and in others oversimplified, but generally they are accurate. The account of the position and operation of the CIA field station, cataloguing many of the problems faced by a CIA officer serving overseas, will be new to most readers and might even be instructive for foreign-service officers and foreign correspondents who thought they knew all there was to know. Add to this a text liberally salted with footnotes—most of them fascinating anecdotes in their own right—and the result is an interesting and readable book.

Unfortunately, the large quantities of good information in *Without Cloak or Dagger* serve as a vehicle for an equal amount of misinformation on the Agency, more misinformation, in fact, than all that's been produced by the movies, television shows, or publications that Mr. Copeland complains of. Moreover, the misinformation is presented very authoritatively, with no hint to enable the uninitiated to distinguish the true from the false. His intent, in a great many instances, is clearly to mislead the reader and give a totally false impression of Agency capabilities and performance.

In describing field operations, Mr. Copeland stresses their defensive nature, stating, with a certain candor, that "the mission of the CIA station is . . . to stay out of trouble." Most of the sixty or so stations around the world have, he says, no more than two or three case officers,* and, ideally, a case officer is responsible for no more than one operation. Contrasted with this low-profile view of the CIA overseas are his assertions of an impressive amount of successful activity. He claims that "over the years, there have been literally thousands of CIA agents in the U.S.S.R., Red China, Cuba and other communist

countries," and that both agents and American sources are constantly in and out of these "denied areas." The implication is that both Peking and Moscow are swarming with CIA spies and that no state secret is safe from them.

The facts as I was exposed to them were vastly different. In the days before I began to worry about becoming an old whore myself, I served for several years at a station with considerably more than three case officers. During one particularly hectic summer, I met regularly with and handled no fewer than twenty agents, one of them with an additional five subagents. My workload had been expanded by taking on handholding chores for some operations of my colleagues who were on home leave, but the average load for case officers is, I suspect, closer to twenty than to one. Even after I had achieved the relative luxury of handling only one fairly high-level agent, I continued to manage four or five other agents in support of my operation and other station operations, and I considered myself underemployed at the time.

It's embarrassing to admit that China was my primary target and all my best efforts resulted in not one penetration of the Chinese military, party, or government above the village level. The other case officers at the station were similarly unsuccessful, as had been every other case officer who had worked on the target for the previous twenty years. We consoled ourselves only with the knowledge that our colleagues in the units working against the U.S.S.R., with more personnel and more money and, presumably, more urgency, would have fared just as miserably but for the greater tendency of Russians to defect. Their one outstanding agent was not developed through any positive effort on their part; he had sought them out.

Early in the book, Mr. Copeland describes the CIA's arrest and physical elimination of a headquarters employee who had served for years as an agent for the Russians. If he expects anyone to believe this story, it must have occurred to him that he is confessing to a role as accessory to an administrative murder. The CIA has no police powers, let alone authority to act as judge and executioner. There are no doubt plenty of officers, young and old, who would not hesitate to carry out

an execution if ordered, but it is incredible that there is a single administrator at any level of the Agency who would take the responsibility of ordering it. Although the Phoenix program, a wholesale assassination of key insurgent leaders in Vietnam, was directed by then Ambassador William Colby, it was carried out principally by the Vietnamese themselves, not by CIA officers. Phoenix had the full approval of higher authority, so the burden of Agency responsibility was minimal. It was not at all equivalent to the secret liquidation of one renegade staff employee in the basement of the Langley headquarters. If this incident had really happened, it would be foolhardy in the extreme for anyone involved ever to mention it; a second execution would be far more likely than the first was.

THE MOST IMAGINATIVE invention of the whole book is the cabal, or inner circle of Agency old-timers, who pop up to illustrate a point now and then. Known only by exotic names like "Mother," "Kingfish," "Jojo," and "Lady Windemere," they go on about the business of making the Agency run, regardless of changes in administration or policy. The last three of those mentioned, on the basis of their described responsibilities, appear to be no more than specialists in a single unit that supports operations without getting directly involved in their execution or command; these positions would not account for the importance or influence Mr. Copeland ascribes to them. Mother is the *éminence grise*. Like the others, he was present at the birth of the Agency, and, faced with the frustration of wondering what decisions the Congress was making for the future of the fledgling Central Intelligence Group, he characteristically suggested, "Penetration begins at home," thus showing that intragovernmental spying was not an invention of the Joint Chiefs. It was also Mother who fabricated a complete espionage operation in those early days just to expose the gullibility of a unit competing with his for influence in the new Agency.

In spite of his early start and undoubted talents of maneuver, Mother somehow never made it to the top, but he enjoys a certain amount of autonomy today as head of the Agen-

* Mr. Copeland corrects a popular misconception by explaining that staff CIA employees are almost never designated as agents, in the sense that FBI officers are known as "special agents." In intelligence an agent is someone, usually a foreign national, hired to provide information or perform other tasks. The staff employee who contacts and directs him, and in general handles his "case," is known as a "case officer."

cy's counterterrorist effort, a huge computerized data bank storing background information on millions of persons, both American and foreign, who could conceivably become involved in terrorist activity, as well as millions more who could not. Mother is, of course, an imaginary character, but, aside from that, there is no way for an outsider to judge the truth of the Agency's so-called counterterrorist activities. It is not legally authorized to keep files on American citizens. The significant thing is that the author wants his readers to believe it is doing so.

The CIA may well become the world's most powerful government agency, according to Mr. Copeland, because it has access to the most knowledge. Removing the dangers inherent in a powerful government agency, he adds, is not a matter of decreasing the power, but of ensuring that those who exercise it are incorruptible and truly responsive to public interest. "CIA officials believe that their agency is already incorruptible and . . . as responsive to public interest as any other agency." Interestingly enough, he does not claim anywhere that the Agency is responsive to higher authority. On the contrary, he gives examples where it has specifically been unresponsive and implies that it will continue to be so in cases where higher authority is in conflict with its own particular view of the public interest.

The overall picture that emerges from this book is of a Central Intelligence Agency enormously competent, frighteningly ruthless, spectacularly successful, terribly powerful, and absolutely trustworthy, the sort of ideal government organization that only a fool or a charlatan would tamper with. The author has composed a presentation that could completely revamp the Agency's image.

It has been apparent that ever since his days as executive director, William Colby has been trying to renovate his organization's image. The impression he wanted to project, as a friend of mine put it, seemed to be "something like a cross between General Motors and the League of Women Voters." There is an ominous implication in this book that, by improving the Agency's image, Colby intends to enhance its power and independence as well.

A great many people are going to take *Without Cloak or Dagger* se-

riously, but I doubt that anyone with the necessary authority will ask the Agency how much they had to do with it, or precisely what their relationship with Mr. Copeland is. Unlike the general run of Walter Mittys who claim to have some intimate relationship with the CIA, Miles Copeland clearly has one, but neither he nor the Agency is going to define it voluntarily. In the foreword, Mr. Copeland says, "I must make it clear, however, that no one at CIA . . . or any other official agency has 'cleared' this book or in any other way implied approval of my writing it." In early November of last year, I wrote a letter to Angus Thuermer, assistant to director William Colby, asking several very specific questions about the clearance of a magazine article that appears, in somewhat different form, as chapter nine, of the book. Mr. Thuermer's reply was unequivocal. "All Agency employees," he said, "sign secrecy agreements, and the federal courts have determined that the secrecy agreements are enforceable contracts." The actual review of manuscripts is a security function, and on that basis he declined to answer my questions, but if the man who sits next to the director of Central Intelligence admits he had the machinery to stop publication of this book and didn't, that should be approval enough for anyone. □

CURSING THE DARKNESS

by Nelson W. Polsby

The American Condition, by Richard N. Goodwin, Doubleday, \$10.

EVER SINCE Richard Goodwin entered public life, in the early 1960s, a certain moral urgency has surrounded his every move, whether it was coining stirring phrases for Presidential speeches ("Alliance For Progress," "The Great Society"), keeping the "authorized" account of the Kennedy assassination within guidelines set out by the family,

Nelson W. Polsby, a political scientist, married to a poet, lives in Berkeley, California. His forthcoming book of essays is entitled *Political Promises* (Oxford University Press).

switching sides from Eugene McCarthy to Lyndon B. Kennedy during the 1968 primary season, or whenever. This same electric quality of absolute rightness pervades *The American Condition*, a lengthy essay on the evils that accompany the concentration of power, and on the consequent need for Americans to rediscover the basic harmonies of a simpler, more communitarian existence as a way of exercising their individualism, reducing alienation, and thereby finding freedom.

The steps by which this quintessential New Frontiersman has come to appropriate the rhetoric of the *National Review* are not spelled out, and that is a great pity. From all his fulminations against inflation ("a tax on the citizenry"), the "bureaucratic spirit," and "coercion," are we to infer a repudiation of Goodwin's earlier commitments? It is hard to say: in a single page he suggests the nationalization of the major sources of capital and that "economic relationships should be decentralized," the two seemingly contradictory imperatives to be reconciled by employing "the new technologies of control."

Goodwin locates much of the responsibility for the alienation of contemporary Americans in the domination by large bureaucracies of the economic life of the nation. Much of this argument is made with copious recourse to quotations from St. Paul and Nietzsche, Jefferson, Marx, and so on (but sparingly from John Kenneth Galbraith, whose analysis Goodwin's most resembles). It is an argument displaying so many of the furnishings of Goodwin's well-furnished mind that the reader may wonder if he has stumbled upon the intellectual equivalent of a garage sale.

The message of *The American Condition* is unrelentingly grim—even in a potentially whimsical moment when Goodwin spins out a fable about how cooking caused the fall of man. Moreover, as the testament of a man formerly engaged feverishly as a political activist, it is thoroughgoing in its rejection of politics. The role of politics in America, as Goodwin sees it, is not to advance human dignity, or even to share some goodies around, but principally to prevent "mortal clashes between powerful private interests. When this is not possible, as during the 1850s, force and not politics decides the issue."

The question is, How much of

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST

Monday, June 10, 1974

B13

Shah Link to Nixon Campaign Hinted

By Jack Anderson

For six months, we have been investigating the strange relationship between President Nixon and the shah of Iran. There have been whispers, all vehemently denied, that the shah funneled money into the Nixon campaign by way of Mexico.

Our inquiries, including overseas calls to Teheran, Geneva, Bonn, Mexico City and other far-away places, have got the Iranians in a dither.

Suddenly, we found Iranian officials were expecting our calls, before we made them. Then the distinguished and decent former Secretary of State, William Rogers, telephoned us in the shah's behalf.

He cautioned us kindly that we were chasing wild rumors. He called back twice, with more categorical denials. Then his law firm followed up with a telegram to United Feature, which distributes our column.

The story we were investigating was "implausible and totally baseless . . ." the telegram charged. "We strongly urge that this story not be published."

We can hardly resist publishing a story that the shah is so anxious to suppress. It all started six months ago when a former high Iranian official came to us with the allegation

that the shah had routed hundreds of thousands of dollars to the Nixon campaign.

The source admitted he had turned against the shah. His information, therefore, must be regarded with skepticism. The Iranian embassy flatly denied the story; the White House denied it; Bill Rogers denied it. And we certainly can't prove it.

But we have uncovered some curious circumstances that are worth relating. First, we contacted another prominent Iranian who, quite independently, told us the same story. The money had been routed, he said, through Mexico. But he, too, admitted he was opposed to the shah.

Then we learned from Swiss banking sources that the shah had transferred more than \$1 million from his personal, numbered accounts in the Schweizerische Bank Gesellschaft to the Banco de Londres Y Mexico in Mexico City.

It also struck us as an interesting coincidence that other Nixon campaign money had been laundered through a Mexican bank. When the FBI began to check into this, it seemed to upset the White House more than any other phase of the Watergate investigation.

The President's two most trusted aides, H. R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman, tried to

use the Central Intelligence Agency to head off the FBI. CIA director Richard Helms and his deputy, Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters, were summoned to the White House. They were instructed to inform the FBI that the Mexican probe was interfering with the CIA's operations.

Not long afterwards, Helms was suddenly named ambassador to Iran. Yet his predecessor in Teheran, Joseph Farland, had scarcely settled down in the job. Clearly, the President wasn't displeased with Farland's performance. For the President tried to placate him by offering him his choice of four other ambassadorships.

Although Farland refused to speak to us for the record, sources close to him told us he was "greatly amazed" and "grief-stricken" at being removed. He not only felt it might be misinterpreted as a blot on his career but he was beginning to enjoy the new assignment. His departure was so "emotional," said our sources, that he was moved to tears.

Why was the White House so concerned about the FBI investigation of cash laundering in Mexico City? In light of the other Watergate revelations, this would seem to be a fairly insignificant detail. And why did Helms agree to tell the FBI that the Mexican investigation could

jeopardize a CIA operation?

We checked with Watergate investigators who said they had detected no trace of Iranian money in their probe of the Mexican connection. But they had picked up hints that something is still lurking in the background which has yet to be revealed. "It is all very mysterious," said one Senate investigator.

None of this proves, of course, that the shah's money ever reached the Nixon campaign. But the intriguing relationship between the President and the shah deserves closer examination.

Footnote: As another piece of the puzzle, the shah announced last July 25 after conferring with the President at the White House that Iran had struck an oil deal with Ashland Oil. Ashland's president, Orin Atkins, has confessed that his firm illegally contributed \$100,000 in corporate funds to the Nixon campaign.

Spokesmen for both the White House and the oil company deny reports that the President personally put Atkins and the shah together at Blair House, where visiting dignitaries are quartered. The Ashland spokesman told my associate Joe Spear only that Atkins was in Washington during the shah's visit.

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HS/HC-980

Senate Favors Limitation on CIA

United Press International

The Senate has voted to close a loophole in the CIA charter that was cited last year to justify the agency's help to Watergate conspirators E. Howard Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy.

An amendment by Sen. William Proxmire, D-Wis., to the 1975 military budget bill would insert the word "foreign" before every reference to intelligence in the CIA's charter, and di-

rect the agency to report to Congress on all duties assigned to it by the National Security Council.

The amendment was accepted by Armed Services Committee Chairman John Stennis, D-Miss., after Proxmire deleted language that would have barred the CIA from providing any assistance to police without the written approval of congressional oversight committees, and the full Senate

accepted the amendment on a voice vote.

Proxmire said hearings before the Watergate committee and the House and Senate armed services committees had shown "a number of misuses of CIA authority." Among them, he said, were the provision of false credentials, disguises, a camera and other equipment to Hunt and Liddy who used them during the break-in at the office of

Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

The agency's former director, Richard Helms, justified the aid to Hunt as part of a National Security Council mission assigned to CIA.

Until Helms testified, it had been generally assumed in Congress that the CIA was concerned exclusively with foreign intelligence.

Washington Star-News
Tuesday, 4 June 1974

Washington Star-News
Wednesday, June 5, 1974

A-23

CIA Cost Disclosure Bid Killed

Associated Press

The Senate has refused to require the Central Intelligence Agency to disclose publicly each year the total amount of money America spends on spying.

Sen. William Proxmire, D-Wis., was voted down, 55-33, yesterday on his public disclosure amendment to the \$21.8 billion weapons procurement authorization bill.

ALSO REJECTED, 55-27, was an amendment by Sen. George McGovern, D-S.D., to authorize a \$100 million grant and loan fund to help defense contractors to convert their plants and employes to civilian work as defense contracts expire.

He has offered similar proposals every year since 1966, when the Vietnam war was in full swing, and all have been defeated.

The Senate approved, 76-12, an amendment by Sen. Hubert Humphrey, D-Minn., to forbid the armed forces from testing poisonous gases, germ and chemical warfare agents and radioactive materials on dogs.

HUMPHREY SAID the Army's Edgewood Arsenal in Maryland recently advertised for 450 beagle puppies to continue evaluation of toxic substances despite widespread public protests.

"I suggest that the Department of Defense take a greater interest in rats, and let the dogs alone," he asserted.

Proxmire's CIA budget disclosure amendment was opposed by members of a 22-man Senate-House special CIA Oversight Committee made up of senior members of the House and Senate appropriations and armed services committees.

Chairman John C. Stennis, D-Miss., of the Armed Services Committee said disclosure could give U.S. adversaries, present and future, "the working tools to blueprint to a degree United States intelligence activity."

"WE MIGHT AS WELL abolish the agency," he said.

Chairman John L. McClellan, D-Ark., of the Appropriations Committee, said disclosure of the intelligence budget total would lead to demands for explanations and details.

"If you end all the ignorance, you end national security," he asserted.

The Senate adopted by voice vote an amendment by Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr., D-Del., declaring it the sense of Congress that defense budgets should not be padded to stimulate the domestic economy, and requiring the secretary of defense to tell Congress within 30 days how much of next year's \$85.6 billion budget is intended for that purpose.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, JUNE 7, 1974

Parts of the Book Censored by the C.I.A.

Following are excerpts from a forthcoming book, "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks. Mr. Marchetti worked for the Central Intelligence Agency for fourteen years as a Soviet-military specialist and executive assistant to the deputy director. Mr. Marks was an analyst and staff assistant to the intelligence director in the State Department.

The book has been at the center of a legal dispute between the authors; the publisher, Alfred A. Knopf, and the C.I.A. A Federal court order permitted the agency to inspect the manuscript of the book. The C.I.A. deleted 339 passages, but later reinstated

171 after the publisher and the authors started litigation against the agency.

A Federal judge cleared for use 140 passages, plus parts of two others, but continuing legal appeals made them unavailable for inclusion in the book. Both sides submitted written briefs to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth District. Oral arguments were heard June 3 and a ruling is pending.

In these excerpts—and in the rest of the book—boldface type represents original C.I.A. deletions that the agency later reinstated. The word DELETED represents deletions the agency refused to reinstate. In all, there were 168 deletions.

THE CIA is big, very big. Officially, it has authorized manpower of 16,500, and an authorized budget of \$750 million—and even those figures are jealously guarded, generally made available only to Congress. Yet, regardless of its official size and cost, the agency is far larger and more affluent than these figures indicate.

The CIA itself does not even know how many people work for it. The 16,500 figure does not reflect the tens of thousands who serve under contract (mercenaries, agents, consultants, etc.) or who work for the agency's proprietary companies.* Past efforts to total up the number of foreign agents have never resulted in precise figures because of the inordinate secrecy and compartmentalization practiced by the Clandestine Services. Sloppy record-keeping—often deliberate on the part of the operators “for security purposes”—is also a factor. There are one-time agents hired for specific missions, contract agents who serve for extended periods of time, and career agents who spend their entire working lives secretly employed by the CIA. In some instances, contract agents are retained long after their usefulness has passed, but usually are known only to the case officers with whom they deal. One of the Watergate burglars, Eugenio Martinez, was in this category. When he was caught inside the Watergate on that day in June 1972, he still was receiving a \$100-a-month stipend from the agency for work apparently unrelated to his covert assignment for the Committee to Re-Elect the President. The CIA claims to have since dropped him from the payroll.

With their characteristic enthusiasm for gimmicks and gadgetry, the CIA came up with two technical discoveries in the mid-1960s that were used in Vietnam with limited success but great delight.

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) In actual practice, however, whatever damage was caused by the chemical was quickly repaired by the Vietcong and North Vietnamese.

The agency's other discovery was a weapons-detection system. It worked by spraying a special chemical on the hands of a suspected Vietcong and then, after a few minutes, shining an ultraviolet light on his hands. If the chemical glowed in a certain manner, that meant that the suspect had held a metal object—in theory, a weapon—during the preceding twenty-four hours. The system's main drawback was that it was just as sensitive to steel farm implements as to guns and it could implicate a person who had been merely working with a hammer. The CIA considered the system such a success, however, that it passed it on through a domestic training program to the police forces of several American cities.

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paramilitary triumphs—the successful invasion of Guatemala by an agency-organized rebel force. And it was in Latin America that the CIA seven years later suffered its most notable failure—the abortive invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. But the agency was slow to accept defeat in the Cuban operation. The only reason for the failure, the CIA's operators believed, was that President Kennedy had lost his nerve at the last minute, refusing more air support for the invasion and withholding or reducing other possible assistance by U.S. forces. Consequently, the agency continued its relationships with its "penetrations" of Cuban exile groups—in a way reminiscent of its lingering ties with Eastern European émigré organizations from the early Cold War period. And the CIA kept many of the Bay of Pigs veterans under contract, paying them regular salaries for more than a decade afterward.

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Time after time, the Cuban government would parade CIA-sponsored rebels before television cameras to display them and their equipment to the Cuban public and the world. Often the captives made full confessions of the agency's role in their activities.

WORKMEN had already started to put the White House Christmas decorations in place on a December day in 1969 when the President met in the Cabinet room with the National Security Council. The (

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) out to the interested parts of the federal government the previous April, bureaucrats had been writing position papers to prepare their chiefs for this meeting. There was sharp disagreement within the government on how hard a line the United States should take with the (

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) Now the time for decision-making was at hand, and those present included the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Under Secretaries of State and Commerce, the Director of Central Intelligence, a representative of the National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA), the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.*

The President opened the session by stating that the NSC had before it some very complex problems—complex not only in the usual foreign-policy sense but also in a moral context which, the President noted, concerned a large portion of the American population. Nixon then turned to his DCI, Richard Helms, and said, "Go ahead, Dick."

The NSC meeting had officially begun, and, as was customary, Helms set the scene by giving a detailed briefing on the political and economic background of the countries under discussion. Using charts and maps carried in by an aide, he described recent developments in southern Africa. (His otherwise flawless performance was marred only by his mispronunciation of "Malagasy" [formerly Madagascar], when referring to the young republic.)

Next, Henry Kissinger talked about the kind of general posture the United States could maintain toward the (**DELETED**) and outlined the specific policy options open to the President. In the case of (

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* Some of the statements were quite revealing. Early in the meeting Secretary of State William Rogers jokingly pointed out, to general laughter in the room, that it might be inappropriate for the group to discuss the subject at hand; since some of those present had represented southern African clients in earlier law practices. Vice President Spiro Agnew gave an impassioned speech on how the South Africans, now that they had recently declared their independence, were not about to be pushed around, and he went on to compare South Africa to the United States in its infant days. Finally, the President leaned over to Agnew and said gently, "You mean Rhodesia, don't you, Ted?"

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) the United States to do so. To what extent Helms' arguments played a part in the presidential decision can be answered only by Richard Nixon himself. But, the following year, at the request of the British, the United States did end its (

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) was such an established factor that it was not even under review at the NSC meeting.

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The Federal Diary

THE WASHINGTON POST

Wednesday, June 5, 1974 B 15

House Clears \$3 Billion for Agencies

By
Mike
Causey



Federal-military agencies soon will get a \$3.8 billion infusion in their budgets that will enable them to meet the pay of 1.5 million agencies to begin pay retroactive money owed more than 2.5 million white collar workers and military personnel since October, 1972. Estimated cost of the back pay is \$533 million.

The House yesterday cleared the funds, which are earmarked in the vital Second Supplemental Appropriation. The Senate may pass it today. As soon as President Nixon signs on the dotted line, the money, needed to meet increased military and civilian pay costs, will be freed to agencies.

The Office of Management and Budget will then begin certifying requests from agencies

that need the money to make the back payments—of from \$59 to \$430—to workers and military aides who were on the payroll between Oct. 1, 1972, and January, 1973. That was the period when Mr. Nixon delayed a 5.14 percent pay raise.

Between 110,000 and 150,000 federal retirees—who were on the payroll during that October to January, 1973, period—will also have their pensions recomputed to make up for the salary they lost because of the pay delay, which was declared invalid earlier this year following a court suit.

Each eligible retiree depending on his former grade, longevity and age will get a monthly pension increase of from \$1 to \$10 as a result. Recomputation will be automatic. Retirees do not need to apply for it.

The average pension increase for those eligible retirees will be about \$5 a month, and the average retroactive paycheck for workers on the payroll during that three-month period will be \$160.

Some agencies already have enough money in their payroll accounts to pay the retroactivity. They will not have to go

clearance from the OMB, but will be able to begin back payments as soon as they have identified the workers, retirees or their survivors who are eligible.

Agencies that have money available will be able, in some cases, to pay employees the retroactive money within two weeks. General Services Administration, for example, plans to make the payments on June 12.

Agriculture, which has 120,000 eligible employees and former employees to track down, believes that most of its people will be paid by August.

Central Intelligence Agency is engaged in a "very aggressive" program to track down persons eligible for the retroactive payments.

Navy, as we pointed out yesterday, may be one of the last federal departments to pay the retroactivity because it is already short of funds due to increased pay costs and higher fuel prices.

Federal Professional Association has an interesting sounding all-day program scheduled Saturday at George Washington

University. David T. Stanley of the Brookings Institution will give the keynote address.

Workshop panelists include top names from government, the private sector and former federal officials who will offer outside perspectives on what is happening to the government. Details by calling FPA at 783-2362.

Jobs: Public Defender Service wants a Grade 4 Xerox operator. Call 638-4972.

Treasury needs a GS 12 classification specialist, GS 13 labor relations specialist, GS 14 equal opportunity officer, and a GS 6 secretary. Call 964-5701.

David Silverglate, executive vice president of the American Postal Workers Union will retire next month and head for Florida. Silverglate was president of the independent National Postal Union then merged with other postal organizations to form the APWU.

He's long been one of the most dynamic and innovative union leaders in the federal sector and a very fine gentleman in the process.

SHOP
AND

THRIFTY LUMBERTERIA

THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, JUNE 4, 1974

Text of Colson Statement After Guilty Plea on Obstruction of Justice

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 3—Following is the text of a statement today by Charles W. Colson, former White House counsel, after he pleaded guilty to obstruction of justice in the Ellsberg case.

I have pleaded guilty today to the information filed by the special prosecutor in the district court. The charges in the information are not those contained in the two indictments previously returned against me—that is the Watergate cover-up and the Ellsberg break-in. I pleaded not guilty to those charges; I can in complete conscience, however, plead guilty to the particular charges of this information. I have taken this action for reasons which are very important to me.

1. To have fought the two indictments might well have resulted in my eventual exoneration. As a defendant I would have been necessarily concerned with protecting my position in the trials. That would have limited my ability to tell everything I know about the Watergate

and Watergate-related matters.

I have told the truth from the beginning but I have not been able to testify fully, for example, because of a threatened indictment I could not appear at the Ervin committee.

I have watched with a heavy heart the country I love being torn apart these past months by one of the most divisive and bitter controversies in our history. The prompt and just resolution of other proceedings, far more important than my trial, is vital to our democratic process. I want to be free to contribute to that resolution no matter who it may help or hurt—me or others. That, at least is the way I see my duty; that is the dictate of my conscience.

2. During the pretrial motions, I listened very intently to many of the arguments related to the national security justification of the Ellsberg break-in. Judge Gesell's words from the bench—to the effect that if this is to be a Government of laws and not of men, then those men entrusted with enforcing the law must be held to account

for the natural consequences of their own actions—had a profound effect on me. Whether at the time certain actions seemed totally justified and indeed essential to the national interest is not the issue. If the overriding national interest requires extraordinary action, then every possible legal sanction must be observed, every right to individual due process respected. We cannot accept the principle that men in high government office can act in disregard of the rights of even one individual citizen.

My plea acknowledges that I endeavored to disseminate derogatory information about Dr. Ellsberg and his attorney at a time when he was under indictment by the same Government of which I was an officer. Judge Gesell's words had particular impact upon me because I have either been under indictment or been the target of serious accusations for the past two years. I know what it feels like—what it must have felt like to Dr. Ellsberg—to have the Government which is prosecuting me also try me in the public press. I know how it feels to

be subjected to repeated and in some cases deliberate leaks from various Congressional committees. In fact, there are records showing that the C.I.A. deliberately planted stories with several major news organizations accusing me of involvement in criminal activities.

I regret what I attempted to do to Dr. Ellsberg. It is wrong whether it is done to him, to me or to others. Not only is it morally right therefore that I plead to this charge but I fervently hope that this case will serve to prevent similar abuses in the future. Government officials must know that under our system of government every individual—whether a potential or actual criminal defendant—is entitled to a fair trial and that anyone who attempts to interfere with that right must suffer the consequences.

It will not answer questions today, but I will make three observations which may satisfy some of your questions: First, my counsel has requested the court to proceed as swiftly as possible with sentencing. I will, as I have

from the beginning, tell the truth; but I want there to be no reason for anyone to even question whether my testimony might be affected—even subconsciously—by the impact it might have on the court.

Second, it is a widely held belief that in plea bargaining the defendant offers in advance testimony against others or at the very least negotiates on the basis that his testimony will be "useful" against others. I do not know about any other case, but I can say that this was not done in my case.

Third, as a result of this action today there may be speculation about my future testimony. I regret that I can only say that I hope that my testimony will be of value to the country and will contribute in some small way to bringing to an end one of the most painful periods in our history.

I truly believe that out of all the agonies of Watergate, it is possible to bring about important changes in our political process and to strengthen our institutions in such a way that they are better protected against those who would abuse the political process or abuse their public trust.

All of us who have been involved in this unhappy chapter of history, along with all of those who occupy public office today, have an overriding obligation to do everything in our power to help restore the confidence of the American people in this Government.

A 16 Tuesday, June 4, 1974 THE WASHINGTON POST

Thai Company Gets the Business**CIA Airline Leaving Thailand**By Philip A. McCombs
and John Burgess

Special to The Washington Post

BANGKOK, June 3—Air America, the airline that for years has served the Central Intelligence Agency and other U.S. government agencies in Asia, will cease all operations in Thailand by the end of June, the U. S. Embassy announced today.

The announcement comes as Air America's extensive operations here have come under criticism from Thai students, and the U. S. government today signed a contract transferring Air America's airplane maintenance contracts to a Thai corporation.

The corporation, Thai Airways Aircraft Maintenance Co., Ltd., known generally as Thai Am, will operate under Thai law and not benefit from the special privileges and immunities that Air America enjoyed, sources said.

These included exemption from Thai taxes and immigration and customs inspections, which powerful student factions viewed as violations of Thai sovereignty.

The signing of the Thai Am contract took place today in a special ceremony at Thailand's ornate supreme military headquarters here.

Thai Am officials say the firm is an American-managed company that is 70 per cent Thai and 30 per cent American-owned.

There are 10 American management specialists and 1,200 Thai managers and workers, Thai Am officials said. The company operates "the most reliable and advanced aircraft repair facility in Southeast Asia" at Bangkok's International Airport, they said.

Although the contract was signed by a low-ranking U.S. Air Force officer and a representative of Thai Am, also present was a group of important Thai and U.S. officials, including Thai Air Chief Marshal Dawee Chulasapya and Maj. Gen. Thomas Melle, commander of the U.S. military assistance command in Thailand.

Political observers said the high officials are eager for political benefit from the apparent lessening of U.S. influence here that the Air America departure implies.

Students, who have been a powerful political influence here since they overthrew the military government late last year, this weekend asked the government of Prime Minister Sanya Dharmasakti to do something about the privileges and immunities of Air America.

Except for a local television station, members of the press were not allowed to attend today's ceremony, and the terms of the contract were not officially announced.

Thai Am officials said, however, that the \$1.35 million, one-year contract called for servicing airplanes at Udorn air base near the Laotian border 300 miles northeast of Bangkok. It could not be learned what kind of planes are involved.

Air America planes operating from Udorn carried out troop movements, resupply missions and other clandestine operations during the years of the U.S. secret war against Communist-led forces in Laos and their North Vietnamese allies.

With the February 1973 cease-fire in Laos, and the recent formation of a coalition government there, Air America's operations are no longer necessary and have reportedly been phased out.

The U.S. embassy in Vientiane recently announced that all Air America operations in Laos would end this Tuesday, which marks the end of first 60 days of the new coalition government and the deadline for the departure of all foreign troops under the cease-fire agreement.

The U.S. embassy here said today that Air America has recently had 1,600 Thai and 250 U.S. and third-country employees working in Thailand, mostly at Udorn.

Many of these may be employed by Thai Am, the announcement said, but neither

U.S. nor Thai Am officials could say how many.

It was not announced what would happen to Air America's planes in Thailand or how the termination of its contract here fits into its general pattern of activities in Asia.

Air America operates in Cambodia and South Vietnam and maintains a large maintenance facility in Taiwan.

In Cambodia, reliable sources said that Air America's contract to repair government air force planes will soon be terminated and the contract given to Thai Am.

Thai Am officials here said today they knew nothing of this.

Air America officials here could not be reached for comment.

[Hugh Grundy, president of Air America at the company's Washington headquarters said he had "no comment for the moment" about the future of the company's operations in Cambodia or other parts of Asia.]

According to documents furnished by the Thai Am office at Bangkok airport and read over the telephone by a secretary, Thai Am was funded in 1967.

It is incorporated in Thailand, and 70 per cent owned by Thai Airways, a government-owned domestic airline, the secretary said.

The other 30 per cent is owned by Consolidated American Services Inc., a subsidiary of Automation Industries of Los Angeles, she said.

David Meyer, Thai Am sales and marketing manager, said over the telephone that Automation Industries is the "parent company." He said it was a "conglomerate" with a number of subsidiaries like Consolidated American.

He said other subsidiaries do such things as operate a bomb test site at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida; carry out tests for railroads; run a desalinization plant in Saudi Arabia and make altimeters and other electronic devices for the aerospace industry.

Thai Am's secretary said that the company "is a com-

mercial venture, not government-subsidized."

No one in the U.S. Embassy, at Thai Am or in political circles here suggested today that Thai Am is in any way linked with the Central Intelligence Agency.

Air America has been the clandestine air arm of the CIA since the late 1940s. Air America was originally called CAT, or Civil Air Transport, and was organized after World War II by Gen. Claire Chennault and other Americans.

It flew air support for Chiang Kai-shek's forces when they were fighting on mainland China and helped

the French during their Indochina war.

TOWN & COUNTRY

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Vol. 128 No 4620/JUNE 1974



Dominican spark Sra. Alma de Vicini (more about her and Oscar de la Renta dress on page 51). Harry Winston jewelry. The peaches-and-gleam make-up scheme that lights up Sra. de Vicini's face is from Helena Rubinstein's Skin Life Moisture Cream Makeup base in Good Ivory contoured with Peach Illumination Blushing Cream Compact; Bronze Fawn and Old Sterling Skin Life Deep Moisture Eyeshadow Creams. Make-up artist Way Bandy. Coiffure by Marc Sinclaire of Elizabeth Arden.

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ation, their minds begin to go. Moreover, they wear their premature aging like a badge of honor because they feel that's what they're supposed to do.

An informal study at one of the nation's busiest cardiovascular institutes indicates that, everything else being equal—age, general health, financial security, etc.—a retired male of executive status responds more poorly to therapy than his counterpart who is still working. Depression—at times well disguised—seems to be the prime factor. The link between depression and cancer is an accepted fact. And at New York's Memorial Hospital a study is under way to determine the relationship between cancer and alterations in one's life style—specifically, losing or changing jobs.

A degree of physical deterioration is inevitable in the aging process, but most major corporations have medical departments that keep close tabs on their executives. Those without exclusive medical facilities make use of the special quick-check executive programs available in most of our large cities and at all the nation's major clinics. The upshot is that America's business executives are among the healthiest in the world. Indeed, Dr. Paul Dudley White's theory regarding the prevention of heart attack through strenuous exercise was perhaps the most important step in lowering the mortality rate of the coronary-plagued leaders of big business—and he was well past the accepted age of retirement when he propounded it.

From the age of 15, a human being loses several million brain cells daily. But the human brain contains upward of 12 billion major cells and countless auxiliaries. While failing memory can occasion advancing age, there is absolutely no basis for the assumption that a specific individual of 65 or 70 is less alert than a specific individual 20 years younger. Otto Schmitt, a professor at M.I.T. whom *Time* Magazine referred to as the "Impresario of the Brain," is founder and chairman of the Neurosciences Research Program—a group of 36 top chemists and physicists (including 5 Nobel Prize winners) whose goal it is to arrive at a comprehensive theory of brain function. Professor Schmitt is 70. When asked if he planned to retire, he said: "Not in the con-

going again."

Things are changing. Everyone agrees that retirement, at whatever age, creates significant personal problems for the individual. Everyone agrees that one of the causes of the retiree's disillusionment is a lack of preparation for that time when he is obliged to leave the company. Some of the larger corporations—GM, for example, General Electric, IBM, and several of the drug companies—have excellent programs to prepare their executives for retirement. Such organizations as American Management Associations, the American Association of Retired Persons, and Retirement Advisors Inc. provide excellent consultation and conduct extensive seminars on financial planning, housing and location, attitudes and role adjustments, and the meaningful use of time. Still, however accurate the diagnosis, the treatment seems somehow symptomatic. Not everyone who retires is interested in altering his attitude and adjusting his role toward reduced activity. There are alternatives.

The dropout phenomenon that appeared in this country a few years ago did not stop at the college campuses but took its toll (or its tribute) from the corporate ranks as well. After 20 years as a top-level C.I.A. analyst, John Koehne handed in his code book, hopped into his camper truck, and began combing the wilder parts of the country in search of a place to expand his consciousness. A success at 49, he made the decision to turn his back on a system fraught with impersonal decisions, power plays, and sycophants. John Thompson, a 47 year old Detroit dentist, sold everything he owned, bought an ancient 100-ton freighter, and hit the high seas with his wife and four children. Tony Rousellot, 35 and a New York stockbroker for 11 years, sold his East Side apartment and his country home and, with his family, moved in among the Indians in Taos, New Mexico.

Hospital boards and volunteer community work are traditional pursuits of retired people. But there is a mustering legion of benevolent entrepreneurs who welcome retirement as an opportunity to get out of the boardroom and into the field. Royal Little, 78, retired head of Tectron, advises retiring executives to shun honor-

(Continued on page 119)

Washington Star-News

Sunday, June 2, 1974

A-3

★ ★

Hunt's Shadow

Watergate burglar E. Howard Hunt, who lived his life in the shadow world of CIA before he won notoriety for the celebrated break-in, has a goal: anonymity. In an interview scheduled to be televised today on ABC, Hunt said, "Anonymity is what I seek more than anything else at this time." But then, Hunt has always seemed to live his life anonymously. As an author of dozens of spy, he wrote under a long string of fictitious names. And to many of his Cuban friends, he was known only as Eduardo.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Friday, May 24, 1974

Washington Wire

A Special Weekly Report From
The Wall Street Journal's
Capital Bureau

NEVER AGAIN, the CIA insists. Burned by Watergate entanglement, intelligence staffers vow to avoid any comparable domestic involvement in the future. Director William Colby issues steer-clear instruction, but the real guarantee is staff readiness to explode if it seems the agency is being misused.

A 19 Friday, May 17, 1974 THE WASHINGTON POST

Hughes Wanted Link To CIA, Maheu Says

LOS ANGELES, May 16 (UPI) — Howard Hughes wanted his business to become a front for the CIA to give him leverage with federal regulatory agencies, a former top Hughes executive has testified in federal court.

Robert A. Maheu, a former FBI agent who has testified he was involved with the CIA while working for Hughes, said he refused to help Hughes accomplish the linkup.

Maheu testified Wednesday in his \$17.5 million libel suit against Hughes for the billionaire's statement that Maheu was fired as head of the Hughes Nevada empire because "he stole me blind."

Maheu has spent the week detailing for the jury the unusual nature of his work for Hughes, for which he was paid \$500,000 a year.

Hughes learned of Maheu's links to the CIA in 1960 or early 1961, Maheu testified, when he had to spend a lot of

time in Miami "on a very sensitive assignment for a government intelligence agency."

Hughes was happy to learn that one of his top aides was involved with the CIA, and "he encouraged me to continue on with the assignment and any other work that might be required of me in future years," Maheu said.

Eight years later, Maheu said, "Mr. Hughes asked me if I could try to make some kind of arrangement with the CIA whereby some part of the Hughes Tool Co. could become a front for the intelligence agency."

"He pointed out that if he ever became involved with the government—with a regulatory body or investigative agency—he thought it would be very beneficial to him . . .

"I told him I couldn't believe what he was telling me and under no circumstances would I assist him in such an endeavor."

Washington Star-News

Thursday, May 16, 1974

Hughes and the CIA

Billionaire recluse Howard Hughes once considered offering his Hughes Tool Co. as a front for the Central Intelligence Agency, a former top executive of Hughes has testified. Robert A. Maheu, who is suing Hughes in a \$17.5 million libel action, also said that in 1960 he tried unsuccessfully to prevent details of a "Hughes-Nixon loan" from becoming public during that election year. According to Maheu, Hughes proposed the CIA connection in 1968 while the two men were discussing the tool company's poor relations with some federal agencies. Regarding the \$205,000 "loan" from Hughes to F. Donald Nixon, the President's brother, Maheu said he succeeded in delaying a newspaper story but the information leaked anyway.

WASHINGTON STAR

Tuesday, 14 MAY 1974

S. Viet Plane, CIA Transport Feared Crashed

SAIGON (AP) — A South Vietnamese transport and a transport of the CIA-operated Air American line crashed near the Cambodian border within a few hours of each other yesterday, military officials reported.

The Air America twin-engine C123 went down from "unknown causes" about four miles south of Tay Ninh City and about 50 miles northwest of Saigon while on a flight from the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh to Saigon's Tan Son Nhut air base, officials said. They said four crewmen, whose nationality was not disclosed, were injured.

Earlier in the day, a South Vietnamese transport aircraft was hit by Viet Cong ground fire and exploded in the air in the same general area near the Cambodian border, the Saigon command said.

Officers in Saigon said two persons aboard the C47 were killed and four others are missing.

Jack Anderson

Some Light Breaks Through — But Not Enough

A controversial book about the Central Intelligence Agency has gone to press with several blank spaces, marking the passages that the CIA has managed at least temporarily to delete.

With the help of our own CIA sources, we have now filled in the blanks. The deletions, all fascinating, some explosive, are more likely to make people blush than to bring down governments.

The CIA, nevertheless, is still fighting in the courts to keep the embarrassing revelations out of the forthcoming book, "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," by Victor Marchetti and John Marks.

Marchetti is a bespectacled former intelligence analyst who has been forbidden by the CIA to mention that he played a crucial role in the celebrated Cuban missile crisis.

The Cuba-bound Soviet missiles, too large to stow below decks, were disguised in crates on deck. U.S. reconnaissance planes brought back photographs, which Marchetti examined. Through tedious, microscopic study, say our sources, he was able to distinguish between tractor crates and missile crates.

The passages that the CIA is still contesting in the courts — with a few exceptions which we voluntarily will omit — might mortify the CIA but couldn't possibly endanger the national security. The censored incidents make the CIA look like a covert circus, with the cloak-and-dagger crowd getting involved in some unbelievable situations, sometimes hilarious, sometimes grim.

One episode that has been deleted from the book, for example, concerns a Soviet spy in Japan who was about to defect to the United States. The prospect exhilarated the head of the CIA's Soviet desk who caught the first jet for Tokyo to get in on the action.

But the Russians became suspicious of their comrade and tailed him to the trysting spot. At the dramatic moment of defection, the prospective turncoat found himself literally caught in a tug-of-war, with the Americans pulling on one arm and the Russians clinging to the other. In the middle of the strug-

gle, the Japanese gendarmes intruded upon the unlikely scene and carted the whole group off to the pokey for disturbing the peace.

This doesn't compare to the high drama in the Himalayas, however, when the United States needed information on the Chinese nuclear tests in remote Sinkiang province. The CIA recruited a mountain climbing crew and trained them for weeks in the Colorado mountains. Then in the late 1960s, the CIA climbers were dispatched to scale one of the loftiest peaks in the Himalayas to install a nuclear-powered listening device aimed at the Chinese test sites.

The climb was so hazardous that a couple packers fell to their deaths. But the device, at last, was triumphantly implanted. Unhappily, the first mountain blizzard swept the listening device over. When spring came, the melting mountain snow was polluted with radiation, which seeped into the watershed. The abashed CIA had to send another mountain-climbing team up the peak to find the wreckage and remove it.

The Marchetti-Marks manuscript also contains some big names, among them that of West Germany's Chancellor Willy Brandt. Like many other world leaders, he received money from the CIA when he was an aspiring young politician.

At a White House state dinner for Brandt in 1971, the high and mighty were puzzled about one nondescript guest whom no one recognized.

The manuscript originally identified the mystery man as Brandt's old CIA

contact, whom the chancellor had asked the White House to invite for sentimental reasons. The CIA got this reference censored out of the book, ostensibly to spare Brandt's sensibilities.

The manuscript also tells of a 1967 trip that President Lyndon Johnson took to Punta del Este, Uruguay, for a meeting of the Organization of American States. In his expansive Texas style, LBJ dispensed gifts and souvenirs, wine and dined dignitaries and put on a lavish performance. To his embarrassment, he considerably exceeded the budget allowed for the trip by the State Department.

Because of economies LBJ himself had imposed, the State Department simply was unable to cover the tab. So the President was obliged to turn to the CIA, which paid the bill out of a secret slush fund called "The Directors Contingency Fund."

This fund had to be tapped in 1967, too, by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara whose Pentagon budget couldn't meet a verbal commitment he had made to a European ally for arms aid. The funds were secretly transferred from the CIA to the Defense Department without the knowledge of Congress.

The CIA also used money from the secret fund to invest in stocks, which presumably were plowed back into CIA retirement, escrow and credit union funds. The revelation that the CIA was playing the stock market, our sources report, was cut out of the Marchetti-Marks book.

However humorous some of the CIA's escapades may have been, the authors are deadly serious about the issues their book raises. For the American people have only the haziest of views into the shadowy, subterranean world of espionage.

Now and then, a light breaks through the murky darkness. It may shine briefly on a love nest, the confession of a refugee, a softening of will or skill. But at best, the public catches only an occasional, fleeting glimpse into the CIA's dramatic and deadly operations. A little more light is needed.

Washington Star-News

Thursday, May 2, 1974

A-21

U.S. ADMITS FLYING S. VIET SOLDIERS

SAIGON (AP) — Air America, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency airline, was used to transport North Vietnamese troops captured by South Vietnamese forces in a battle this week, U.S. Ambassador Graham A. Martin admitted today.

Martin denied that this was a violation of the Vietnam cease-fire agreement, which says in Article 4: "The United States will not continue its military involvement or intervene in the internal affairs of South Vietnam."


Martin made his admission after Associated Press photographs taken in the Mekong Delta showed uniformed South Vietnamese troops loading handcuffed Vietnamese aboard a plane marked Air America.

The ambassador said he authorized the transport of a wounded North Vietnamese at the request of the South Vietnamese government for "humanitarian reasons." He said he didn't know six other prisoners would be added to the flight.

On the battlefield, South Vietnamese troops, tanks and warplanes fought Communist forces along the Cambodian border, killing 113 North Vietnamese, the Saigon military command said.

Field reports said the battle spilled over into Cambodia Wednesday for the third time this week, but the Saigon command denied crossing the border.

950



Construction of a 15-story Rodeway Inn will begin soon in Rosslyn. The 136th unit in the fast growing Rodeway Chain, the 319-room motel is a joint venture between PIC Realty Corp., wholly-owned subsidiary of Prudential Insurance, and R-V Development Co., Dallas. Besides five levels of underground parking, the inn will have a coffee shop, restaurant, lounge and several meeting rooms.

CIA DILEMMA

A10 Thursday, May 2, 1974

How to Recruit Minorities Without Publicity?

By Beth Price
Journal Staff Writer

The super-secret Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), headquartered in McLean, is finding itself in a unique vise of its own making: namely, how to promote equal employment opportunity programs at the agency without blowing its cover.

Like all federal agencies, the CIA is under orders to increase the number of minorities, especially blacks, and women employed at most levels of the agency.

But unlike other federal agencies, the CIA shuns publicity and cherishes its low profile. The less said about the international intelligence-gathering agency, the better, most officials would agree.

Behind the fenced and tree-barricaded grounds, leading up to the massive white headquarters building just off Route 123 in McLean, there are several CIA employees trying hard to attract more blacks and women especially for professional positions. And trying equally hard to be quiet about it.

They're mulling the problem of how to clear up some of the misconceptions blacks and others have about the CIA and how to attract some of them to apply for jobs. This they want to do without letting on to too many people exactly how

many blacks they want, how many they have now, or what the agency needs them for.

The same quandary is met with the CIA's women employees. Although the problem isn't to hire more women, because the percentage of women is relatively high, there is a dilemma when it comes to promoting women into executive positions or moving them into male-dominated departments. Where does the CIA find qualified women and yet keep quiet about their efforts to do so?

The director of Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) at the CIA, a white male who asked not to be named, has attempted to find one solution to the recruitment problem. He has opened up a walk-in office in Rosslyn.

Without seeking publicity about it, he and his staff, who also asked not to be named, try to encourage people of minority races and women to drop in and inquire about possible employment at the CIA.

The Washington Area Recruitment Office of the CIA is located at 1820 N. Ft. Myer Drive, Rosslyn. The phone number is 351-2028, and interview hours are 9 a.m.-3:30 p.m.

But despite this unmasked outpost, the CIA still has a long way to go in its recruitment program. One

complicating factor is the necessity to reduce the work force at the agency, which means that some people are being laid off and some positions are going unfilled at the same time that the agency is trying to attract blacks and women.

The percentage of blacks employed at the agency is just over five per cent. For women, the figure is 32 per cent. However, the figures are incomplete because the CIA won't reveal how many employees it has altogether.

To recruit more blacks, the EEO director said, a black assistant will soon be hired.

Other efforts have included importing 25 black college professors to CIA headquarters for a tour to show them that much research and analysis goes on there. Not all CIA work is clandestine or police-like, the EEO director said.

He added wistfully that he hoped to convince blacks to "get over their hangup that we're a spook outfit."

The agency is preparing a brochure for its recruiters to hand out "describing the true nature of agency missions and functions, etc., in order to dispel misconceptions of agency employment among minority groups," the EEO director said in his 1974 affirmative action plan.

By 1980, the CIA hopes to have a black employee percentage of 8.9 per cent, according to the EEO director.

There's no problem with the number of orientals employed at the agency, and the situation with Spanish employees is "uncertain. ... We're looking into it now," according to the EEO director.

Many women at the CIA are underemployed, that is, clustered at grades 5 to 9, often in clerical or secretarial positions.

The main thrust of the women's panel at the CIA is to promote more women into upper-level positions, not necessarily to hire more women. The women's coordinator, a white woman, said, "We're not after promoting unqualified people. We're after equal opportunity, not more equal."

She's hoping to set up some programs that will help women get into "bridge jobs" and then onto the career ladder.

To accomplish their 1974 affirmative action goals, the CIA is trying to bring more blacks into its summer intern programs and into its work-study programs for college students.

The agency is also encouraging its employees to persuade their black friends to consider employment at the CIA.

100-10000130001-1
HS/HC-950

THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, May 3, 1974 A 15

Colson: CIA Planted Critical Stories

United Press International

Former presidential adviser Charles W. Colson charged yesterday that the CIA planted derogatory stories about him in the press to divert attention from one of its cover agencies under scrutiny by Watergate investigators.

Colson, now under indictment in both the Watergate cover-up and White House "plumbers" cases, cited stories allegedly stemming from the CIA as typical of the "flood of publicity"

about the scandal that he said make a fair trial impossible anywhere in the United States.

Asking that his indictments be dismissed, Colson submitted 39 bound volumes containing more than 5,000 newspaper and magazine clippings to U.S. District Court seeking to prove his point.

Colson's lawyer said much adverse publicity was the fault of deliberate news "leaks" by government agencies.

"The most outrageous instance of government misconduct occurred when the CIA planted adverse publicity about defendant Colson in order to divert attention from Mullen & Co., a CIA cover agency which employed Howard Hunt after his 'retirement' from the CIA," the brief said.


It cited specifically an article in the March 5, 1973, edition of Newsweek headlined "Whispers About Colson" and alleging his involvement "in various acts

of political espionage."

"It has been learned subsequently that this article and others were intentionally generated by the CIA in order to divert attention from a CIA cover agency, Mullen & Co., which was coming under scrutiny because of Howard Hunt's employment at Mullen."

Mullen is a public relations firm with offices a block from the White House that has been reported in the past to be a CIA cover. Hunt worked there after leaving the CIA as a writer and part-time White House consultant under Colson from 1971 until a few days after the June 17, 1972, arrests when his name was linked to the case.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, MAY 3, 1974



Associated Press

A South Vietnamese soldier leading handcuffed prisoners of war to an Air America plane for transportation from a fighting area. Air America is financed by the C.I.A.

U.S. Admits C.I.A. Plane Carried P.O.W.'s in Vietnam

SAIGON, South Vietnam, May 2 (AP)—The United States Ambassador, Graham A. Martin, said today that the airline of the Central Intelligence Agency had been used to transport North Vietnamese prisoners, but he denied that this represented a violation of the cease-fire terms.

The North Vietnamese and Vietcong have repeatedly charged that the United States is violating the cease-fire agreement by assigning American civilians for military-related operations, for intelligence gathering and to advise and give technical assistance to the Saigon Government.

Mr. Martin said he had authorized the use of an Air

America plane for "humanitarian reasons" after a request for help to transport a wounded prisoner. He said he had not known that six other prisoners of war would be put on the plane.

The Ambassador's acknowledgement came after Associated Press photographs, taken Tuesday in the Mekong Delta, showed seven North Vietnamese being led aboard an Air America plane in an apparent violation of the cease-fire. One of the prisoners was wounded in the leg but walked unaided.

Observers noted, however, that the photographs also documented a violation by Hanoi—the presence of North Vietnamese troops in the South, which the United States has consistently denied.

Asked how many times Air America had been used for humanitarian missions, Mr. Martin replied: "I'm not sure."

The C.I.A.-financed Air America is under contract to the four-nation International Commission of Control and Supervision and is used by the United States Embassy for travel in Indochina.

Washington Defend Action

WASHINGTON, May 2 (AP)—The State Department today defended the use of an Air America plane to transport "a wounded person" in Vietnam. "It was motivated by humanitarian considerations," a press officer, Paul Enright, said at a news conference.

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST

Tuesday, May 6, 1974

B19

CIA Switched Agents' Files on FBI

By Jack Anderson

The Central Intelligence Agency switched files on the FBI, we have now learned, in a deliberate attempt to mislead the G-men who were investigating the Watergate break-in.

The agents had discovered from the grand jury testimony that Mrs. James McCord, wife of the Waterbugger, had burned some of her husband's papers after he was arrested inside the Watergate on June 17, 1972.

According to the testimony, someone named Pennington, who had served with McCord in the CIA, had been present at the burning.

This led to a routine FBI request for a CIA file on Pennington, which threw CIA officials into a panic. For Lee Pennington, a CIA consultant, not only had been present but had participated in the burning. A faithful CIA man, he had reported the incident to his superiors.

Pennington later testified that he had driven to the McCord home—as a friend of the family, not as a CIA informant—after the Watergate arrest. Pennington found Mrs. McCord burning papers and joined in, although he insisted that nothing sensitive had been fed to the flames.

The last thing the CIA wanted was to be linked to the Watergate incident. So the CIA sent the FBI a file on Cecil Pennington instead of Lee Pennington. By a coincidence, Cecil Pennington once had also been as-

sociated with McCord in the CIA.

Our sources say it was no accident that the CIA furnished the FBI with the wrong file. They claim it was deliberate obstruction of justice.

For the FBI quickly recognized that Cecil Pennington had nothing whatsoever to do with Watergate. Still suspicious, the agents asked once more for clarification. But again, say our sources, the CIA dodged.

Investigation Squelched—Distinguished old Sen. John C. Stennis (D-Miss.), the Pentagon's foremost Senate champion, intervened to kill an investigation of Deputy Defense Secretary William P. Clements. Sources privy to the incident say Clements privately asked Stennis to intervene.

Clements had come under fire from the Senate Commerce Committee for a possible conflict of interest. Although he owns stock valued at \$100 million in Sedco, a Dallas drilling firm, he has presided at the Pentagon over policymaking decisions with regard to the Alaskan Naval Petroleum Reserve.

His company is a bidder on the pipeline that would be the likely outlet for oil should the rich Alaskan reserve be opened. Clements has urged that it be thrown open to commercial development.

Stennis asked Senate Commerce Chairman Warren G. Magnuson (D-Wash.) to halt the investigation of Clements, claiming jurisdiction for his own Senate Armed Services

Committee. Out of Senate courtesy, Magnuson called off the investigation and turned it over to Stennis.

Stennis' office acknowledged that the old man had asked Magnuson to give up the Clements case. After speaking with Stennis, however, a spokesman said he could neither confirm nor deny that the senator had intervened at Clements' request. "He talks with Clements all the time," said the spokesman.

After our inquiries, Stennis hastily put out a statement claiming that he had investigated the alleged Clements conflict and had found Clements innocent. Stennis noted that Clements had removed himself from any decision-making regarding the oil reserves.

In an earlier column, however, we printed memos that showed Clements still involved in oil decisions after he supposedly had removed himself.

Footnote: Meanwhile, confidential Treasury Department documents reveal that the President's Cabinet-level Emergency Energy Action Group wants to open the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge "to commercial oil development."

This refuge, which happens to be located next to the oil-rich Alaskan Naval Petroleum Reserve, shelters some of the world's rarest animals on one of the last truly wild frontiers.

The energy group's recommendation, presented in a memo meant for the eyes only of Treasury Secretary William E.

Simon and energy chief John Sawhill, illustrates the administration's determination to override any environmental concern that stands in the way of energy production.

A battle is now raging in Congress over the issue, with Sen. Adlai E. Stevenson III (D-Ill.) and Rep. John Moss (D-Calif.) leading the fight to protect the public interest on Alaska's lucrative North Slope.

Washington Whirl—The acquittal of former Attorney General John N. Mitchell and Commerce Secretary Maurice H. Stans caused rumblings inside the special prosecutor's office. Although this wasn't their case, staffers there are concerned about the psychological effect it will have on future Watergate cases. They are particularly nervous over the case against those who burglarized the offices of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist, which is being tried as a civil-rights case rather than a burglary. Some of the Watergate lawyers fear that this is stretching a legal point.

The American Electric Power System, which once urged takeovers of consumer-owned companies through subversion of city councils, is on the brink of gobbling up Fort Wayne's municipal utility. There, the giant firm has promised glistening downtown buildings as a carrot to city voters. Actually, the lease deal probably will mean hikes in the Indiana city's low rates, particularly for low-income elderly people and blacks.

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CIA Going Through Change

N.Y. Times News Service
WASHINGTON — Bruised by the domestic politics of the Vietnam conflict and the Watergate affair, its influence in the White House broken by the practitioners of detente, the Central Intelligence Agency is undergoing a major, perhaps fundamental, transformation.

Its claws — the covert operations that once marshaled large mercenary armies in Laos and Latin America and toppled undesired governments in Iran and Guatemala — are now largely retracted.

The weightiest organ in the bureaucracy, the Board of National Estimates, a Federal court of intelligence, has been abolished.

Under its new director, William E. Colby, some of the agency's functions and priorities have been shifted, with seemingly paradoxical results.

Although President Nixon has given Colby more power and responsibility than most

of his predecessors, the director has markedly less access to the White House.

While he may not face as much rivalry from the military intelligence establishment as some critics feared, Colby's agency is being challenged by the State Department's Intelligence and Research Bureau, newly revitalized at Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's behest.

These changes, which by the nature of the intelligence profession have taken place quietly, became known through interviews in the intelligence community.

The rules of the game requires that there be no attribution of information acquired from high intelligence officials. When Colby sees newsmen — he has done so more frequently than any of his predecessors since he took over last summer — he requests that not even the terms "officials" or "sources" be used.

The mandate given Colby by the President provides him not only the power to preside over all intelligence operations, but also the power to allocate the entire intelligence budget of about \$6 billion.

Even tactical intelligence, previously an activity jealously maintained by the military services, comes under his purview.

Impelled by apparent failures of Israeli tactical intelligence during the October war, American intelligence officials have decided to place greater stress on relaying information on the deployment of opponent forces to field commanders in West Germany.

But the most striking changes in the Central

Intelligence Agency have come at the top, having been initiated by Colby himself.

He replaced the 10-man Board of National Estimates and its staff of 20 last October with a system manned by what he calls national intelligence officers.

The board formerly produced long-range estimates of the intentions and capabilities of antagonists.

The new 11 national intelligence officers are expected to range through the entire Government and beyond to put together their evaluations.

The new officers are preparing more short-term assessments and fewer longrange estimates. This is partly in response to the demands of their chief consumer, Kissinger.

In the year since he has taken charge, Colby has let it be known that he wants the agency to concentrate on what he believes are new priorities — international

trade, cultural relations and the monitoring of international agreements to reduce arms and armies.

To this end the agency continues to maintain agents in American companies engaged in foreign trade and in journalism, with perhaps 500 of 6,000 agents using the cover of businessman or reporter.

Colby, who spent most of his career with the agency in covert operations, is intent on keeping that capability. Even if it is being applied only sparingly.

But there are luncheon debates among the agency's senior officials about the value of maintaining the planes, the weapons and the trainers that were associated with the secret armies.

"It doesn't seem to go with Nixon's idea of constructing world peace," said one official.

Kissinger apparently has also given some thought to reducing the size of the covert operations establishment, according to one of his aides in the Bureau of Intelligence and research.

The bureau, under William G. Hyland, has become more active and does much analysis work for Kissinger, with results that are said to please him.

This has meant a new kind of competition for the C.I.A.

But in the agency's spotless halls in Langley, Va., there seems to be a good feeling about the challenges of the new system and the newly reduced role.

"How it's going to net out is too early to say," a 20-year veteran remarked. But this system can be made to work."

Tom Braden

Do We Still Need Our 'Clandestine Warriors'?

The fight between the Central Intelligence Agency and a former employee named Victor Marchetti is a lot more important than it sounds.

On the surface we have another boring argument about secrecy. Marchetti writes a book about CIA. The agency says the book contains classified material. It goes to court asking for an order not to publish. The judge rules that some of the material may be published (CIA forgot to classify it) and some may not.

So Marchetti's book will be published with 168 deletions, and his publisher (Knopf) will appeal the judge's ruling at great financial cost.

Pending appeal, all of the foregoing is likely to encourage the heavier use of rubber stamps marked "secret" by CIA people, some of whom don't know a secret from a paper clip, and also to obscure Marchetti's point in writing this book.

Here, in the interests of objectivity, a word should be said about Marchetti's errors of judgment. What possible good can it do to name foreign politi-

"The clandestine operations side of the CIA—particularly those which are paramilitary in nature—ought to be disbanded."

cians who, back in the late '40s, when the cold war was really hot, took money from the CIA to build their political organizations? Some of them have now attained power. Naming them may ruin them. Is the public titillation worth the ruin? There are other such judgmental faults. They detract from Marchetti's main point.

Nevertheless, the main point is worth making. It is that the clandestine operations side of the agency—particularly those which are paramilitary in nature—ought to be disbanded.

I am not talking about secret intelligence. I am talking about running secret wars in Laos and Cuba and overthrowing governments in South America and elsewhere. I am talking about

buying labor unions and conducting propaganda operations.

If the CIA ever had a mandate for this kind of thing, it has long since been revoked. "I had the greatest forebodings about this organization and warned the President (Truman) that, as set up, neither he, the National Security Council nor anyone else would be in a position to know what it was doing or to control it," wrote Dean Acheson. The advice not taken seems prophetic.

Look back, if you will, at Laos; at the Bay of Pigs; at some of the sanguinary operations in Vietnam. Did they not do far more harm than good? Were they not either foisted upon partially willing Presidents by zealous agency

salesmen or invented on the spot simply because the capability to conduct them had been authorized?

And the propaganda. There was a time when front groups battled front groups in ideological struggle, and public opinion could be swayed. CIA went on employing propaganda fronts long after anybody except professionals on both sides was paying any attention to the propaganda. It is still doing so. The usefulness is marginal; the chances for embarrassment great.

CIA's power in the Washington power game has diminished substantially during the Nixon years. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has a firm hand on operations, and William Colby, CIA's new director, reports to Kissinger and not to the President, as his predecessors always did.

But administrative change; CIA's clandestine operations division goes right on planning. If Henry Kissinger can take time out from present crises to oversee its dismantlement, he will prevent some future ones.

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WASHINGTON POST
SUNDAY
25 APRIL 1974

A 16 Sunday, April 21, 1974 THE WASHINGTON POST

John Downey: Content After 21 Years in Jail

By Frank Schumer
The Boston Globe

BOSTON—To look at John T. Downey is to wonder how 21 years of prison in China could have left so little a mark on this vigorous and gentle-mannered man.

At 43, Downey is robust and alert—very much an older version of the football star and wrestling team captain he was during his undergraduate days at Yale. There is still the impish grin and congenial appearance that his classmates at Choate must have noticed when they voted him "most popular, most versatile and most likely to succeed."

With his vogueish, wire-rimmed glasses and his fashionably long hair, Downey appears never to have stepped out of the mainstream of American society. Only his gray flannel, cuffed slacks and his button-down Oxford shirt, reminiscent of the Ivy Leaguer's uniform of a past era, betray Downey's incongruous fit with the present.

In his spacious Cambridge apartment, barren except for newspaper and legal texts strewn about, Downey sits back, props his feet up on his desk, and asks the question that has baffled him most since his return:

"Why does everyone want to make such a fuss over me? You know, I get letters from people asking me what I think about America after being away for 21 years. But I'm no expert. My opinions don't deserve any special attention. I don't want to be put on a pedestal."



JOHN DOWNEY
... robust and alert

With a quick wave of his hand, Downey brushes aside the 21 years he spent in prison as a "pretty boring time." Sometimes he was lonely, sometimes frightened, but he was sustained by his unflagging belief that someday he would be released.

"In my heart, I always—well, nearly always—knew I'd get out," he said. "I just had a hunch I'd return."

Avoiding attention wherever possible, Downey spends most of his time "scrambling to keep up with all this work" at law school.

As for friends, Jack Downey never did find it difficult to mix. He thinks his classmates are "a great bunch of people." He drinks with them, mingles with them and even plays football on the Law School team with his classmates, most of whom are young enough to be his children.

Downey does not think he will follow the star-studded path to Washington or Wall Street that many Harvard law students pursue. "It would take too much time to build up a career like that," he said. Jack Downey does not have that time to spend.

If there were opportunities lost, career options closed to him during the years he was away, Downey is neither concerned with dwelling upon them or casting any judgments on anyone. Instead, he has oriented himself to the present, happy to pick up the pieces of his fragmented career and start from scratch.

"I'm really pretty content with my life now," he said. "Gosh, when I think of some of the business problems or troubles supporting a family that men my age have, I feel as free as a bird."

As an honor student at Yale, Downey had a world of opportunities open to him. In his senior year, he had decided to follow the legal career of his father, a probate judge in Wallingford, Conn., who died in an automobile crash when Downey was six. But when a CIA recruiter approached Downey in the spring of his senior year, it seemed that a post with the CIA was "a good way to keep my options open."

His options were abruptly closed when his plane was captured flying over Manchuria on Nov. 29, 1952.

Although Downey refuses to discuss precisely what his mission in China was, Thomas B. Ross, a classmate of Downey's at Yale and co-author of a study of the CIA, said Downey was a trainer of agents to be dropped into China with radio equipment to monitor conversations between nearby airfields and Mig pilots fighting in Korea.

When his team of agents was captured in early November, Downey—assisted by Richard G. Fecteau of Lynn, Mass.—led a mission to rescue the agents. When their plane encircled the area in search of the captured agents, the Chinese were waiting for them. Downey was sentenced to life imprisonment on espionage charges and Fecteau, who

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was released in 1972, was sentenced to 20 years.

Life in prison for Downey was a regimented schedule of activities that varied little over the 21 years. Downey says his days began at 6 or 6:30, when he was awakened, given his meals and allowed to take daily exercise. The prisoners were schooled in "ideological studies" which Downey said he "would prefer not to go into," and were allowed to read selected American periodicals.

From newspaper clippings, the letters from home that the prisoners were permitted to receive and radio broadcasts, Downey said he kept in touch with events at home. "I think I was better informed about things going on in America then than I am now—especially sports. They gave us all kinds of sports articles to read," he said.

A former English major with an appetite for literature and language, Downey was fed on a steady diet of English and American novels. In prison, he taught himself to speak Russian, French and a little Chinese.

His only companions were, from time to time, other American prisoners and the Chinese prison guards. His mother, Mrs. May V. Downey, a school teacher in New Britain, Conn., and his younger brother, William, a New York lawyer, were allowed to visit Downey five times over the 21 years.

During the lonely hours, Downey would indulge his homesickness and dream about his carefree undergraduate days at Yale. "You know how it is when you're away. The good things seem to grow bigger and the bad things disappear," he said.

In December, 1971, Downey's prison sentence was reduced to 25 years—a move Downey attributes to President Nixon's impending visit and the Sino-American thaw. He was released four years before his 25-year sentence expired. According to Downey, his release was updated because of his mother's sudden illness.

Some of Downey's friends dispute his interpretation of the circumstances leading to his release. Steven Kiba, a U.S. pilot who was in prison with Downey, said earlier this year that the Chinese would have released Downey sooner if the United States had admitted he was a CIA agent. Jerome A. Cohen, a former classmate at Yale and a professor at Harvard Law School, said the government's repeated denial of Downey's involvement with the CIA was the worst possible tactic.

Downey refuses to comment on this explanation, although he is careful to point out that he is "not under any special orders of secrecy by the government."

During Downey's imprisonment, the U.S. government insisted that he and Fecteau were civilian employees of the army whose plane was downed when it strayed off course during a flight from Korea to Japan. President Nixon first mentioned Downey's link with the CIA at a press conference in January, 1973, two weeks before Downey was released.

When he came home, he found that the 21 years had brought success to many of his former friends and classmates. Thomas J. Meskill, his next-door neighbor in New Britain, had become the governor of his home state. Jerome A. Cohen, a college classmate, had established himself as a prominent expert on legal matters at Harvard Law School. Downey's younger brother William was a successful New York attorney with a wife and family.

If someone could give Downey back the years he lost in a Chinese prison, would he aim for the honor and prestigious positions his old friends achieved?

Downey doesn't think so.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, APRIL 15, 1974

Cuts That C.I.A. Sought in Book Touch on Official Slips

By ERIC PACE

The C.I.A. tried to censor from a forthcoming book about the agency slips of the tongue by the then Vice President, Agnew and the then C.I.A. chief, Richard M. Helms, that seemed to betray ignorance of foreign affairs, a New York publisher has disclosed.

The Central Intelligence Agency demanded last year that 339 passages be cut from the book, "The C.I.A. and the Cult of Intelligence," written by Victor Marchetti, a former C.I.A. employee, and John Marks, a former State Department employee. But a Federal judge has ruled that the publisher, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., can bring it out with only 27 cuts despite the government's contention that publication would injure the national defense.

As disclosed by Knopf, though, some of the other, earlier cuts that were demanded seem merely embarrassing to the agency or to the Administration, such as this description of a Cabinet-level meeting attended by President Nixon:

"Vice President Spiro Agnew gave an impassioned speech on how the South Africans, now that they had recently declared their independence, were not about to be pushed around, and he went on to compare South Africa to the United States in its infant days. Finally, the President leaned over to Agnew and said gently, 'You mean Rhodesia, don't you, Ted?'"

Another deleted passage, which referred to Mr. Helms at a National Security Council meeting in 1969, went as follows:

"His otherwise flawless per-

formance was marred only by his mispronunciation of 'Malagasy' (formerly Madagascar) when referring to the young republic."

The C.I.A.'s blue pencil also affected disclosures in the book that are reported in the current issue of Time magazine; and were characterized as "doubtless authentic" by an intelligence expert in Washington yesterday:

Time says the book recounts in the nineteen-sixties the agency helped the Government of President Fernando Belaunde Terry of Peru to crush a local insurgent movement by building a jungle military installation and recruiting an anti-guerrilla unit.

The book also reports that the agency learned of an airplane-hijacking by Brazilian radicals—but let the hijacking take place so as not to betray its knowledge of Brazilian guerrillas' activities, the magazine says.

Reference to Vietnam Group

The original deletions that were reported by Knopf included a passage that has to do with equipment used by members of an ethnic group in Vietnam, the Nungs, who were hired by the C.I.A. and sent on forays along the Ho Chi Minh trail. The passage says:

"Since most of the Nungs were illiterate and had great difficulty in sending back quick, accurate reports of what they saw, the C.I.A. technicians developed a special kind of radio transmitter for their use.

"Each transmitter had a set of buttons corresponding to pictures of a tank, a truck, an artillery piece or some other military-related object. When the Nung trail-watcher saw a

Vietcong convoy, he would push the appropriate button as many times as he counted such objects go by him.

Each push sent a specially coded impulse back to a base camp which could in this way keep a running account of supply movements on the trail. In some instances, the signals would be recorded by observation planes that would relay the information to attack aircraft for immediate bombing raids on the trail."

Several other of the original cuts, as reported by Knopf, involved assertions that the C.I.A. had sent "special operations" personnel to Bolivia "to assist local forces in dealing with the rebel movement." The book also reports that a C.I.A. operative tried in vain to prevent the Bolivian authorities from having Ernesto Che, the rebel leader, executed.

Another of the cuts involved a passage describing agency-organized "guerrilla raids against North Vietnam, with special emphasis on intrusions by sea-borne commando groups"—although that aspect of the agency's operations had been disclosed before.

Also deleted was part of a passage saying the Federal Bureau of Investigation practiced wiretapping against numerous foreign embassies in Washington "in cooperation with the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company (a Bell subsidiary)."

Commenting on the deletions, a Knopf senior editor, Charles Elliott, said in an interview that some of them had been frivolous, and he observed, "Some things were taken out simply to protect the C.I.A."

Knopf, the co-authors and the Government have all filed

notices of appeal since the March ruling that reduced the cuts to 27. The Government, under pressure from opposing lawyers, had previously reduced its original list of 339 passages by half that number—including the ones now disclosed.

The legal status of the remaining deletions is unclear, pending further legal action, and Knopf fears that lack of time will require that these passages be left out of the first edition of the book, which is to come out in June.

HS/HC-950

Oakton Man Still Fighting The CIA

by Joseph Gatins

Has the Central Intelligence Agency tapped the telephones, checked and intercepted the mail, and followed the movements of a 45-year old ex-Scoutmaster and church-going Oakton resident for the past five years?

Victor L. Marchetti, now a Vienna youth soccer league coach, says it has. Why should the CIA want to watch over Marchetti, an apparently unobtrusive

homebody? He says it's because he was a CIA agent himself and has co-authored a book on the agency, which he hopes will be published this May but which the CIA has bottled up in litigation since the first outline was drafted over 18 months ago.

The book, "The CIA and The Cult of Intelligence," is rumored to be the biggest piece of "whistle-blowing" non-fiction to be written on the intelligence agency to date.

Marchetti is also the highest ranking ex-CIA officer to possibly come forth with information on the CIA's clandestine operations. He resigned in 1969 with top marks on his latest efficiency rating, after a 14-year stint in the agency. He rose from the position of junior officer trainee in clandestine operations to

executive assistant to the CIA's deputy director.

While Marchetti was at one time enjoined by the CIA not to talk about his manuscript, he says that the litigation is now at the stage where publication will occur, with or without the deletions which the agency has requested in court.

The CIA which originally sought to halt publication of the book, has now requested 340 deletions which Marchetti says would cut 15 to 20 per cent of the book.


These deletions, ranging from one word to three page cuts, requested under various security regulations have now been whittled down to 162, 140 of which were recently denied by a federal court. The CIA is appealing that decision.

Marchetti says the book has a goal of reform; is not an appeal to the "lunatics." He contends that both he and co-author John Marks, a former foreign service officer, "believe in some legitimate areas" of the CIA's intelligence collection and analysis. The book, Marchetti says, does not discuss names of agents whose disclosure would jeopardize life, nor does it discuss or reveal techniques and analytical methods which he thinks are legitimate.

Marchetti says the book does, however, name some foreign officials tied to the CIA, talks of "what happened in Chile," the CIA's relations with the press, and refers to the gamut of "covered actions" — clandestine operations which Marchetti says include acquisition of private airlines abroad, manipulative coup d'etats, shoring up dictatorships, propaganda, and penetration of cultural organizations in foreign countries.

Marchetti transferred out of the agency's clandestine operations division after a training session at Camp Peary near Williamsburg and worked for ten years as a Soviet military intelligence analyst. He says his decision to leave came after he spent three years in "the executive suite" in the Langley office where he saw how the CIA fits into the U.S. intelligence community and how much emphasis was placed on clandestine work.

Although the CIA had many rationalizations for doing so, Marchetti says, it was the "ominous development of a growing domestic operations section in the CIA — which came to full flower in the late 1960's — which also made him question his role and the CIA's role in general. "Domestic operations is the single most secret component of the CIA," Marchetti says, "I couldn't find out a thing on it."



VICTOR MARCHETTI

Thursday, April 11, 1974 The GLOBE 3

THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, April 4, 1974 A 7

Panel Votes To Release CIA Report

The Senate select Watergate committee voted yesterday to declassify and release a report prepared by its vice chairman, Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.), concerning the possible involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Watergate affair.

The committee, meeting in closed session, voted to ask the CIA to declassify a number of documents and other materials that Baker has collected as part of his inquiry. Chief committee counsel Samuel Dash and minority counsel Fred Thompson were asked by the committee to work out details with the CIA.

In addition, the committee voted to invite former special presidential counsel Charles W. Colson to testify before it. Colson appeared before the committee Sept. 19 but invoked the Fifth Amendment when questioned under oath on the grounds that he was a target of a federal grand jury investigation.

HS/MC-950

Baker Seeks Release of CIA Report

Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr., R-Tenn., is asking the special Senate Watergate committee to facilitate public release of a report he has prepared on the Central Intelligence Agency's role in the Watergate case.

The committee will hold a closed-door meeting today to consider Baker's request, which may encounter opposition from Democratic members irked by the GOP vice chairman's probe.

Baker said he will ask the committee to declassify the report so that it may be made part of the public record. Much of the material in the report, he said, consists of quotes from classified CIA documents.

BAKER supervised the special probe into the CIA and Watergate which was carried out in large part by the committee's GOP staff.

Some Democrats have privately charged that Baker was attempting to divert attention from White House misconduct by showing the CIA had something to hide in the Watergate case.

WATERGATE PANEL ASKS CIA DECLASSIFICATION

Associated Press

The Senate Watergate committee has voted to ask the Central Intelligence Agency to declassify all documents relating to a probe of possible links between CIA and the Watergate break-in and cover-up.

The vote was unanimous and was taken yesterday at the suggestion of Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr. of Tennessee the committee's ranking Republican and vice chairman.

Baker has conducted the investigation independently.

An aide to Baker said the committee asked the CIA to declassify all "documents, material transcripts, interviews and other data" connected to the investigation.

"After looking at the situation more thoroughly, we decided that the Watergate committee probably does not have the authority to declassify this material," the aide said.

British Ask CIA To Help Restrict Arms to Ulster

BELFAST, Northern Ireland (UPI) — Police said today they have asked the American Central Intelligence Agency and Interpol to help track down the supply routes for new, illegal automatic weapons reaching Northern Ireland.

Searches this week uncovered American, West German and Russian rifles which police said they believe are part of a large consignment of weapons entering the British province.

The weapons found are the American AR15, a sports version of the military M16, the German Landmann 22, which police said was recently outlawed in West Germany, and Russian World War II model guns. Police said dossiers were supplied to Interpol, which is checking possible links with arms dealers in Belgium.

WASHINGTON STAR

Friday, 5 APR 1974

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Thursday, April 4, 1974

The Organization Men

Of the many important lessons to be drawn from Watergate, one of the least discussed is the extent to which institutions help restrain excess ambition and zeal. Vice President Ford hinted in that direction in a recent speech criticizing "an arrogant elite guard of political adolescents" which bypassed the regular party organization, made its own rules and ran roughshod over the seasoned political judgment of party regulars. But the Vice President necessarily limited his remarks to the GOP, when in fact it is necessary to look beyond that for an answer.

The national preoccupation with what happened in Watergate has tended to overshadow the equally important question of how it happened. As a result, entirely too many people have chalked up the whole sordid episode to politics as usual. Yet generally it was the amateurs playing at politics, rather than the professional politicians themselves, who conceived and carried out the cover-up.

Those who emerged from the episode with their integrity intact tended to be career officials and such institutions as the Internal Revenue Service and the CIA. The explanation seems to be that these officials had an unshakable determination to defend their institutional interests, therefore they couldn't be persuaded to join in the Watergate circus. It's fashionable to ridicule the limited loyalties exhibited by organization men and bureaucratic institutions, and to disparage their preoccupation with minor improvements rather than sweeping reform. Yet while such institutional inhibitions may be frustrating, they are also likely to be prudent.

It's important to remember that the political parties, like the FBI or CIA, are enduring institutions with enduring interests. Critics are forever inveighing against "machine politics" and "political wardhealers," as though they were somehow loathsome. The worst of them may well be; certainly history offers

some pretty sordid examples of political machines. But successful political organizations are responsive to the concerns of citizens in a way "reform" politicians rarely are. Perhaps more to the point, if only out of self-interest successful political organizations would not likely try to subvert the very political process of which they're so integral a part.

Vice President Ford implied that, ethics aside, professional politicians would not have undertaken a Watergate-type operation because they would not have risked the damage that a bungled operation was likely to inflict. CREEP, on the other hand, had no organizational loyalties beyond the reelection of Richard Nixon, therefore it had no overriding need to worry about the wider GOP fortunes.

Moreover, party pros would not have acted as though the 1972 election were a matter of life or death. Most of them understand that politics is not an abstract goal but an intricate social process. Its weapons are not break-ins and burglary but accommodation and compromise. Opponents are not enemies to be subdued but a political faction to be won over.

All this tends to suggest that the best way to avoid future Watergates is to strengthen the political parties. Unfortunately, though, the trend is in the other direction: The changing role of the media, emerging demographic patterns, and broad economic and social changes have combined to weaken party loyalty. It's still not clear what will arise to take the place of the major party organizations, except that the sorting out process is likely to be drawn out and maybe even painful.

Yet despite the received wisdom about "political hacks," the worst effects of the new political environment may very well be minimized precisely by encouraging the participation of organization men who can be depended upon to respect political and institutional limits.

The Spies Who Came In From Sakhon Nakhon

By H. D. S. Greenway
Washington Post Foreign Service

SAKHON NAKHON, Thailand, April 6—What was a master spy novelist like John Le Carre, author of "The Spy Who Came in From the Cold" and "A Small Town in Germany" doing here in a small dusty town in northeast Thailand?

The average tourist in Thailand settles for Bangkok's floating market or maybe a day trip to the Bridge on the River Kwai. But John Le Carre was observed here inspecting a nondescript and deserted house, across the street from a gas station, with empty holes where the air conditioners used to be. Baleful water buffaloes watched him as he circled around the house taking

notes and an occasional photograph.

Until a few months ago the house was the CIA headquarters in Sakhon Nakhon, 350 miles northeast of Bangkok. But in December the CIA's cover was "blown" in one of the more bizarre and embarrassing incidents in the history of espionage. A visit to the CIA house in Sakhon Nakhon, for spy fans, may rank one day with a trip to the Berlin Wall or a ride on the Orient Express.

Northeast Thailand is the scene of a sputtering Communist rebellion, and last December Thailand's premier and several newspa-

See CIA, A19, Col. 1

Approved For Release 2017/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00495R000000300011-1

Le Carre was writing in his notebook when we headed out of town to Nakhon Phanom on the border with Laos, where there is a bigger and better CIA house

The following table shows, and 15-18.

U.S. Judge Rebuffs CIA On Secrecy

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency has received a major setback in a court battle to keep its cloak over its covert activities.

In a ruling made public yesterday, U.S. District Court Judge Albert V. Bryan Jr. held that the CIA had exceeded its classification authority in ordering 168 deletions in a forthcoming book, "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence."

After having gone through the manuscript deletion-by-deletion, Judge Bryan reduced the number of national security excisions to 15. On originally reviewing the draft the CIA said 339 omissions would have to be made on national security grounds prior to publication.

In his ruling Friday, Judge Bryan said the CIA had "failed to meet the burden of proving classification."

The American Civil Liberties Union greeted Bryan's ruling as having a "profound impact on secrecy in government."

"It is the first time that any court has ever held that the government's asserting certain material is classified is not sufficient to prove it is classified," said ACLU attorney Melvin L. Wulf, who participated in the court arguments.

See MARCHETTI, A14, Col. 6

Post., Tuesday, 2 Apr 1979

CIA Is Rebuffed on Secrecy

MARCHETTI, From A1

The book was written by two former government intelligence officers, Victor L. Marchetti of the CIA and John D. Marks of the State Department's Office of Intelligence and Research. Both men have been out of the government since 1969.

It was a case in which the government for the first time sought to exercise prior restraint on security grounds over a manuscript written by former government employees.

In 1972 Judge Bryan upheld the right of the CIA to prior review of the Marchetti manuscript, which at that time had not yet been written.

When the book was finished, with the assistance of Marks, it was submitted to the agency for clearance and came back in September, 1973, with the original 339 deletions.

Marchetti, Marks and the

publisher, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., challenged the classification actions in a countersuit during which Judge Bryan heard testimony in a closed courtroom from CIA Director William E. Colby and his four top deputies.

The final result was the Friday ruling which held, in essence, that a fact could not be classified simply by a CIA official declaring it to be so.

Judge Bryan said that the decisions on what was classified in the manuscript by each CIA deputy director seem "to have been made on an ad hoc basis as he viewed the manuscript, founded on his belief, at that time, that a particular item contained classifiable information which ought to be classified."

The judge said that the government should have been able to produce documents or evidence of other affirmative

actions to demonstrate that material in the CIA book was, in fact, classified.

Both the government and the authors have a basis for appeal. The CIA will presumably seek to again make the omissions it ordered in the manuscript. The authors may ask to reopen the question of whether their respective oaths of secrecy did not violate their First Amendment rights.

The CIA declined yesterday to comment on the decision. But the decision, if left standing, could strip away sanctions of secrecy covering many operations it is seeking to keep out of the public domain.

CIA Director Colby has indicated that he has drafted legislation which would provide explicit congressional sanctions and stiffer penalties to buttress the agency's system of classification should the case be lost in court.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, APRIL 2, 1974

Judge Backs Publishing of C.I.A. Book If 27 of 339 Sought Deletions Are Made

By LESLEY OELSNER
By The Associated Press

WASHINGTON, April 1—A judge has ruled that a controversial manuscript about the Central Intelligence Agency may be published if the authors and publisher delete 27 items. The Government demanded 339 deletions.

Judge Albert V. Bryan Jr. of the United States District Court in Alexandria, Va., thus rejected to a large degree the Government's contention that publications would injure the national defense. He based his decision partly on the guarantees of the First Amendment, saying that these should not be left to the "whim" of a Government official.

'Secrecy' Contract

However, he rejected the contention of the authors and publishers that the First Amendment protected them against any deletions.

He thus relied on a decision he made in 1972 in the case—substantially upheld by the Court of Appeals—supporting the Government's right to review the manuscript before publication.

One of the authors, Victor Marchetti, is a former C.I.A. official, and Judge Bryan had ruled that Mr. Marchetti's right to write about the agency was governed by a "secrecy" contract he signed when he joined the agency.

While calling Judge Bryan's latest ruling a substantial victory, lawyers for the authors and the publisher, Alfred A.

Knopf, Inc., of New York, said they planned to appeal.

"It leaves open a lot of First Amendment issues," Floyd Abrams, the lawyer for Knopf, said today.

Melvin L. Wulf of the American Civil Liberties Union, representing Mr. Marchetti and his co-author, John Marks, a former State Department employee, said that the A.C.L.U. would try to get all restrictions removed.

The Government is also expected to appeal, because Judge Bryan's opinion, if upheld, could have broad ramifications on the manner in which the Government tries to administer its classification system.

Irwin Goldbloom, a Justice Department attorney who represents the Government, said that, while a decision to appeal was up to the Solicitor General, it was likely that the department would both appeal and ask for a stay of Judge Bryan's ruling pending that appeal.

14-Page Opinion

Judge Bryan, in a 14-page opinion and two lengthy appendices filed Friday but not announced until today, took a tough stand on the burden of proof that the Government must bear if it wants to sustain censorship based on the fact that information is "classified."

Deputy directors of the C.I.A. testified during the trial that the items the Government wanted deleted—a list reduced to 168 by the time the trial began last month—were classified information before the writing of the book, entitled "The C.I.A.: The cult of Intelligence."

Under the previous rulings in the case, this was one of the tests to be used in deciding what censorship was permissible.

But, Judge Bryan rejected C.I.A. aides' testimony regarding 140 items and parts of two other items, saying they did not provide evidence that there had been the type of "affirmative action" envisioned by the Executive order that describes the act of classification of information.

"Although this is here denied by them, the decision as to each item here in question by an individual deputy director seems to have been made on an ad hoc basis as he viewed the manuscript, founded on his belief at that time that a particular item contained classifiable information which ought to be classified," the judge said.

'Public Domain'

Judge Bryan conceded that the result of his decision "may be to release some sensitive information." But, he said, "it is not too much for the public and these plaintiffs to expect" that actual classification, according to prescribed procedures, be made.

"The ipse dixit of the deputy directors after receipt of a manuscript is not sufficient, and cannot suffice if the First Amendment rights of these plaintiffs or others like them are to survive," he said.

The authors and publisher had contended that many of the items in the book were already in the "public domain" and thus not covered by the secrecy contract.

The Washington Merry-Go-Round**THE WASHINGTON POST**

Tuesday, April 2, 1974

B15

Watergate Forces Retirement at CIA

Jack Anderson

The Watergate has claimed a major victim in the Central Intelligence Agency with the forced retirement of its dedicated director of security, Howard Osborn.

A veteran of 26 years at the cloak-and-dagger complex, the 56-year-old Osborn was caught up in the suppression of a mysterious CIA memo that described how documents were burned at the home of Waterbugger James McCord, an ex-CIA agent.

The secret memo was based on information supplied by a former FBI inspector, Lee Pennington, then with the CIA as a paid "consultant." Pennington, an old family friend of the McCords', had visited Mrs. McCord after her husband was arrested inside Democratic National Committee headquarters in June, 1972. He found her burning papers and documents. Earlier, she had burned typewriter ribbons.

Pennington loyally reported the episode to his CIA bosses, and the CIA wrote it up in memo form. For more than a year and a half, it lay in the CIA files like a paper bomb.

Meanwhile, FBI sleuths were asking embarrassing questions about whether the CIA knew of destroyed documents from among McCord's papers, and were getting persistent denials from the CIA.

Finally, Senate Watergate committee vice chairman Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.) began snooping into the CIA role in the cover-up, and a middle-level CIA employee who knew of the hidden memo threatened to blow the whistle.

After some debate, CIA Director William Colby was told of the suppressed memo and he quickly contacted Rep. Lucien Nedzi (D-Mich.), chairman of a House intelligence subcommittee. They agreed that the best course was to let all congressional committees involved in the Watergate probe, as well as Leon Jaworski's special prosecutors, know about the memo.

Nedzi, after full hearings with Pennington, McCord and CIA officials including Osborn, concluded that the CIA had not dispatched Pennington to burn the papers, as the memo seemed to suggest. Osborn claimed that he had not even known of the memo. Nevertheless, Nedzi and Colby were both worried about the cover-up.

"It led to the early retirement of Osborn," Nedzi told us. When we reached the ex-CIA security boss at his home near the agency he had served so long, he clung to his oath of secrecy.

"I had planned for over a year to retire in June," Osborn insisted. "I realized there was no financial benefit to staying and decided to retire."

Navy Blues—A defense contractor has charged that a boy-

hood friend of Sen. Russell B. Long (D-La.) offered the senator's services for \$150,000 to settle the contractor's dispute with the Navy.

Long, chairman of the powerful Senate Finance Committee, knew nothing of any such offer, according to his office, nor has our investigation showed that Long ever authorized one. J. Roy Becnel, who is accused of making the offer, swore to us: "I never asked for a dime. I never expected anything."

But the contractor, Lewis Malnak of Cherry Hill, N.J., has told Internal Revenue Service investigators that Becnel sought cash for his services.

Malnak, president of Lew Malnak Associates, went to Becnel in 1972 for help in settling a \$750,000 contract claim with the Navy. Malnak says he had heard that Becnel knew Long and that Becnel identified himself as a "bag man" for the Louisiana senator.

Malnak swears that Becnel asked for \$50,000 in cash "to get the claim settled immediately" through Long's office. When Malnak protested that he lacked such a large sum, Becnel suggested that he boost his claim above \$1 million and pay \$150,000 if Becnel's efforts were successful, according to Malnak.

Malnak, with no important contacts in Washington, had tried several times unsuccessfully to see Long's top aide, Bob Hunter. Once Becnel became in-

involved in the case, the barriers fell quickly.

"They walked Becnel in like he was a member of the staff," Malnak recalls. He claims Hunter promised to "look into (the case) because Becnel asked him to." Malnak's logs show he met with Hunter three times in 1972.

At the last meeting, Malnak says, he felt that Hunter had lost interest. Malnak says he never promised nor paid Becnel a commission, nor ever talked money with Hunter.

In commenting on the case, Hunter says he has known Becnel for years, as has Long. Hunter recalls meeting with Malnak at Becnel's request, but says he did nothing to help Malnak.

Becnel, a former justice of the peace and drainage contractor, hotly contests Malnak's story. "I'm not a satchel man," he steamed. "I never knew Russell Long" to take a dime. "I'll get hold of Malnak and break his neck."

Footnote: Malnak's interest is in getting his claim settled. He charges that he was "blackmailed" after his detection equipment discovered that the Navy had bought faulty distress warning devices for Polaris subs. Reps. Edwin Forsythe (R-N.J.) and Les Aspin (D-Wis.) have asked for a complete Justice Department probe of the Navy's handling of the case.

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The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST

Friday March 29, 1974

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HS/HC-950

THE WASHINGTON POST, SATURDAY, MARCH 30, 1974

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Sen. Baker and the CIA

Sen. Howard Baker's fruitless investigation of gossamer links between the Watergate scandal and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) seems unlikely to help President Nixon but threatens serious damage to the nation's beleaguered foreign intelligence operation.

Despite accumulating newspaper leaks and Baker's hints of knowing much more than he can tell, Watergate is not about to be blamed on the CIA, in part or in whole. Under close examination, the leaks turn out to be red herrings. Objective investigators are positive there was no CIA role in Watergate.

But conservative Republican Baker, ironically, sounds ever more like left-leaning critics of the CIA who complain that senators linked too closely to the agency never do adequately probe its inner recesses. What's more, the flood of innuendo seemingly originating from Baker's investigation further erodes the CIA's tattered morale and prestige.

Baker's motives are as shrouded as his overall Watergate performance. As senior Republican on the Senate Watergate Committee during last summer's televised hearings, he achieved instant fame. But the image of objectivity that made him a TV idol infuriated the White House and party regulars. Baker, a party man and a Nixon man, began hedging his bets in mid-summer.

That was apparent Aug. 2 when Richard Helms, former CIA director, returned from his post as ambassador to Iran to testify before the Watergate committee. Many senators believed the highly respected Helms had been bounced from the CIA for refusing to take the Watergate rap. But Baker was surprisingly hostile, his questions pre-saging his future investigation.

Baker has heatedly denied that this course was dictated by senior White House aides. Even so, his actions were obviously designed to help Mr. Nixon. In explaining his conduct immediately after the Watergate burglary, the Pres-

ident contended he feared investigation would uncover super-secret CIA operations. If Baker developed even tangential CIA connections with Watergate, Mr. Nixon would obviously look better.

Working toward that end, Baker late last October noted a Harper's magazine article by Andrew St. George claiming that Helms had advance knowledge of the Watergate burglary. Baker eagerly dispatched the article to

"Under close examination the leaks turn out to be red herrings. Objective investigators are positive there was no CIA role in Watergate."

Sen. Stuart Symington of Missouri, acting chairman of the CIA oversight subcommittee. St. George, a journalistic swashbuckler, was summoned to Washington for a closed-door session. The verdict: he knew nothing.

But Baker relied on more than flamboyant journalism. The Watergate committee's minority staff, concentrating on the CIA, has produced a classified report. Insinuating more than accusing, it is the mother lode for published reports suggesting some ominous CIA role in Watergate (though, publicly, Baker affirms Helms' innocence).

The Watergate committee majority staff regards the report as next to useless. Rep. Lucien Nedzi of Michigan, ranking CIA expert in Congress, believes there is no reason to change the Oct. 23 finding of his House subcommittee giving the CIA a clean bill of health. Federal prosecutors have found no CIA role in the conspiracy. Pub-

lished charges of such a role have all turned into red herrings.

Thus, recent newspaper accounts of internal tapes destroyed by Helms for his last CIA days become hollow when it is learned they were unrelated to Watergate. Nor is there factual grounding for insinuations, fostered by Baker, that prize-winning Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward was given Watergate information in return for steering clear of the CIA. The most recent red herring: a Chicago Tribune story, reflecting the Baker report, that a CIA agent was sent to Watergate burglar James McCord's house shortly after the burglary to destroy documents linking him with the CIA; in truth, a CIA informant joined McCord's wife in burning his papers.

Baker has been subjected to puzzled scrutiny by Senate colleagues, not only for his insinuations but for the way he conducts his investigation. When Helms was summoned from Tehran yet again last month, he faced intensely hostile closed-door questioning by Baker. The use of ex-White House aide Charles Colson, indicted in the Watergate conspiracy, as a major source of information in Baker's CIA investigation, is subject to criticism.

Moreover, the investigation is beginning to echo old complaints from Senate super-doves such as Sen. J. W. Fulbright of Arkansas: The CIA is permitted to run wild by Symington and other Senate protectors. Adding conservative Baker to the Fulbright camp further endangers the future of this vital agency.

When Baker on CBS's "Face the Nation" last Sunday declared "there's a great wealth of information" coming from his investigation (though he could not say what), his real message to the House could be: don't push too hard on impeachment because I am raising lethal new questions about the CIA. Actually, Mr. Nixon's problems seem too acute for Baker's warning to matter much. However he may hurt the CIA, Howard Baker can scarcely help the President.

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THE WALL STREET JOURNAL,
Monday, March 25, 1974

Sen. Howard Baker (R., Tenn.) said Nixon should give the House Judiciary Committee any documents "arguably relevant" to its impeachment inquiry. He also suggested, on CBS-TV's "Face the Nation," that the committee let Nixon's lawyer participate in its principal deliberations. Baker said there are many unanswered questions about CIA involvement in Watergate.

* * *

Baker Probes Possible Ties Between CIA and Watergate

By Lawrence Meyer
Washington Post Staff Writer

For several months now, the Senate Watergate committee's ranking Republican, Howard H. Baker Jr. of Tennessee, has been directing a closed-door investigation into possible ties between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Watergate affair.

The most recent witness known to have testified before Baker was former CIA director Richard M. Helms, whom Baker had brought back from Tehran, where Helms is U.S. ambassador, to answer questions earlier this month. When he emerged from the closed session after three hours of taking testimony, Baker said only that Helms had been "forthcoming" as a witness.

Baker, the Senate select committee's vice chairman, has at turns been coy and reserved in discussing his investigation suggesting on the one hand in vague pub-



HOWARD H. BAKER JR.
... vague on findings

lic statements that information yet to be revealed may dwarf what is already known about the Watergate affair but then refusing to elaborate on those statements.

"I'm just trying to get all the facts I can," Baker said recently. "I can't make anybody believe that, but it's true." Baker said he is tying up "loose ends" and that he is not "pursuing any theory" concerning the CIA.

(Appearing on the CBS program Face the Nation yesterday, Baker said he has submitted an extensive report on the question of possible CIA involvement in the Watergate coverup to the Watergate committee.

(He refused to reveal what he had found, but added that "it is not a one-line report saying we found no involvement by the CIA... I know more than I'm at liberty to disclose at this moment." He said he has recommended to Senate Watergate Committee chairman Sam Ervin that the material be turned over to the Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees.)

See BAKER, A8, Col. 1

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Sen. Baker Probes Ties Be

BAKER, From A1

One apparent result of Baker's work was the disclosure, first made on CBS News, that the CIA had destroyed a number of tape recordings at about the same time that it received a request in January, 1973, from Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) to retain all records that might be related to Watergate. Baker had been looking into the tape destruction, but he denied that he was the source of this story.

As a result of the report, Rep. Lucien Nedzi (D-Mich.) chairman of the House Armed Service Intelligence subcommittee, requested an explanation from the CIA and said he concluded that CIA had not destroyed any Watergate-related or presidential tape recordings during its January, 1973, housecleaning.

In addition to bringing Nedzi to the defense of the CIA, Baker's probe has clearly annoyed other senior Democrats in Congress. Sen. Stuart Symington, ranking Democrat on the Senate Armed Services committee, attended the closed session questioning of Helms along with Sen. Sam J. Ervin Jr. (D-N.C.), chairman of the Watergate committee.

Although Symington said little to reporters after the session, others present said he was clearly annoyed at the line of questioning that reportedly centered on whether the CIA was involved in the Watergate break-in and whether Helms had any advance knowledge of it.

Ervin declined afterward to say anything about the substance of the questioning, but he left the interview with a ringing endorsement of Helms. "I think Mr. Helms is above reproach in any respect for the years he was with the CIA and since he has been ambassador," Ervin told reporters. "I don't think Mr. Helms has ever done anything wrong in connection with the whole affair."

In one of his occasional statements giving the impression that he is on the verge of discovering or revealing something spectacular, Baker told the Associated Press Managing Editors convention in Orlando, Fla. last Nov. 19 that the American people may have "seen only the tip of the iceberg" concerning the Watergate affair. In an interview, Baker said he would explain several days later what he had

meant, Baker smiled, declined and walked away.

A month later, Baker said on ABC-TV's "Issues and Answers" that if the White House would release information concerning a "matter of grave national importance," then "some of the conduct that appears otherwise unexplainable" could be explained.

When asked during the program if he knew of any more Watergate "bombshells" still unknown to the public, Baker responded ominously, "There are animals crashing around in the forest. I can hear them, but I can't see them."

Last Jan. 23, when the Watergate committee still was planning to hold more public hearings, Baker told his fellow committee members that might call more than a dozen witnesses to testify in closed session, including Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Joint Chiefs of Staffs chairman Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, former CIA director Helms and Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward.

Kissinger and Moorer were among government officials that Baker wanted to question concerning alleged spying by the Pentagon on the National Security Council. Helms and Woodward were among other witnesses whom Baker wanted to question concerning the CIA and its possible involvement in the Watergate affair.

Despite Baker's reluctance to discuss details or the direction of his investigation, a memo from the committee's minority counsel, Fred Thompson, to Baker gives some indication of what Baker is pursuing.

Thompson's memo, dated Feb. 20, lists 16 items or areas where the committee staff "has made and which you have made personally (requests to the CIA) which have not been complied with."

Among the requested items are:

A "Watergate file," prepared by the CIA. Contact reports from CIA case officers who worked with convicted Watergate conspirator Eugenio Martinez, who was also a CIA operative at the time of the Watergate break-in.

Logs or notebooks of technicians or others "indicating the Jan. 21, 1972 order to destroy tapes. Any other logs, notebooks or notations indicating any other destruction or orders to destroy tapes released Jan. 24, 1973 destruction order."



Sen. Howard Baker (R-Tenn.) speaks to reporters before his

A "Mr. Edward" file the CIA kept on Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr., another former CIA employee, who used "Edward" as a pseudonym. And "the extent of CIA activities in Mexico in calendar year 1972."

Thompson's memo goes on to point out that CIA activities in Mexico were "the basis of the Haldeman-Ehrlichman-Helms-Walters controversy."

The issue between former White House chief of staff H. R. (Bob) Haldeman and former Presidential domestic adviser John D. Ehrlichman on the one hand and Helms and deputy CIA director Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters on the other concerns whether the White House tried to use the CIA to impede the FBI's Watergate investigation or whether the White House was legitimately concerned that the FBI would expose CIA operations in Mexico.

Thompson's memo also refers to a request to the CIA concerning "any previous relationship, contact, or reference in files to Bob Woodward, Carl Bernstein, and The

Washington Post's investigative reporting on the Watergate affair.

According to Baker, he had received information from a source he declined to disclose that Woodward has agreed with Robert F. Bennett, president of the Washington public relations firm of Robert R. Mullen & Co., to be "appropriately grateful" for information linking the White House and the Nixon re-election committee to the Watergate break-in.

Woodward and Bernstein, who met with Baker on Jan. 30, said that Baker told them he had information that Woodward has agreed with Bennett to "go easy" on his company and the CIA in exchange for information.

Both reporters denied that any such agreement had been made. Bennett acknowledged in an interview that his company has in the past — though it does no longer, he said — provided cover for CIA agents abroad. But Bennett denied having told Baker or anyone else that he and Woodward had any agreement where the Mullen company received favorable treatment.

Between CIA and Watergate



Associated Press

appearance on CBS' "Face the Nation" television program.

In the interview, Bennett supported Woodward's denial that any deal or bargain had been struck in his talks with Woodward. Bennett said he told Woodward, "If you'll be straight with me, I'll be straight with you. . . I'll tell you everything I know about the Watergate."

Bennett added, however, that he was concerned that Woodward or some other reporter might "stumble" on to the connection between the Mullen company and the CIA during the Watergate investigation. So, Bennett said, he attempted to divert Woodward and other reporters from the Mullen-CIA link by giving them other information.

"There wasn't so much of an ironclad agreement with Woodward as there was unilateral action on my part," Bennett said. "I kept opening doors for him over here," he said, gesturing with his left hand, "to keep him away from over here," he indicated with a gesture to his right.

Bennett said he had never informed Woodward of the Mullen company's dealings with the CIA.

Bennett said that he had told Baker essentially the

same thing during an interview in December. In early February, Bennett said in a later interview, he saw a copy of a report made by his CIA "case officer" or contact of an interview where Bennett described his relationship with Woodward.

When he saw the report, which Baker says he has also seen, Bennett said, he saw immediately that the case officer had misunderstood the arrangement with Woodward.

In a subsequent interview, Baker was told what Bennett had told The Washington Post. "I dispute that," Baker said. "The information I have goes beyond that."

During this interview, Baker referred to a handwritten, one-page memo that he took from his pocket. At one point, Baker showed the memo to his press aide, Ronald McMahan, but refused to show it to a Washington Post reporter. Baker said that he had prepared the memo by hand-copying a classified document. Although he referred to it periodically during the interview, Baker declined to reveal what it contained.

Another incident Baker has looked into involves Bennett,

Ervin and a mutual friend of both.

According to Bennett, last spring he was approached by the friend, a North Carolina lawyer, who asked him if he was concerned about the Senate committee hearings. Bennett said he told the lawyer he was concerned about bad publicity if called as a witness, and the lawyer offered to speak to Ervin, whom he knew, and vouch for Bennett's character.

The friend, Bennett said, told Ervin, "I've known Bob Bennett for many years, and he's an honest, upright man." Bennett said the friend told him Ervin responded, "Oh, thank you very much. Glad to know that," or something like that.

Bennett and the North Carolina lawyer agree that the lawyer knew nothing about the connection between Bennett's firm and the CIA. The lawyer said that in speaking to Ervin he did not "go beyond an expression of opinion about the character of the person."

Subsequently, Bennett said, his CIA case officer expressed concern that the hearings might "blow the cover" for an agent using Bennett's firm. Bennett said he told the case officer that that was unlikely and recounted the conversation with the North Carolina lawyer.

According to Bennett, the case officer's memo that he was later shown by Baker had the same basic facts but with a different emphasis, making the situation more "dramatic" and "purple" than it was. Bennett said the memo could be read to make it appear that "maybe we had pulled off some great coup or Bennett has the Ervin committee in its back pocket."

Ervin declined to comment on the matter through a spokesman.

Baker, refusing to disclose what the memo said, told a reporter who recounted Bennett's version, "You're way off base. That's a different sheet of music." The memo, Baker said, "on the face of it is very direct, dogmatic, and categorical."

Baker said, however, that he has no suspicions about Ervin and is "absolutely convinced that he (Ervin) did nothing untoward — absolutely and completely."

Baker said he has not talked to the North Carolina lawyer about the memo to find out his version. "It's not so important to me what happened as it is that that statement is in a memo."

Another area Baker has explored involves charges

that the Pentagon was spying on the White House to gather information about foreign policy initiatives President Nixon was taking.

News stories first began appearing on the surreptitious passage of information from military aides in the White House to the Pentagon in January, although Baker said he learned about the incident in October. And he later acknowledged that it was the Pentagon spying he was referring to in his "animals crashing around in the forest" remark on "Issues and Answers" in December.

Among the witnesses Baker says he has interviewed are Joint Chief of Staff chairman Adm. Moorer and Rear Adm. Robert O. Welander, who was in charge of liaison between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the White House. Baker declines to discuss whatever he might have learned in these interviews.

Baker said that since first learning about the military spying in October, he had been urging the White House to reveal it because he believed that the incident would help "explain" the Watergate affair.

When the military spying story first appeared in January, there was some suspicion that Baker had played a role in leaking such information in an effort to help explain the Watergate cover-up, a suspicion Baker said he was aware of. But Baker denied that he had leaked any information for the initial story about the military spying.

In discussing his investigation, Baker bristles at questions about his motives. "I am not trying to develop a theory," he said. "I am not trying to bail out the President. I am not trying to lynch the CIA. I am not trying to lynch the President. I am not trying to bail out the CIA. I am pursuing the facts."

Despite Thompson's memo complaining about the CIA—which Baker said he sent on to CIA director William Colby—Baker asserted that "Colby has been extremely cooperative."

Attempts by a reporter to discuss Thompson's memo with Colby for the record, however, were rebuffed by the CIA.

Baker said that he has submitted a "fair-sized report" to Ervin to bring him and the committee up to date on his investigation. Baker was non-committal about whether his investigation is complete.

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Saturday, March 23, 1974 E51

Baker Traces CIA's Watergate Links

By Jack Anderson

For months, Sen. Howard Baker (R-Tenn.) has been piecing together evidence that the Central Intelligence Agency somehow was involved in the Watergate break-in.

Now he is preparing a detailed report, backed up with secret documents. The report will depend for explosive effect, however, more on the questions it asks than on the answers it gives.

The report will focus largely on former CIA agent E. Howard Hunt, who retired from the CIA in 1970, joined a CIA cover organization and then went on the White House payroll in July, 1971. A year later, he helped plan the Watergate break-in.

In Baker's study of the CIA role in the case, he has made these tentative findings:

- Deputy CIA Director Vernon Walters' repeated claim that the CIA grew wary of Hunt and broke contact with him by August 31, 1971, is false. The CIA now admits its top psychiatrist, Dr. Bernard Malloy, met secretly with Hunt on the Daniel Ellsberg case as late as October 27, 1971.

- Baker has documents showing the CIA role in the Watergate cover-up was far more extensive than has been revealed in public testimony.

- Baker's documents also indicate that former CIA Director Richard Helms helped place Hunt with Mullen and Co., a CIA

front. Baker believes the CIA kept close tabs on Hunt even after he supposedly "retired" from the CIA.

- While Hunt was working for the CIA front company, he sought out an old Bay of Pigs sidekick, Bernard Barker. The senator suspects Hunt may have been planning exploits with Barker on behalf of the CIA. The senator would like to prove, but cannot, that two of the exploits were the Watergate and Ellsberg psychiatrist break-ins. What Baker can show, however, is that Hunt contacted Barker in April, 1971, months before going on the White House payroll.

- After Hunt went to work for the White House, he got a tip from Robert Bennett, head of the Mullen CIA cover company, that one of Bennett's ex-employees in New England had some fresh information on the Chapquiddick episode. Hunt could have obtained the information by making a simple call to the ex-employee. Instead, Hunt obtained from the CIA's deputy director a wig, false ID cards, a voice modulator, a camera, a recorder and a "safe house." The trip to New England proved totally fruitless, leading Baker to suspect it may have been a cover for some other CIA purpose.

- Baker has received indications that Hunt was reporting indirectly to the CIA even after he had moved into the White House. The senator suspects, for example, that the CIA may have been involved with Hunt's cele-

brated excursion to Denver in a ludicrous CIA wig to talk to Dita Beard. The CIA reportedly was worried whether we got the famous ITT-Dita Beard memo from the same source who gave us the ITT Chile memos implicating the CIA in a plot to block the inaugural of the late Salvador Allende.

- Baker suspects, but cannot prove, that Hunt's plan to break into the safe of Las Vegas publisher Hank Greenspun may also have had some CIA undertones. The safe contained billionaire Howard Hughes' private papers. Hughes not only was associated with the Mullen CIA front but had also employed Robert Maheu, another CIA front man.

- After the Watergate break-in was discovered, Hunt fled to California to a man identified as "Mort Jackson," who has close CIA connections, Baker has learned.

These bits of evidence have led Baker to suspect that Hunt may never have broken off his ties with the CIA, despite statements to the contrary from CIA officials.

We dug into this story a year ago. We were able to report on April 7, 1973, that the CIA strangely had ordered its agents not to talk to the FBI about the Watergate case. We published the proof on May 8, quoting from a confidential FBI memo which said:

"It is recalled we specifically were requested by the CIA not to interview... two CIA employ-

ees, and instructions were issued to WFO (Washington Field Office) to this effect."

However, we later learned that the White House had asked the CIA to intervene with the FBI to limit the Watergate investigation. This request was made by H. R. Haldeman, then the powerful White House staff chief, who told the CIA "it was the President's wish." We obtained and, on May 30, quoted the secret CIA memos about Haldeman's intervention.

This led us to the conclusion not that the CIA was implicated in the Watergate break-in but that the White House was trying to use the CIA to thwart the FBI investigation.

Baker now believes the CIA involvement was much greater than we had been able to learn. Our own CIA sources, while reserving judgment on Baker's report until they see it, agree there's more CIA involvement in the cover-up than has been printed. They concede that numerous contradictions at least need to be clarified.

Official CIA spokesmen, however, gave a "no comment" to our detailed questions, saying only that they were cooperating with congressional investigators. Bennett told my associate Les Whitten the Mullen company severed all its CIA ties in June 1973. He firmly denied that he had acted as a conduit for information from Hunt to the CIA during the 1971-72 Watergate times.

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The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, March 19, 1974 B15

Baker Eyes CIA Over Watergate

Jack Anderson

Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.), the Senate Watergate matinee idol, has been doaling behind the scenes with embattled ex-White House aide Charles W. Colson in a joint effort to implicate the Central Intelligence Agency in the Watergate break-in and cover-up.

Although Colson exorcised his Fifth Amendment rights at the Senate hearings, he has collaborated quietly with Baker's top committee aide, Fred Thompson, in the desperate attempt to shift more of the Watergate blame to the CIA.

Colson has also been in touch with the White House on the CIA angle. This has aroused suspicion that the Baker-Colson maneuver may be a White House ploy to divert public attention from President Nixon's own Watergate role.

Sources close to Baker hotly deny that his CIA investigation is a diversionary action. They say he is hard at work on a detailed report, which they promised will be a "bombshell." From hints we have gotten of moans in Baker's possession, "bombshell" is a fair description of what he has discovered.

For months, Baker has dallied with the idea that the CIA really engineered the celebrated break-in at Democratic headquarters for vague "national security" reasons and then pulled

strings to hush it up. But he has never seemed to be able to get his theory to jell.

What finally persuaded him he was right, our sources say, was the admission by the CIA on Jan. 29 that tapes of CIA conversations were destroyed during the Watergate period—after Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) has specifically requested that they be preserved.

At Baker's instigation, former CIA chief Richard Helms, now ambassador to Iran, was hauled before the committee a week ago under the most secret conditions.

In addition to Baker and Thompson, the session was also attended by Chairman Sam J. Ervin Jr. (D-N.C.), counsel Sam Dash and a few trusted aides. Also present, surprisingly, was Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), who heads the Senate's hush-hush CIA oversight subcommittee.

For four hours, the chain-smoking Helms was grilled about the CIA's part in the Watergate events. We have learned that the secret transcripts show that Baker's questions were aimed at uncovering a hidden CIA involvement.

Baker seemed convinced, for example, that Helms personally ordered the tapes destroyed. Our sources say that Helms skillfully parried Baker's ques-

tions and did not incriminate the CIA.

Once the hearing was over, Baker and Thompson went to work on the report. It probably will be submitted to Symington's Subcommittee for Security Review.

Baker, meanwhile, is expected to demand that all CIA documents in the Watergate case be declassified. He has claimed privately that these papers will bolster his case. Others who have had access to the documents insist they may raise more questions than they answer.

Footnote: Baker could not be reached. Colson, Thompson and Dash refused to provide any details about the CIA investigation. Thompson, however, said: "Hopefully, the entire picture will be made public. At that time, people can make their own judgments."

Hoover's Privy—Thanks to the foresight of the National Park Service, future generations of Americans will not forget what Herbert Hoover's outhouse looked like.

The Park Service is planning to reconstruct Hoover's boyhood privy, plank by plank, near the cottage where the 31st President was born in West Branch, Iowa. The Hoover Presidential Library and burial site are part of the same compound.

In addition to adding an air of authenticity to the Hoover park, the outhouse will hide an electrical transformer. The privy is supposed to be completed in time for VIP viewing at the centennial celebration of Hoover's birth this August.

Des Moines architect William J. Wagner, who designed most of the buildings in the Hoover park, was commissioned to draw the privy plans.

With respect for historical accuracy, and tongue in cheek, Wagner researched the project and came up with a detailed design for a five-by-six, board-and-batten structure, complete with a peg for a Sears and Roebuck catalogue. The "front elevation" drawing shows a door decorated with the traditional crescent moon.

The two-holer, "lift-up" seat, Wagner noted in his plans, should be constructed of "butternut or elm," as these are "warm feeling" woods. He drew the seat, Wagner told us, from a life-size model, which he found at an old stagecoach stop in Iowa.

Footnote: Wagner, who says he has "a deep personal feeling for Herbert Hoover," designed the former President's privy for no pay. He invited us to Des Moines to "feel his butternut model."

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Watergate Panel Hears Ex-CIA Chief

Former CIA Director Richard M. Helms testified in executive session yesterday before the Senate select Watergate committee for about six hours.

Helms, now U.S. ambassador to Iran, was called back from Tehran at the request of Sen. Howard H. Baker (R-Tenn.), vice chairman of the committee to answer questions concerning activities of the CIA and the Watergate scandals.

Although neither Baker nor Helms would discuss what was said during the closed session, Baker told reporters after hearing three hours of testimony that Helms had been "very forthcoming" as a witness. Baker said that he was recommending that Helms' testimony and other documents held by the committee that are classified be made public.

"I think that now we've reached the stage where rumor is possibly more destructive than fact," Baker said. "Everybody's best interests would be served by an early and complete disclosure" of the information, he said.

Sen. Sam J. Ervin Jr. (D-N.C.), chairman of the committee, told reporters that he had no reason to suspect Helms was in any way involved in the Watergate affair. "I think Mr. Helms is a public servant above reproach," Ervin said. "I don't think Mr. Helms has ever done anything wrong in connection with the whole affair."

Saturday, March 9, 1974 THE WASHINGTON POST

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MAR 1974

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Guess Who's Trying to be Henry Superspy?

Inside the American Intelligence Establishment

Who's Who and What's Happening in the Spy Business
—A Long Look Behind the Classified Curtain

By Tad Szulc

One day it is the controversy over the Central Intelligence Agency's role in Watergate. Another day it is a piece of inept CIA skulduggery in a remote province in Thailand. Then it is the grudging admission that quite a few American newsmen have been operating as CIA informants abroad. Or the discovery that the agency has been secretly training Tibetan guerrillas in Colorado, and Cambodian and Ugandan irregulars at hidden camps in Greece while bank-rolling colonels on the ruling Greek junta and financing famous European statesmen and contriving to overthrow the Libyan regime.

The CIA, it would seem, just cannot stay out of the headlines, which is a commentary on the agency itself and on the contradictions in our society. Though it obviously is one of the most secretive agencies in the United States government, the CIA probably receives more publicity than any Washington

the CIA should be made more accountable to proper Congressional committees as is, for example, the Atomic Energy Commission, whose work also is secret. Yet there is no other nation where key intelligence officials are as easily identifiable as in the United States and where the head of intelligence is publicly and extensively questioned by the legislature—never mind how thoroughly—as William Egan Colby, the new CIA Director, was last year. And it is not all that hard for investigative reporters to track down some CIA actions, much to the agency's annoyance. In Britain, the Official Secrets Act would make this impossible. In France, the top-secret *Service du Territoire* would prevent it. So would Israel's Shin Bet, with the assistance of official censorship. In Communist countries, exposure of the security services is unthinkable.

Unsatisfactory as it is to those appalled by the CIA's excesses, the disposition that does

the Soviet KGB's external operations.

Having said all these things, I should add that despite all the publicity about the CIA and company, the function of intelligence in the modern age is not always understood by the public or, for that matter, by our top policymakers. In fact, the entire American intelligence apparatus—not just the CIA—is undergoing a major institutional crisis. This crisis results in fairly equal parts from the profound political and technological changes affecting the world in the 1970s (perhaps not fully comprehended by the intelligence people themselves) and from the style of foreign policy as conducted by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. What is at issue now is the effectiveness of our intelligence machinery and the question of whether it is helped or hurt by Kissinger's decision to be the de facto chief intelligence officer of the United States in addition to serving as Secretary of State and the President's principal foreign

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WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS
Washington, D. C., Monday, March 11, 1974

A-3

Barker Fired From CIA For Criminal Ties — Helms

United Press International

The Central Intelligence Agency fired Watergate burglar Bernard Barker in the mid-1960s because he was involved with "gambling and criminal elements," according to former CIA Director Richard Helms.

Barker is the man who worked for E. Howard Hunt Jr. during the Bay of Pigs Cuban invasion. In the spring of 1971 he recruited, at Hunt's request, the Cuban burglary team that broke into the Los Angeles office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist and subsequently was caught in the Watergate break-in.

Helms' testimony, given to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee behind closed doors on Feb. 7, was made public yesterday. The hearings were to confirm Helms' appointment as ambassador to Iran.

BARKER'S attorney, Daniel F. Schultz, promptly refuted Helms' description of why Barker was terminated by the CIA.

"Mr. Helms' testimony is inconsistent with official information we have received from the CIA. It is categorically denied by Mr. Barker and is simply not

true," Schultz said in an interview with UPI.

Helms' statement on Barker appeared to conflict with Barker's own account of his relations with the CIA, given in sworn testimony before the Senate Watergate committee May 24, 3½ months after Helms spoke to the Foreign Relations Committee.

Helms told the committee about Barker:

"During the Bay of Pigs he was one of the Cuban derivatives who was involved in that operation and it is my recollection that all lines with him on the part of the agency were eliminated some time in the middle sixties.

"AS A MATTER of fact we found out he was involved in certain gambling and criminal elements and we didn't like the cut of his jib and we cut him off."

Barker, testifying to the special Senate Watergate committee, said he left the CIA immediately after the end of the Bay of Pigs American operation against Cuba in April 1961.

CIA spokesmen said it would be "difficult" to find out exactly when Barker left the agency or the circumstances.

HS/HC-950

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By Tad Szulc

One day it is the controversy over the Central Intelligence Agency's role in Watergate. Another day it is a piece of inept CIA skulduggery in a remote province in Thailand. Then it is the grudging admission that quite a few American newsmen have been operating as CIA informants abroad. Or the discovery that the agency has been secretly training Tibetan guerrillas in Colorado, and Cambodian and Ugandan irregulars at hidden camps in Greece while bank-rolling colonels on the ruling Greek junta and financing famous European statesmen and contriving to overthrow the Libyan regime.

The CIA, it would seem, just cannot stay out of the headlines, which is a commentary on the agency itself and on the contradictions in our society. Though it obviously is one of the most secretive agencies in the United States government, the CIA probably receives more publicity than any Washington bureaucracy except for the White House. Most of this publicity is negative, sometimes indignant, often sensationalist, and frequently lopsided. The CIA's track record in the 27 years of its operations largely accounts for this lavish yet unwanted coverage—it's done everything from stealing the text of Khrushchev's secret Kremlin speech denouncing Stalin and the Bay of Pigs, to overthrowing foreign regimes, to running the Laos "Clandestine Army," and possibly outfitting the Watergate "Plumbers"—but it is our endless fascination with espionage and cloak-and-dagger stories that makes readers unflinchingly receptive to stories and books about the CIA.

On a more serious level, however, our interest underlines the important point that a secret agency cannot function in utter secrecy in what still is a reasonably open society. The CIA is the subject of continued public scrutiny and debate—even if the scrutiny is superficial and the debate seldom well informed, and even if it is true that the agency has been allowed to run wild and uncontrolled. There is a growing view reinforced by the

the CIA should be made more accountable to proper Congressional committees as is, for example, the Atomic Energy Commission, whose work also is secret. Yet there is no other nation where key intelligence officials are as easily identifiable as in the United States and where the head of intelligence is publicly and extensively questioned by the legislature—never mind how thoroughly—as William Egan Colby, the new CIA Director, was last year. And it is not all that hard for investigative reporters to track down some CIA actions, much to the agency's annoyance. In Britain, the Official Secrets Act would make this impossible. In France, the top-secret *Service du Territoire* would prevent it. So would Israel's Shin Bet, with the assistance of official censorship. In Communist countries, exposure of the security services is unthinkable.

Unsatisfactory as it is to those appalled by the CIA's excesses, the exposure that does exist in our democratic society clearly is a plus. Last year's discovery of the abortive 1970 White House plan for domestic intelligence (Tom Huston, its author, praised the CIA for its cooperative spirit in engineering it) underscored the importance of such exposure. So did disclosures of the CIA-run Operation Phoenix in Vietnam set up for murdering suspected Viet Cong agents. We are highly sensitized to the role of intelligence agencies here and abroad. But so strange is our morality that we usually tend to accept the national security need for building better and better nuclear arsenals but flinch indignantly at the notion of American involvement in global intelligence operations.

This is where the contradictions of our society come in. However, the reality is that effective foreign policy depends not only on classical political and economic diplomacy, but also on military deterrents and the availability of solid intelligence. To abolish our intelligence services would be tantamount to unilateral nuclear disarmament, something not seriously proposed here. We must live with the reality that the CIA and its sister agencies will go on existing, so will

the Soviet KGB's external operations.

Having said all these things, I should add that despite all the publicity about the CIA and company, the function of intelligence in the modern age is not always understood by the public or, for that matter, by our top policymakers. In fact, the entire American intelligence apparatus—not just the CIA—is undergoing a major institutional crisis. This crisis results in fairly equal parts from the profound political and technological changes affecting the world in the 1970s (perhaps not fully comprehended by the intelligence people themselves) and from the style of foreign policy as conducted by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. What is at issue now is the effectiveness of our intelligence machinery and the question of whether it is helped or hurt by Kissinger's decision to be the de facto chief intelligence officer of the United States in addition to serving as Secretary of State and the President's principal foreign policy advisor.

First, however, let's briefly look at the United States intelligence establishment.

In theory, the intelligence community is a unified body presided over by the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), which is directly responsible to the National Security Council at the White House and consequently to the President. The USIB is headed by the Director of the CIA, who also acts as Director of Central Intelligence and, again in theory, as chief of the intelligence community. William Colby replaced Richard Helms in this twin post last September (there was a five-month interregnum during which James M. Schlesinger managed to shake up the community quite considerably before moving on to be Secretary of Defense), but there are no indications so far that Colby carries much more weight with the Nixon-Kissinger White House than did Helms. Helms, now Ambassador to Iran, was in deep disfavor with Kissinger. The White House tends to regard Colby as an efficient intelligence bureaucrat and administrator (despite his long career as a clan-

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destine operator) who meets Kissinger's special requirements. So it is hard to think of Colby as the real chief of the intelligence community in the sense that Allen Dulles was when he was CIA director from 1953 to 1961. There seem to be no giants nowadays in the spying business. It has been touched by the age of mediocrity too.

The other agencies forming the USIB are the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), supposedly the spokesman for the Pentagon, but not always in tune with the intelligence experts of the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the National Security Agency (NSA), specializing in highly sophisticated electronic and technological intelligence gathering; the State Department's smallish but excellent Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), mainly concerned with analyzing political and economic intelligence; the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which has its own intelligence-processing capability in the nuclear field; the Federal Bureau of Investigation, contributing counterespionage functions; and the Treasury Department, a fairly recent addition, which is involved in intelligence operations against narcotics traffic and which also runs the Secret Service.

Below the USIB, but connected with the major intelligence agencies, are such specialized organizations as the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the most secret of them all. NRO's existence has been one of the intelligence community's best kept secrets. Its mission is to coordinate the so-called "overhead" reconnaissance conducted by Samos spy-in-the-sky satellites and high-flying planes like the SR-71, the successor to the famous U-2. The Air Force runs NRO with special funds—some estimates are that NRO spends \$1.5 billion annually, about a fifth of the total United States intelligence budget—and it is believed that the Under Secretary of the Air Force, currently James W. Plummer, is its immediate boss. Overhead reconnaissance is absolutely essential for the monitoring of military deployments by potential adversaries: The Samos satellite, for example, is the so-called "means of national verification" for the 1972 Soviet-American nuclear control agreements. It insures that the Russians are not cheating on the antiballistic missile (ABM) limitations or exceeding the number of land- or submarine-based missiles under the temporary accord on offensive strategic weapons. The Samos, with its high-precision photography, keeps Washington posted on every new missile site and type of weapon deployed by the Soviet Union. Thanks to the Samos we know that the Soviets are busily building their strength. And the Russians, of course, have their own version of the Samos to keep us honest.

NRO experts work closely with the huge National Security Agency (believed to employ more than 20,000 civilian and military specialists), both in actual overhead reconnaissance and in the painstaking electronic monitoring of Soviet advances in the de-

velopment of Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) warheads. (These are multiple warheads, usually three, carried by individual ballistic missiles. Each can be guided separately to its assigned and very precise target.) Developing MIRV was a major American nuclear breakthrough, and for the last five years enormous effort has gone into monitoring Soviet tests to determine whether the Russians have it too. The American defense posture and disarmament negotiating stance depend on this knowledge. The intelligence community believes that the Soviet Union "MIRVed" last year, but is uncertain just how precise the Soviet targeting system is.

This information is the raw strategic intelligence that NRO and NSA feed to the CIA and the DIA—and ultimately to the USIB and the White House—for evaluation and interpretation. NSA also provides the intelligence community with a fantastic wealth of electronic intelligence—ELINT in the professional jargon—in addition to data on Soviet or Chinese military deployments and developments. NSA listening posts around the world eavesdrop on practically all the non-American (not only Communist) military radio, microwave, telex, and telephone traffic. They intercept conversations among Soviet MIG pilots; routine communications either in clear language or in code (one of NSA's crucial functions is code-breaking as well as code-making) involving Warsaw Pact military units, Chinese, North Vietnamese, North Korean, and other Communist detachments; and just about everything of potential interest to the United States that can be overheard or copied. This work is done from secret land bases ranging from Ethiopia and the Indian Himalayas to Turkey and the Aleutian Islands as well as from ELINT ships (the Pueblo, captured by North Korea, was one) and ELINT aircraft flying all over the world. NSA-equipped and manned aircraft directed secret ground penetrating operations in Laos and Cambodia, and presumably do so now in other critical areas—the Middle East is probably one. It may one day be NSA's function to interrupt the worldwide United States military communications network with a message preceded by the code word CRITIC (which automatically gives it absolute priority over all other traffic) to alert the White House, the North American Defense Command in Colorado, and the Strategic Air Command in Omaha that enemy missiles or bombers have been launched—or are about to be—against the United States. The extra few seconds such a warning would provide before, say, a Soviet first strike would allow the United States to respond with a second strike from Minuteman missiles in North Dakota, Polaris and Poseidon nuclear submarines cruising under the oceans, and SAC B-52 bombers on permanent airborne alert.

But since a nuclear holocaust is not generally anticipated, the value of strategic intelligence relates to the construction of our defense and diplomatic policies. And this is

where the intelligence community's current internal crisis appears in its most acute form. To be meaningful, strategic and tactical intelligence must be properly evaluated and interpreted. The National Security Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office produce and supply the raw intelligence for the CIA, DIA, and INR. But the CIA, DIA (and the individual military intelligence services), and INR also collect and produce intelligence they obtain through non-electronic means. Each agency plays a dual role and each has its own analyses, opinions, and biases. Each tries to influence policy, often for self-serving reasons. The CIA, for example, is barred by statute from formulating policies, but the CIA obviously holds policy views and subtly, if not always successfully, tries to influence national decision-making processes. During the latter part of the Vietnam war, for example, the agency continually warned against military over optimism and against underestimating North Vietnamese and Viet Cong power. The CIA urged realism in "Vietnamization" policies. On the other hand, it miscalculated the advantages of getting rid of Prince Norodom Sihanouk in Cambodia because it minimized the potential of the rebel Khmer Rouge guerrillas. The Administration accepted the CIA's Cambodia opinions with results that are less than felicitous. As will be seen, the CIA also had views on strategic negotiations that differed from those of other members of the intelligence community. It played an important role in helping to undermine the Socialist régime in Chile—this included strong policy views in favor of doing so—in addition to carrying out White House instructions in this area. In other words, the CIA never simply cranked out intelligence without adding policy views.

The DIA, whose generals and admirals are concerned with the fortunes of the military profession, often seems to have a vested interest in "worst case" interpretations of intelligence data. Put simply, military analysts tend to suspect the worst concerning the potential enemy's intentions because that justifies requests for bigger budgets and appropriations for new weapons systems. Politically, "worst case" conclusions may bring trade-offs. In 1969, for instance, the Pentagon's insistence that the Russians had "MIRVed" (the CIA accurately concluded that they hadn't yet) forced Nixon and Kissinger to "buy it off": They promised appropriations for new weapons systems so that the military establishment would support the SALT I negotiations with the Russians. And so on.

Traditionally, the general idea always has been that the intelligence community, with all its various resources, would present the President with agreed estimates on everything from Soviet nuclear advances to Hanoi's intentions in Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia; the likelihood of a Soviet-Chinese war; the chances of a new Middle Eastern conflict; the survival power of the

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Socialist regime in Chile, and many other situations of concern to the United States.

When the CIA truly was Washington's pre-eminent intelligence organ, its Office of National Estimates prepared the so-called National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) on behalf of the entire intelligence community, although other agencies' dissenting views were duly noted. By and large, however, the NIEs were fairly sacrosanct.

But in June 1973, when Kissinger was the President's chief of staff for foreign affairs, the Office of National Estimates was abolished. John W. Huizenga, the Chief of National Estimates, was forced into premature retirement by Schlesinger. The changes were based on reorganization plans for the intelligence community that Schlesinger, then head of the Office of Budget and Management, prepared for the White House in November 1971. The new estimating system turned out to be more responsive to the special needs of the Nixon-Kissinger White House, and this is very much part of what is happening to the intelligence community.

Instead of a permanent estimates body, Colby, acting as Director of Central Intelligence, set up a corps of so-called National Intelligence Officers drawn from the CIA and other agencies to work on specific intelligence projects. This staff has the logistic support of the whole intelligence community. It is headed by George Carver, designated as Chief National Intelligence Officer, who operates directly under Colby with three deputies and approximately 30 National Intelligence Officers, although this figure probably will increase as the corps develops. Carver is a CIA veteran and a Vietnam expert. He first caught Kissinger's eye because he represented the CIA on the Vietnam Task Force, an interagency group, and occasionally on the National Security Council. In practice, Colby and Carver assign a specific project—it could be Arab attitudes on oil or the likelihood of a North Vietnamese offensive in 1974—to a National Intelligence Officer, who pulls together all the necessary intelligence resources to produce a report submitted to Colby and then to the National Security Council, which means Henry Kissinger wearing the hat of Special Presidential Assistant and/or chairman of the top-secret "40 Committee" in the NSC

structure. This means that different senior estimators work on various projects rather than having the Office of National Estimates approving all the reports as it did in the past. Kissinger and his staff have direct access to the National Intelligence Officers when work is in progress, so Kissinger can better control the process of intelligence.

This is the most important structural and political change to affect the intelligence community since Helms was shipped to Iran early in 1973. Schlesinger's short reign at the CIA Langley headquarters produced some superficial changes: The staff was cut by nearly ten percent; scores of old-line "romantics" in the Clandestine Services were retired (E. Howard Hunt was retired by Helms in 1970); the agency was reorganized along more modern and efficient lines; and the importance of electronic intelligence was emphasized by bringing Pentagon "overhead" reconnaissance experts to Schlesinger's seventh-floor executive suite at Langley.


But the really significant change in the intelligence community's structure came with Kissinger's decision to atomize it and therefore bring it under his own tight control. Kissinger wanted to break the frequently artificial consensus of estimates and encourage a direct flow of intelligence from the various agencies to his own office in the White House where he and his National Security Council staff made the final estimates and evaluations.

This naturally led to a major controversy—an academic one, since Kissinger had the last word—between Kissinger and the traditionalists in the intelligence community. In brief, the opposing positions were these: Kissinger believed that the agreed national estimates were the lowest common denominator reached by agencies that often disagreed on interpretation of data—in his own words, he had to fight his way through "Talmudic" documents to find their real meaning; the traditionalists' view was that Kissinger was disrupting an orderly intelligence procedure in favor of his own biases, that he wanted interpretations to fit his preconceived policy opinions. Intelligence community veterans complain that Kissinger and his people now use the intelligence product capriciously and unprofes-


sionally. They resent what they consider his capricious handling of intelligence and his practice of eliminating top intelligence people from the decision-making process. They say that under the new system, the intelligence community, including Central Intelligence Director Colby, has no idea what happens to the intelligence product, such as the National Intelligence officers' contribution, once it is fed into the White House machinery.

Even in Dick Helms' day, old-timers say, the Director of Central Intelligence rarely had a chance to defend his views at the White House because National Security Council meetings were increasingly infrequent and there was no other forum where he could speak out. In his latter years Helms had virtually no direct access to Nixon, while Kissinger made no bones about his low opinion of the CIA boss. Colby, as far as it is known, is not faring much better with the White House. For example, when Kissinger and Schlesinger ordered the worldwide United States military alert during last October's Mideast crisis, Colby was not consulted beforehand. He simply was summoned after the decision was made and informed of it.

CIA officials also think that Kissinger often ignores agency views and estimates in favor of opinions more to his pragmatic liking. This, they say, is what happens when CIA and military intelligence differ considerably. The 1969 MIRM controversy was the first instance of it. Later the White House minimized CIA warnings that the Viet Cong was much stronger in Vietnam than the US Command in Saigon claimed and that pacification was far from successful. Kissinger, CIA people say, never requested the agency's opinion on the soundness of the DIA plan to snatch American war prisoners from the Sontay camp in North Vietnam (the camp was empty when the raiders landed). No questions, they say, were put to the intelligence community when the Administration decided on the Cambodian invasion in 1970 (the military insisted they knew where to find the elusive COSVN command of the Viet Cong inside Cambodia; it has not been located to this day). No questions were put to the intelligence community when the White House decided to




William Hyland, Director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR).



William Colby, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).



Vice Admiral Vincent de Poix, Director of the Defense Department's Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).



Lieutenant General Lewis Allen, Director of the National Security Agency (NSA).

support the South Vietnamese thrust in Laos in 1971 to sever the Ho Chi Minh Trail (the operation failed). CIA people wonder why Kissinger never ordered the intelligence community to prepare studies on all these plans before deciding to carry them out.

Colby, a lifetime clandestine operator (he fought behind enemy lines in France and Norway as a young OSS officer in World War II, then made a CIA career in Vietnam as station chief and later as chief of the pacification program with ambassadorial rank), still chairs the USIB as Director of Central Intelligence—USIB now is mainly concerned with evaluating Soviet military and political strength. But Colby's power has been considerably eroded in comparison with that held by his CIA predecessors.

Individual intelligence agencies now are increasingly in rivalry with one another (the difference is that in the past natural rivalries were discouraged by the White House; now they seem to be encouraged) for the attention of Henry Kissinger and thus the President. To put it simply, Kissinger, who distrusts all bureaucracies including the intelligence community, devised a series of sophisticated moves to weaken the intelligence apparatus so that he could become the chief interpreter and arbiter of the intelligence product emanating from each agency.

Kissinger continues to control the National Security Council—he retains his post of White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs despite his new post as Secretary of State—and this preserves his control of the evaluation of intelligence. This is probably the most powerful function in the formulation of foreign policy, which can be evolved only on the basis of evaluated knowledge. That is what intelligence is all about. The Secretary of State has no such statutory power; traditionally he is a consumer of intelligence. During Nixon's first term William P. Rogers simply relied on his own Intelligence and Research Bureau—and there are regrets at the State Department that he did not study that first-rate product sufficiently—but Kissinger, wearing his many hats, is both chief *producer* and chief *consumer* of the total intelligence available to the United States government. His CIA detractors call him the "super case officer" in the intelligence community.

Kissinger also has a handle on major intelligence decisions through his chairmanship of the "40 Committee" in the National Security Council. This is principally a policy body—the intelligence community, the Defense, State, and Justice departments are represented on it—that makes broad decisions in the field of intelligence and instructs the appropriate agencies to carry them out through their own means. Its name is derived from the number of the 1969 NSC memorandum that set it up in its present form. Earlier, the Committee was known as "5412," a memorandum number dating back to the Eisenhower Administration, and during the Kennedy and Johnson

administrations as "303," this being the room number in the Executive Office Building where the group met. Britain has a similar body known as the "20 Committee," but its name is a product of British whimsicality. Since the British group was called by insiders the "double-cross committee," its chiefs translated the Roman numerals "XX" into the designation "20" for their outfit.

The "40 Committee" decisions must be personally approved by the President. Its agenda and the frequency of its meetings are secret, but it is assumed that all large-scale operations (as distinct from ongoing standard activities) are reviewed there. This was the case, it is said, with the CIA's clandestine army in Laos and with Operation Phoenix in Vietnam. But it also is known that between 1970 and 1973 the "40 Committee" has concerned itself on a number of occasions with the Chilean situation before and after the election of Salvador Allende, the late president, as well as with such recondite matters as whether the Norwegian government would grant concessions to American oil firms. In the case of Norway, US policymakers felt that normal diplomatic pressures were inadequate and that intelligence resources were required. It is not clear just how the CIA went about this assignment. Likewise, the CIA's role in an abortive attempt to overthrow the Libyan regime some time in 1971 has not been fully explained—in fact, the whole operation remains an official secret. However, responsible sources claim the CIA was instructed to eliminate the radical government of Colonel Qaddafi when he threatened to nationalize U.S. oil companies. Given the scope of United States interests, there is no limit to the situations the "40 Committee" may be drawn into.

Odd as it may sound, the "40 Committee" under Kissinger early realized that Soviet leaders should have a better understanding of the United States. The function of the American intelligence community is, by definition, to ferret out knowledge about the Soviet Union, but sophisticated thinkers here concluded that awesome policy errors in the Kremlin can be avoided if the Russians knew more about American attitudes and potential reactions. It would be an exaggeration to suggest that the CIA is engaged in educating the KGB (although a peculiar rapport between them exists in certain fields such as security at the time of Nixon's Moscow visit and Brezhnev's Washington trip), but the intelligence community clearly was delighted some years ago when the Soviet Academy of Sciences organized its "USA" institute under Gyorgi Arbatov, a specialist on American affairs. The assumption here is that the new institute is performing a political intelligence function in conjunction with the KGB and the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

Speaking of the KGB, which is the CIA's principal opponent in intelligence wars, the private assessment here is that the Soviet service has been improving over the years,

think, however, that the Russians are far behind us in electronic intelligence even though they, too, have equipment like overhead satellites.

Experts say that the KGB's internal defenses are strong. It is doubtful that the CIA ever really penetrated it, although there was the case of Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, a senior KGB officer who allegedly served British and American intelligence for years as a double agent. Despite claims here, it remains unclear what precisely Penkovsky really did for the West. Because it is both a domestic security service (in the FBI sense) and an international intelligence agency like the CIA, the KGB obviously is hard to penetrate. CIA Director Colby made this point indirectly when he told a Congressional committee in executive session late last year that he was spending much of his time trying to penetrate the Soviet Communist party.

It is presumed to be among the "40 Committee" functions to supervise secret intelligence agreements with friendly countries. Such agreements exist with Britain, Canada, Australia, South Africa, and Israel, among others. The CIA and the British MI-6 occasionally exchange agents when it is convenient for one service to work under the cover of the other, but the principal aim of the agreements is the exchange of intelligence. A secret British-American intelligence group thus functions at the British Embassy in Washington. There are extremely close ties with Canada; recent published reports said that Canadian intelligence personnel worked hand in hand with the CIA here and in Ottawa. Finally, there is an intelligence exchange agreement within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but this is a more limited arrangement because of what the CIA sees as the dangers of leaks to the Soviets.

Despite budget and personnel cuts, internal divisions, rivalries, and frustrations, the United States intelligence community is a formidable empire. It is believed to employ around 100,000 people in all the agencies (not counting the FBI) and its annual budget is somewhere between \$6 billion and \$7 billion, the bulk of the money going to the expensive technological operations in the National Security Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office. Although the CIA is overseen by special Congressional appropriations subcommittees, its budgeting, like that of the NSA, DIA, and NRO, does not appear on the books. Instead, the Office of Budget and Management hides it in appropriations for other government agencies. Sometimes agencies like the Agency for International Development spend their own funds on the CIA's behalf, as was done in Laos and Vietnam, to be paid back later.

The intelligence community, especially the CIA, also works through innumerable fronts, often supposed businesses, and channels funds for political operations through labor and cultural groups. At the war the CIA owned at

least two airlines—Air America Inc. (operating) and Southern Air Transport (being sold). It also had contracts with several bona fide US carriers. Southern Air Transport carried out a number of secret operations in the Caribbean in recent years. The CIA still charters Southeast Air Transport planes to such agencies as AID to bring Latin American students and professionals to the US for conferences and other meetings sponsored by the US government. In 1964 a special company was set up in Miami to recruit Cuban pilots, veterans of the Bay of Pigs, for secret operations in the Congo. In earlier years the CIA subsidized the National Students' Association, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, the Congress for Cultural Freedom, and a series of related magazines here and in Western Europe. Although the CIA is barred by law from operating in the United States (except at its Virginia headquarters), the agency still maintains covert offices in Miami, New York, New Orleans, San Francisco, and Charleston, South Carolina. CIA officials say these offices support foreign operations and, among other functions, help to debrief interesting travelers returning from abroad. But in the course of Watergate investigations it developed that Langley headquarters as well as the CIA offices in Miami and San Francisco provided logistic support for the White House "Plumbers." One employee, in fact, still was on the CIA payroll when he was arrested at the Watergate office building in June 1972.

Basically, the CIA is divided into two main departments: operations and analysis. There are experts in Washington who hold the CIA analysis branch in extremely high esteem, but tend to be skeptical of the operators. The two departments are often at odds politically: the operators often dismiss the estimators as "eggheads" while the analysts think of the operators as a wild bunch. This situation is changing as more and more old-timers, mostly OSS veterans, retire, a new generation of agents and analysts enters the CIA ranks, and the needs of intelligence, especially in electronic intelligence, change along with the rest of the world. But there also are stresses inside the clandestine services. "Action" officers—the "black" operators and paramilitary specialists—are more gung-ho than what the CIA calls covert political operatives, and this, too, leads to internal disagreements.

Top specialists in their fields still are hired from the outside—the CIA has experts on everything from West African culture to Filipino tribal myths and the effects of the Humboldt Current on fisheries in the Pacific—but the basic recruitment is mainly from colleges and universities. The decision whether a recruit should be assigned to operations or analysis is usually made during an initial stage at the CIA's "basic training" school on Glebe Road in Virginia. Recruits selected for operations are assigned to a tough course at a special school known as "The Farm," near Yorktown, Virginia. Promising analysts may be sent back to uni-

versities for postgraduate studies in various fields.

Traditionally, the CIA has been run by men from the clandestine services. The most notable CIA director with this background was Allen Dulles, probably the best intelligence operator the OSS had in Europe during the war. Richard Helms ran the clandestine services before rising to the directorship. William Colby served briefly as deputy director for plans (the "dirty tricks" division) after his return from Vietnam and before being named Director last year. As CIA Director and Director of Central Intelligence, Colby, a 54-year-old self-effacing but tough man, is backstopped by Lieutenant General Vernon (Dick) Walters, the Deputy Director of Intelligence. Walters, an extraordinary linguist, spent much of his Army career as a military or defense attaché overseas, but he is not considered an expert on either analysis or clandestine operations. It was Walters's lot, however, to be drawn into the Watergate cover-up controversy when the White House tried to get the CIA to take the blame for the "Plumbers" and pay their salaries after they went to prison.

Schlesinger and Colby reorganized the CIA structure to a considerable extent. The old Plans Department (DDP) was renamed Directorate for Operations (DDO), absorbing the scientific and technical divisions. It is headed by William Nelson, a clandestine services veteran from the Far East, who took Colby's former job. Colby, not being a professional estimator, has kept on Richard Lehmann, a highly respected official, as Deputy Director for Current Intelligence (DDI). Lehmann works with George Carver in the new National Intelligence Officers' system. Major General Daniel O. Graham, brought from the Pentagon by Schlesinger, is in charge of "overhead" intelligence, his speciality. He works directly with Colby, but he feels strongly that military intelligence at the Pentagon should become more sophisticated so that it would not lose influence to the civilian agencies.

CIA officials say that the new electronic intelligence systems have cut down the agency's clandestine work through agents. After all, enormous resources are earmarked for worldwide eavesdropping and celestial reconnaissance. But, they hasten to add, the CIA has not lost its capabilities in this field. It retains its paramilitary organization. Many agents are involved in the new government-wide operations against the traffic in narcotics and against international terrorists. The agency, in fact, seeks to project an image of concentration in these areas. More recently, the CIA was asked by the new Federal Energy Office to monitor the movements of oil tankers throughout the world to determine shipping patterns during the energy crisis. Deeply involved in the corporate affairs of the oil industry, the CIA is believed to be the only government agency to have been able to compile a list of joint ventures in the petroleum industry. This is a top-secret document both from the view-

There is no question, either, that the CIA remains deeply involved in covert political action everywhere in the world. The latest example of such activities concerned the CIA agent in northeastern Thailand who faked a letter to the Bangkok government from a guerrilla leader proposing negotiations. This was a classical example of the "disinformation" technique, intended to embarrass the guerrilla leader with his followers and thus weaken the subversive movement. But the new Thai government took a dim view of the CIA's involvement in domestic politics and a scandal developed, especially because the American Ambassador, Robert Kintner, has a CIA background himself. Intelligence specialists here think the letterwriting agent exceeded his authority—and did a sloppy job to boot—and this episode already has resulted in the recall of B. Hugh Tovar, the chief of the big CIA station in Thailand, and has complicated our diplomatic relations with the Thais.

The Thailand incident also served to underscore the extent to which the CIA operates abroad in conjunction with local security services. In exchange for intelligence or whatever special favors it desires from local police or counterinsurgency forces (often for reasons having nothing to do with the interests of the host country), the CIA may provide them with training or special equipment. Thailand, where the United States has vast interests and where there is a local insurgency problem, is a case in point. But it also has been argued that this system has resulted in indirect CIA support for police forces in politically repressive governments from Latin America to Asia and Africa. Last year, responding to Congressional pressures, the CIA promised to end its secret programs of actually training foreign police forces.

I made the point earlier that there are no giants in the United States intelligence community. This may be partly due to Henry Kissinger's forceful personality—he overshadows other figures in the intelligence establishment. And the recent quick turnover in top intelligence jobs has left the community in flux and uncertainty, aggravated by the Kissinger-imposed strictures on its modus operandi.

At the CIA, for example, William Colby still is new in his job and judgments are being reserved as to his efficiency and the value of his innovations. The main concern in the CIA is that he assert his independence toward the White House, particularly in the area of estimates. Thus far his public image has not been bad. He is available to testify before Congressional committees much more frequently than Helms did—late last year he appeared before two separate subcommittees to discuss the CIA's involvement (or, as he claims, non-involvement) in the Chilean situation. He has testified on Watergate as often as he was called.

In the State Department, the new man in

continued

former CIA official, a distinguished ex-Soviet affairs, and a Kissinger protégé. He worked for Kissinger in the planning section of the National Security Council staff. But he has been in his new post only since last December.

The Defense Intelligence Agency, a 5,000-man operation, is headed by Vice Admiral Vincent P. dePoix, an austere man who has held his job since early 1973. The National Security Agency has a new Director in Air Force Lieutenant General Lewis Allen who was brought to the CIA from the DIA last year by Dr. Schlesinger, then appointed to head the NSA. He is another top specialist in "overhead" intelligence. Both dePoix and Allen are career military intelligence officers with highly technical backgrounds. They are little known outside the professional intelligence community. Few Washingtonians recognize Admiral dePoix or General Allen on the rare occasions when either comes to lunch downtown.

It is probably too early to assess whether Kissinger's domination of the American intelligence operation is good for the country. But there are thoughtful intelligence specialists who have serious reservations about it. Experienced intelligence people see a danger in the dual role Kissinger is determined to play: He may be tempted to interpret intelligence data to fit his policy concepts. They think he did so last year when he apparently ignored CIA and INR warnings that the Egyptians and the Syrians were actively planning an attack on Israel because of his conviction that the Soviets would not abet an operation that would endanger the détente they had worked out with him. This, CIA people think, was a classic example of how a statesman can become the intellectual prisoner of his own ideas.

Finally, there is the notion that to be useful, intelligence must be totally detached from the policy-making process. This concept of intelligence independence was a cornerstone of the legislation that created the CIA in 1947. Yet Kissinger seems determined to weld together the functions of intelligence and policy formulation, perhaps disregarding the profound difference between *capabilities* and *intent* of hostile parties. To differentiate between them is, after all, the principal function of sophisticated intelligence. Kissinger's technique, possibly a plausible one under the existing system of government in Washington, is simply to throw specific hard questions at the intelligence people, receive the answers, and then make his own judgments.

The question, therefore, is whether American intelligence is more effective than before—in the most professional sense of the word. Allowing for the fact that it may still be premature to render hard judgments—the intelligence community, after all, is in flux—there seems to be growing evidence that the present period is bound to be transitional because it does not satisfy the emerging policy needs.

The intelligence community itself feels shackled by the White House in the intellectual dimension of its work. Being a bureaucracy, it cannot function as efficiently as it should when it believes (rightly or wrongly) that fundamental concepts of the *use* of intelligence are being violated at the top of the Administration. This is something that Henry Kissinger, whatever hat he may be wearing, is bound to discover sooner or later. This is not to say, of course, that every bureaucracy should not be shaken up periodically. The perpetuation of old habits leads to sloppiness and opposition to new ideas.

Quite possibly, the real change will come when the new generation of intelligence specialists replaces the "old spies" who still think in terms of World War II, the OSS, and the Cold War. Be that as it may, enormous care must be exercised to prevent the intelligence product from being misused politically, as often appears to be the case at this juncture, to satisfy grandiose policy concepts politically useful to the White House or the new State Department under Kissinger. The tendency still is too strong to shoot the bearer of ill tidings—carefully constructed policies are not challenged by cold evidence. Soviet cheating on the détente, a sacred Nixon achievement, must not be ignored to prevent the détente from collapsing. This is the principal example. There may be others. The object, then, is to make professional intelligence a *respected* servant of policy. And a final word: The surest way to demoralize the intelligence community is to try to involve it, as the Nixon Administration tried to do, in such nefarious doings as Watergate and its cover-ups. □

They Tried Everything And Came Up Empty

By John McKelway
Star-News Staff Writer

Before the country reluctantly turned to gas rationing, any number of schemes were tried to reduce long lines of automobiles at gas stations.

THE ODD-EVEN plan, tried for a time in the Washington area, was dropped because federal officials had underestimated the large numbers of odds who turned out in greater num-

The Rambler

bers than ever before. Some had never purchased any gas before but felt it was their duty to do so. On even days, many motorists with even tags simply ran out of gas because they could find no lines to wait in. They were hauled away and were furious.

THEN CAME the "Maryland plan." It lasted two days and four meetings.

Under this arrangement, persons of certain religious beliefs were to receive gas alphabetically. Thus, the Anabapists had a whole day to fill up and were followed each passing day by Buddhists, Catholics, Dunkards and Episcopalians.

The Zoroastrians, however, objected.

THE MARYLAND plan, forgotten even as church attendance climbed was superceded by the "Alexandria Approach," based primarily on the weight of each driver.

All those over 150 pounds could get gas Monday through Wednesday. Stations were open for the rest of the week to those who were lighter at the time they entered the pump area.

This caused the big station strike when operators refused to physically weigh people. Lines were longer than ever before and many sent their little children rolling into stations behind the wheel. There was widespread diting.

NEXT, THE "Washington Agreement" was attempted. It looked good for awhile. Dreamed up by 87 persons who worked in the District Building, the arrangement stated that anyone in Maryland with a busted car clock could get gas in Northern Virginia if he, or she, took the Beltway and only on Sunday. Virginia motorists could, at the same time, receive a half-tank in Maryland once they proved their glove compartment had been stuck for over six months.

District motorists, meanwhile, were limited to two gallons if they signed an affidavit saying they would get out the vote once the mayor decided to run.

(This was canceled early one morning when an energy czar said it violated the Hatch Act.)

Administration spokesmen tried for a time to take to the tube and say "there is no gas shortage." But no one, oddly enough, would swallow the line.

TRIED BUT dropped, for one reason or another, were several other plans. Distribution by height and color of eyes never even got off the ground. Three gallons per child was unpopular. One that permitted a full tank to those whose ancestors fought in the Battle of Bladensburg never seemed to interest much of anybody.

So rationing arrived. People were learning to live with it when the country ran out of water.

But that's another story.

THE WASHINGTON POST, SATURDAY, MARCH 30, 1974



WHAT ABOUT THE CIA INVOLVEMENT IN WATERGATE??



I'M AFRAID I'M NOT AT LIBERTY TO ANSWER THAT!



By Oliphant for the Denver Post

HS/HC-950

A 8 Tuesday, March 5, 1974 THE WASHINGTON POST

Around the Nation

CIA's Trims in Book Defended by Colby

Associated Press

William Colby, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, testified yesterday that there are items in a book manuscript about the agency "which are very serious indeed" and would imperil national security if published.

Colby was the final witness in a case involving the book about the CIA written by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks. The CIA wants 162 passages deleted before the book is published this spring.

Irwin Goldbloom, deputy assistant attorney general who is the chief federal lawyer in the case, had said in advance that Colby's testimony probably would be taken in secret.

However, he appeared in public session at the trial before Judge Albert V. Bryan Jr. in U.S. District Court in Alexandria. Most of the testimony at the 2½-day trial has been taken with the public and press excluded.

Judge Bryan fixed March 18 for final arguments in the case.

Before Colby testified, co-author Marks was cross-examined in closed session about his testimony Friday. The gist of it was that much of the material he provided for the book he learned after he resigned as a State Department employee.

CIA Cuts in Book

William Colby, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, testified that some parts of a book about the agency "are very serious indeed" and would endanger national security if published.

Appearing in an open court session in Alexandria, Colby was the final witness in the case involving a book by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, from which the CIA wants some 162 pages trimmed.

U.S. District Court Judge Albert V. Bryan Jr. fixed March 18 for final arguments in the case.
tr for pickup

CIA on the Loose In Friendly Countries

Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1

By John M. Taylor

Perhaps it is no more than coincidence that Thailand was the setting for the CIA's most recent debacle — the fabrication of a letter last December in which a Thai insurgent leader purported to offer the government a cease-fire in return for a degree of regional autonomy. Because the letter in question was dispatched by registered mail, it was easily traced back to the CIA officer who had sent it.

The CIA letter represented a type of crude deception which might have been attempted anywhere, but somehow the Thai locale seems appropriate. For Thailand is typical of a handful of countries around the world in which the CIA has operated much like a sovereign state. In "friendly" host countries such as Thailand, the agency is able to achieve a freedom of operation to which it could not aspire in a neutral or hostile environment.

What was to have been accomplished by this bogus letter, which eventually found its way to the prime minister of Thailand? The presumed rationale is that receipt of such a presumptuous offer from an insurgent leader would awaken the Thais to the insurgent threat along their borders. No matter that this was a domestic problem, one with which the government had been coping more or less adequately for some 15 years. No matter that, since October, Thailand had operated under a government highly sensitive to anything smacking of interference in its internal affairs.

BUT SENSITIVITY to changes in political climate never has been a hallmark of CIA operations. Much as soliders are accused of preparing for the last war, so do intelligence organizations such as CIA seemingly dwell in the political milieu of yesteryear. The agency's vintage years were the 1950s and 1960s, when containment of communism was a byword and, in budgetary terms, CIA was one of the sacred cows of official Washington. Its recruiters operated on virtually every campus in the nation, and this writer was among those who succumbed to the lure of romance plus public service.

In its operations abroad, the agency's representatives often ride roughshod over the resident American ambassador, who is nominally the ranking U.S. official in his country of residence. One may ask why the ambassador, from his position of supposed authority, cannot prevent such abuses as the CIA letter. After all, his primacy within the overseas mission has been underscored by a succession of White House directives dating from the Kennedy administration.

THE FACT IS THAT AN ambassador — be he a career official or a political appointee — faces real handicaps in his role as mission manager. He is a political appointee, he will

probably have little or no experience in the bureaucratic infighting required to make one's views prevail in Washington. He will find that both the CIA and Defense components of his mission have independent reporting channels. And whether he is a political or a career appointee, the ambassador can rarely count upon the hard-nosed backing in Washington that his colleagues enjoy. The State Department has long been a patsy in the Washington power structure, and an ambassador's "support" at home sometimes consists of two or three senior Foreign Service Officers who aspire to his job.

In his country of residence, an ambassador enjoys certain distinct perks (perquisites). He rides around town with a flag on his fender and is a member of the best clubs. But more often than not, by the time he arrives his CIA counterpart has been in residence for several years. The CIA man perhaps has helped quash legal proceedings when the prime minister's son was in that traffic accident at Harvard, and flew in duty-free champagne when the interior minister's daughter finally got married. When Washington finally approved those helicopters which the defense attache had been working on for a year, it was the CIA man who modestly advised a few key officials that he was hoping for some good news on those choppers.

ABOUT THE TIME that the ambassador begins to wonder about who is running the mission his wife comes down with acute appendicitis. There are no commercial flights that day, but the CIA man waves his wand and a plane materializes out of thin air. It doesn't seem to have any of the usual markings, but at the airport no questions are asked.

It is in this context that one should view Ambassador William Kintner's problems in Bangkok. As diplomatic incidents go, the affair of the CIA letter is the type of brouhaha that will blow over in time; already references to it are buried in the inside pages of our papers. But some nagging questions linger. Does anyone really believe that the spurious letter was the brainchild of a junior officer who dispatched it without the knowledge of his superiors? Those to whom this sounds plausible should have no trouble at all with Rose Mary Wood's story about that tape recorder.

The New York Times recently editorialized that "the senior members of Congress have . . . failed to exercise any real independent scrutiny of the CIA." The lesson of the CIA letter is that control of the agency in the field is no more effective than that which is nominally exercised in Washington.

In addition to the background to which he alludes in this article, John M. Taylor is a former Foreign Service officer who writes frequently on historical, international and current affairs topics.

D-3

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS
Washington, D. C., Sunday, March 3, 1974

HS/HC-950

Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1

A-8

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS
Washington, D. C., Friday, March 1, 1974

CIA BOOK SUIT

Secrecy Is Where One Can Find It

By Mary Ellen Perry

Star-News Staff Writer

A high-ranking official of the Central Intelligence Agency acknowledged in testimony yesterday he did not check to see if material he censored as being top secret in a draft of a book about the CIA had already become public knowledge.

Harold L. Brownman, deputy director for management and services, was one of four deputy directors testifying for the CIA in the first day of a suit brought against the federal agency by two authors of a pending book entitled "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence."

AUTHORS Victor L. Marchetti and John D. Marks are suing in U.S. District Court in Alexandria for relief from an injunction, issued before they wrote the book, barring them from publishing it without first getting clearance from the CIA.

They are being represented by the American Civil Liberties Union, which says the action is the first of its kind in CIA history.

Their co-plaintiff is the New York publishing firm of Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., which wants to print the 514-page manuscript intact, without the 163 deletions ordered by the CIA.

THE NON-JURY trial will turn on three issues: Whether the CIA can prove the censored portions should be classified; whether they consist of information Marchetti learned while a CIA employee, and whether the information already is in the public domain.

Even if the CIA should prove the information should be classified, it could still be published if the authors proved Marchetti learned it after leaving the CIA or it was already a matter of public record. Marks is a former State Department employee.

"DID YOU find out if any speeches by CIA officials or congressmen or any press reports had been made public in regard to the information contained in the deletions you made?" Knopf attorney Floyd Abrams asked Brownman.

"No, I did not," Brownman replied.

He and the other deputy directors, Carl E. Duckett, William E. Nelson and Edward Proctor, testified they used guidelines in Executive Order 11652, their own experience, reviews of CIA records and their own personal judgment in recommending deletions of information they considered classified.

Duckett said the guidelines "tell what would be damaging to national security or injurious to the conduct of American foreign relations" if revealed.

MUCH OF THEIR testimony was closed to the public and the press after Justice Department attorneys told Bryan it would involve recital of "classified information."

Marks described the manuscript as being "an across-the-board critique of the covert activities of the CIA." He said the deleted portions described the CIA's "bumbling inefficiency. They make a lot of mistakes, then hide behind national security," he said.

Marks said he and Marchetti were "paper shufflers" in their respective jobs, "but we shuffled a lot of important papers."

Both are free-lance writers now.

The injunction was issued in April 1972 by U.S. District Court Judge Albert V. Bryan, who is now hearing the suit.

HS/HC-910

Four CIA Officials Defend Censorship Of Marchetti Book

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

In a closed federal court room guarded by U.S. marshals, four deputy directors of the Central Intelligence Agency yesterday defended national security censorship of a book by two former intelligence officials.

U.S. District Court Judge Albert V. Bryan Jr. cleared the Alexandria courtroom for their testimony which touched on 162 deletions ordered by the CIA on grounds that the material divulges highly sensitive intelligence secrets.

Attorneys for the authors, former CIA analyst Victor L. Marchetti and former State Department intelligence officer John D. Marks, are challenging the classification procedures of the CIA on grounds that the censorship action was improper and capricious.

Marchetti and Marks are suing the respective heads of their former agencies, CIA Director William E. Colby and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, to restore all deletions from their manuscript, "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," scheduled for publication this spring by Alfred A. Knopf Jr.

Colby has said that the court test is crucial to his statutory role as a protector of national security sources and secrets. Should the CIA lose the case, Colby has ordered legislation drafted for submission to Congress which would impose new criminal penalties on former CIA employees who divulge what the government deems to be classified material.

Attorneys for the two authors contend that the issues in the battle of the book touch on the First Amendment questions that were raised in the Pentagon Papers case. In the current trial, however, the issue at hand is the validity of the security standards applied

by the CIA to the Marchetti-Marks manuscript.

It was to defend its position on this point that the government marshaled the rare gathering outside of headquarters of top intelligence officials in the Alexandria court room: CIA Deputy Directors William Nelson for operations, Carl Duckett for science and technology, Edward Proctor for intelligence and Harold L. Brownman for management and services.

The thrust of their combined testimony, it was understood, was that each decided on the basis of his particular expertise that portions of the manuscript violated security classifications.

This was the procedure that was described as "capricious" by attorneys for the two authors, who requested that the documents and classification standards be produced to justify the deletions.

CIA Director Colby is expected to testify, also in camera, at today's session. To rebut CIA testimony, the two authors offered the testimony—also behind closed doors—of former National Security Council staffer Morton Halperin, who was an expert witness in the Pentagon Papers case.

The case, which is expected to be argued for a week, is an outgrowth of the government's first effort to impose pre-publication restraint in the courts on national security grounds. In the Pentagon papers case, which the government lost, the Justice Department went to court after publication of the Vietnam study had begun in The New York Times, The Washington Post and other newspapers.

In arguing for the book's publisher, Knopf, New York attorney Floyd Abrams said a question in the case is "whether Knopf's right to publish can properly be deemed less extensive than was that of The New York Times in the Pentagon papers case."

The government won the first round in the battle of the book in 1972 when Judge Bryan enjoined Marchetti from publishing classified material gathered during his 14 years of CIA employment without prior agency clearance.

When the manuscript was completed last fall Marchetti and Marks submitted it, under the terms of the injunction, for CIA review.

Initially the CIA ordered more than 300 deletions. After negotiation the number was reduced to 225. By yesterday the government was seeking to strike 162 passages.

Should the government prevail on the remaining points, Knopf reportedly intends to publish the manuscript with the deleted passages marked "Deleted."

THE WASHINGTON POST
A 28 Friday, March 1, 1974

Not Watergate Material, Nedzi Says

CIA Is Backed on Tapes

By Laurence Stern

Washington Post Staff Writer

Rep. Lucien Nedzi (D-Mich.) said yesterday he has concluded that no Watergate-related or presidential conversations were destroyed by the Central Intelligence Agency in a major house-cleaning of tape recordings in January, 1973.

Nedzi based his judgment on an examination of a voluminous report, including logs, notes and memoranda, delivered to him yesterday by the CIA.

The Michigan Democrat is the chairman of the House Armed Services Intelligence Subcommittee, which conducted extensive hearings last year into alleged CIA involvement in the Watergate scandal. In a report on the inquiry the subcommittee concluded that the CIA had been duped by high White House aides into providing some assistance for the Watergate cover-up but had no substantive involvement in the affair.



REP. LUCIEN NEDZI
... checked agency logs

In the course of his investigation Nedzi took sworn testimony from dozens of witnesses, including top CIA officials, all the key presidential officials involved in the case and a number of Watergate defendants. "Someone is trying to blow smoke around," Nedzi

observed of persistent charges on Capitol Hill that the CIA was more deeply implicated in the scandal than has, as yet, been demonstrated in public testimony.

The issue of CIA involvement in Watergate has been a continuing subject of surmise at the highest levels of the administration since the scandal first surfaced in June, 1972.

President Nixon himself acknowledged such a concern motivated him to set in motion White House meetings within a week of the break-in between his two top aides, H. R. (Bob) Halde- man and John D. Ehrlich- man, and former CIA Director Richard Helms and his deputy, Gen. Vernon Walters. The President acknowledged, however, in his May 22 Watergate statement that this concern was unfounded. Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.), cochairman of the Senate Watergate committee, has been the most

See CIA, A14, Col. 1

No Watergate Link Seen In CIA Tape Destruction

CIA, From A1

persistent questioner on Capitol Hill on the question of CIA implication in Watergate.

In recent weeks he has been interrogating witnesses and seeking to gather evidence that might link the agency to the scandal. Such a determination would tend to justify early White House actions which delayed for more than two weeks the Justice Department investigation of Nixon re-election funds "laundered" through a Mexican bank.

So far Baker's inquiries into the CIA role have failed to draw any conclusive connections. "The animals are crashing around in the forest," he told an interviewer recently. "You can hear them but you can't see them."

Nedzi said the new CIA report supplied yesterday does not alter the general conclusions of the subcommittee investigation last year.

CIA logs and memos provided yesterday, combined with evidence already before his subcommittee, demonstrated that none of the

destroyed tapes bear on Watergate, he said.

CIA officials said that the mass destruction of tapes in mid-January, 1973, was "routine" and prompted by the need to clean out its files. The only prior tape destructions on comparable scale, according to CIA spokesmen, were carried out in 1971 and 1964.

The tapes were destroyed, by one official account, on Jan. 18, one day after the CIA's office of congressional liaison received a letter from Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) asking the agency to retain all records that might pertain in any way to Watergate.

HS/HC-550

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR:

The CIA Denies Charges

The Washington Post's story about the National Caucus of Labor Committees (of Feb. 17, 1974) could leave the impression with some of your readers that the CIA, through its refusal to comment, indeed might be involved in the kinds of activities the NCLC alleges. Our recollection is that we told your reporter that the NCLC appeared to be

a domestic organization, so he should ask the Federal Bureau of Investigation rather than CIA for information about it. While it appeared self-evident that the NCLC charges are only twisted fantasy, your circulation of them forces CIA to deny them flatly as false.

W. E. COLBY,
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Washington.

WASHINGTON Post-

Monday, 19 Feb 1974

HS/HC-950

NBC Challenges CIA On Tape Destruction

NEW YORK (AP) — NBC News has reported that the Central Intelligence Agency destroyed tapes made following the Watergate break-in affair after Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield asked that any Watergate evidence be saved.

NBC said the CIA denies deliberate destruction of any Watergate evidence. But the CIA tapes were destroyed Jan. 18, 1973, the day after the CIA acknowledged receipt of a letter from Mansfield to various agencies asking that any Watergate materials be saved, NBC said last night.

CIA Director William E. Colby said Tuesday the intelligence agency had destroyed all but one of its tape recordings made during the Watergate affair.

However, Colby said the destruction of the tapes was a routine matter. "There was nothing deliberate about this in the sense of destroying a damaging tape or anything like that."

NBC said it was told by a CIA spokesman that Mansfield's letter arrived Jan. 22 —four days too late.

"Nevertheless, by checking Senate Mansfield's office, we were able to find a receipt for the letter signed by the CIA on the 17th, the day before the tapes' destruction," said NBC correspondent Carl Stern.

"Informed of that, the CIA withdrew its earlier statements and now says only that it will try diligently to pin down what happened," Stern reported.

NBC said the destroyed CIA tapes were recorded in the month following the Watergate break-in and involved then CIA Director Richard Helms, his deputy Vernon Walters, acting FBI Director Patrick L. Gray, former White House domestic adviser John D. Ehrlichman, ex-White House counsel John W. Dean III, "and possibly even the President."

STAR NEWS

Thurs. 31 JAN 1974

CIA Can Find Only 1 Tape on Watergate

By Michael J. Sniffen

Associated Press

CIA director William E. Colby said last night that the CIA can find only one tape recording bearing on the Watergate affair and that it has destroyed all its other tapes from that period.

In a telephone interview, Colby said, "Sen. (Howard) Baker asked us if there were any other tapes that bore on the subject. And we don't have any other on this subject at the moment. We had periodic destruction of our tapes."

(In a separate interview with United Press International, Colby denied a CBS News report that the agency had destroyed tapes considered vital to the Watergate probe. He said there was no indication any had ever existed.)

Baker, the Tennessee Republican who is vice chairman of the Senate Watergate committee, confirmed in another telephone interview he had requested any CIA tapes bearing on the Watergate affair.

He said the CIA had been cooperating fully.

Colby said that the one tape the agency has that fits Baker's request is of a conver-

sation on June 22, 1971, between E. Howard Hunt Jr., of the White House special investigations—or plumbers—unit, and Marine Gen. Robert E. Cushman, then deputy director of the CIA.

The transcript of that tape has been entered into the record of the Senate Watergate committee. He said the agency would supply Baker with the tape itself. "Anything we own he can have," Colby said.

But, Colby said, "Over the last 15 years, we have made tapes but periodically they were torn up the way you tear up old notes or old checks after income tax time. And we have not made any tapes in the past year."

He said the Cushman-Hunt tape, made by Cushman in his own office, "survived normal procedures of destruction because it was put in a separate drawer somehow."

In the tape transcript, Hunt asked Cushman to supply him two things: "flash alias documentation . . . and some degree of physical disguise for a one-time op-in and out."

All Except One CIA Tape Recording Destroyed

By Martha Angle

Star-News Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency has destroyed all of its tape recordings of telephone conversations and office meetings except for the tape already made public in hearings of the Senate Watergate committee.

CIA Director William Colby said last night the agency destroyed the tapes sometime after January 1973, when it discontinued a "10 or 15" year practice of taping "selected" phone calls and meetings.

Destruction of the CIA tapes came to light when Republican Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr., R-Tenn., asked for the tape recording of a mid-1971 conversation between convicted Watergate burglar E. Howard Hunt Jr. and Marine Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., then deputy director of the CIA.

BAKER ALSO asked Colby for any other CIA tapes which might have a bearing on the Watergate investigation.

"When I first talked with Sen. Baker on Saturday, I wasn't sure whether we had any other tapes or not," Colby said last night. "I checked and found that we didn't."

A transcript of the Hunt-Cushman conversation was introduced into evidence during the Senate Watergate hearings last year and in the past several months Baker has been conducting his own investigation into the CIA's role in Watergate-related activities.

Two of the seven men captured on June 17, 1972, in Watergate — Hunt and James W. McCord — were retired CIA employees, while three others — Eugenio Martinez, Bernard L. Barker and Frank Sturgis — had at various times been under contract with the agency.

HUNT RECEIVED a variety of materials, including false identification papers and a speech alteration device, from the CIA in 1971 while working with the White House "plumbers" unit which broke into the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

Unlike the automatic voice-activated White House system which recorded President Nixon's phone calls and meetings, the CIA taping was done on a "selective" basis on manually operated recording devices, Colby said.

He said the tapes "were periodically destroyed, and about a year ago I decided I didn't want to use the system any longer and it was discontinued."

Colby, who became CIA director in September, was executive director of the agency when the decision was made a year ago to halt the taping. He said James R. Schlesinger, then CIA director and now secretary of defense, agreed with the decision.

AFTER THE taping was discontinued, Colby said, all tapes on file at the CIA were destroyed.

The Associated Press quoted Colby as saying the Hunt-Cushman tape "survived normal procedures of destruction because it was put in a separate drawer somehow." Cushman made the tape when Hunt came to his office.

Colby said the agency has already turned over masses of documents to the Water-

gate committee, the Special Prosecutor's Office and congressional committees which exercise "oversight" functions regarding the CIA.

The CIA director said he is now preparing answers to other requests by Baker for information. Baker declined to say exactly what data he is seeking from the CIA except to say it included information about "agency contacts with any and all of the Watergate types."

HINGTON STAR-NEWS

D.C., Wednesday, January 30, 1974

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS
Washington, D. C., Sunday, January 27, 1974

Embattled Author Wins CIA Round

The CIA has lost another round in its bid to put a gag on a former agency official who has written a critical and revealing book about U.S. intelligence practices.

Victor Marchetti, the former CIA official, is preparing a legal challenge of some 135 deletions CIA and State Department censors have insisted be removed from his book, and he is under permanent court order to publish nothing without first clearing it with the agency.

But the government failed last week in a secret attempt to persuade the judge in the case, Albert V. Bryan Jr., of the federal district court in Alexandria, to punish Marchetti for a series of CIA leaks in recent weeks.

GOVERNMENT lawyers, in a letter to the judge classified and stamped "Top Secret," invited Bryan to cite Marchetti for contempt of court for five alleged violations of the injunction.

Only one of the citations directly involved Marchetti at all: AA Canadian televi-

sion interview late last year in which Marchetti alleged that German Chancellor Willie Brandt once received CIA political funds in the early cold war era.

The other four instances had no direct connection with Marchetti at all. They included articles in Harpers Magazine and the New York Times describing earlier government attempts to censor the Marchetti book, and two articles in the London Sunday Telegraph and the Washington Post describing hitherto unpublished intelligence operations.

THE JUDGE yesterday informed all the parties that he had no intention of beginning a contempt proceeding against Marchetti simply on the government's say so, and he suggested that as things now stand Marchetti would be free to reveal anything he wants to, since he obeyed earlier requirements that any manuscript he wrote he submitted for prior censorship.

—OSWALD JOHNSTON

CIA Destroyed Tape Recordings

By Martha Angle
Star-News Staff Writer

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Unlike the automatic voice-activated White House system which recorded President Nixon's phone calls and meetings, the CIA taping was done on a "selective" basis on manually operated recording devices, Colby said.

He said the tapes "were periodically destroyed, and about a year ago I decided I didn't want to use the system any longer and it was discontinued."

The Associated Press quoted Colby as saying the Hunt-Cushman tape "survived normal procedures of destruction because it was put in a separate drawer somehow." Cushman made the tape when Hunt came to his office.

Colby said the agency has already turned over masses of documents to the Watergate committee, the Special Prosecutor's Office and congressional committees which exercise "oversight" functions regarding the CIA.

Bizarre Plot Is Denied

The Washington Post, Wednesday, Jan 23, 1974

A CIA Non-Caper Inside British Labor

By Bernard D. Nossiter

Washington Post Foreign Service

LONDON, Jan. 22—The bizarre tale of CIA agents protecting Britons from their own security negligence today blew up in the letters column of The Times of London.

The destruct button was pushed by Miles Copeland, the American source of the original account and a self-described "consultant" for the Central Intelligence Agency.

Copeland wrote The Times, "I had no facts of my own to corroborate the information" he gave the paper. But, he went on, if his story was not true, it should be.

The curious caper began last Friday when The Times ran at the top of page one a story headlined: "CIA men in Britain checking on subversion."

The tale, essentially an interview with Copeland, disclosed that "between 30 and 40 extra American intelligence men have been drafted to Britain since the present state of emergency was introduced."

Their mission, Copeland told Christopher Walker, The Times reporter, was to ferret out subversives, particularly in British trade unions.

"Rightly or wrongly," Copeland was quoted as saying, "the top men in the CIA be-

lieve that the present spate of strikes in Britain has far more sinister motives than the mere winning of extra wages. They believe that the aim is to bring about a situation in which it would be impossible for the kind of democratic government you continue to enjoy here. . . . There is no doubt at all that it [the CIA] has agents operating inside the British labor unions. . . .

The CIA has been trying to convince the British for some time about the power of subversives within the unions. The present state of Britain makes it a professional troublemaker's dream."

The Times did not report that Copeland, 57, makes a living in London advising what he says are multinational American corporations on "security problems." Nor did the newspaper disclose that Copeland has co-authored a novel entitled "Black September" for which, he says, Simon & Schuster has paid an advance of \$70,000.

When The Times story appeared, the American embassy here said that it "is so outside the area of truth that it must be denied categorically."

The next day, Louis Heren, The Times' deputy editor for foreign news and former



MILES COPELAND

... unspokesman

Washington correspondent, wrote a signed front-page article describing such denials as "automatic and understandable."

Heren suggested that the CIA was only doing its duty, that "From Washington, Britain must now be beginning to look like a Central American banana republic. . . . It must seem that the Government is incapable of governing. Military trade unionists are in direct confrontation with authority."

Today, however, Copeland

confessed that his tale was a throw the government but classic case of the wish fathering the thought.

He wrote:

"On the evening of January 16, I reviewed with Christopher Walker the information which provided the basis for his story on CIA men in Britain. Although I had no facts of my own with which to corroborate the information, it made sense to me in the light of my background knowledge of the war of the spooks. . . .

"I have chilling suspicions that the United States embassy might be speaking the truth in that pompous denial it issued on Friday and that the CIA really is in this instance as delinquent in the performance of its assigned duties as the denial claims. I hope my suspicions turn out to be unfounded. . . . Both Black September and the IRA have boasted that 1974 is to be 'the year of the killing.'"

More prosaic intelligence sources here never took Copeland's yarn seriously. They said that even the CIA which sometimes acts without considering political consequences, must know that industrial action by coal miners and railway engineers here does not reflect a plot to over-

throw the government but simply a wish for more money in the case of the miners and preservation of the engineers as a separate craft in the case of the railwaymen.

These sources, however, did say that Copeland had revealed a bureaucratic act of marginal significance, that the CIA office here has put on a few additional men. But this expansion was attributed to the importance of the new station chief, Cord Meyer, rather than any increased activity. Meyer is the high CIA official credited with the ill-fated plan in the 1960s to buy up, through foundation funds, leaders in the American National Students Association and several American trade unions.

As for Copeland, he first achieved notoriety with the publication of "The Game of Nations," a purportedly factual account of his dealings on behalf of the CIA in Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East.

Today, Copeland says he was but is no longer a management specialist. Or the agency, sometimes working on the CIA payroll and sometimes working under contract for a prominent management

Time to Spook the Spooks?

By C. L. Sulzberger

MILAN, Italy--The role of intelligence in modern societies is now increasingly questioned as the result of scandals, wiretappings, failures to evaluate correctly what special services report, or inexcusable political interventions like the recent C.I.A. case in Thailand.

Thus, in the United States and France, there have been flamboyant bugging incidents which threaten to topple leading officials. Greece's own central intelligence agency, K.Y.P., has allegedly been at the heart of two successive putsches. And Israel's highly expert spook apparatus produced correct information that war was coming last October—yet the Government ignored these warnings.

Many security organizations have acquired unsavory reputations. Both Britain's secret intelligence service (viz., Kim Philby) and the Soviet services (viz., Colonels Penkovsky and

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Popov) have been demonstrably penetrated by their adversaries.

Moreover, the ancient business of intelligence has been totally revolutionized by technological revolutions. The computer plays an enormous role in analyzing the information of spies and special agents. And electronic eavesdropping plus space satellite photography combine to open brand new fields of espionage, fields that remain closed to small, poor, underdeveloped countries.

Indeed, it is increasingly obvious that pooled intelligence among allies is sensible even for rich and powerful nations. A former French Minister of Defense wonders whether France (whose intelligence services have been smudged with scandal) requires such agencies in peacetime.

He says: "France is not an important enough country to require a peacetime intelligence service anyway. All it needs is to have good relations with its allies and enough of a new intelligence service to be able to function should there be a serious threat of war."

icy" is pondered by Stevan Dedijer, a Yugoslav-born Swedish citizen now on the faculty of Lund University, Sweden. Dedijer has special expertise since he admits having worked successively for the Soviet N.K.V.D. (now M.G.B.), the American O.S.S. (precursor of the C.I.A.), then in "intelligence activities" for Yugoslavia—before moving to a Swedish ivory tower.

Mr. Dedijer reaches the novel conclusion that courses in "intelligence" should be given in universities—where everything from hotel management to embalming is now taught. He says that despite a broad literature of case histories and spy novels, there are "very few systematic social studies" on the subject. Yet there exists a contradiction between "the need to democratize intelligence and to control it on the one hand, and its secrecy and illegality requirements on the other."


He points out that mass media and other groups "are making intelligence questions objects of public debate and political problems," adding: "The demands for the democratization of intelligence policy and its control are being raised." He suggests examination of the following:

"Is a wider and greater public control of the intelligence production system, management system and policy system necessary, desirable and possible? What does intelligence cost us? How many are engaged in it, who and where are they and how selected? What is the return on our investment in intelligence? How much waste and abuse is involved? Is the intelligence community subverting our basic national values and quality of our life?"

Mr. Dedijer concludes: "We are learning that intelligence is too important to be left to professional intelligencers. Intelligence, as all other key functions and institutions, has to be on tap but not on top of society."

He believes: "The basic intelligence goal for individual countries is changing from intelligence for national existence and security to intelligence for national growth and development."

There is much to be said for his fresh approach to a field hitherto cloaked in dark suspicion and speckled with gaudy romance. Surely, for a subject so vital to contemporary societies, there should be public discussion and even intellectual courses examining the needs and methods of what used to be an unmentionable trade.



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
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CIA Winding Down Activities in Laos

By Tammy Arbuckle
Star-News Special Correspondent

LONG CHENG, North Laos . . . Over the last few weeks, the United States has withdrawn almost all of its paramilitary personnel and closed down virtually all of its paramilitary operations from this high mountain valley which was the joint American and Mao nerve center for 11 years of the war in north Laos.

The Central Intelligence Agency which ran these operations is now in the process of handing over its functions to the U.S. Agency for International Development and to the military attache's office of the U.S. embassy in Vientiane, the Lao capital.

The windowless rock-walled rooms, with special combination locks on their doors, which once housed the paramilitary headquarters are now taken over by AID. Instead of shotguns and other weapons, there are trays of official papers.

U.S. OFFICIALS, hung with webbing festooned with hand grenades, smoke canisters and water bottles, packing Browning automatic pistols on their hips and Colt AR 15 submachineguns slung across their chests, are a thing of the past.

Talk at the soldiers' mess no longer centers on helicopter assaults behind enemy lines, the latest U.S. Air Force errors or shotup U.S. aircraft limping onto Long Cheng's air strip. Instead it focuses on new medical dispensaries, a hospital, a new gas station and a chicken farm to provide the Meo with protein.

A lanky Texan, Phil Buechler, an old U.S. AID hand in Laos has been appointed AID area coordinator and will be the chief American here.

AID is gradually taking over the compound and officials and defence attache personnel far outnumber CIA personnel.

AN AMERICAN AID official and his wife, who is a trained nurse, have moved their house to Long Cheng to help the Meo leader, Vang Pao, with economic programming.

The CIA handled both military and civilian affairs at Long Cheng but now responsibility is split with civilian affairs going to AID and military affairs to the attache's office. The dozen attache personnel at Long Cheng, however, don't expect to be there long. They are likely to leave Laos—either by the start of the new U.S. fiscal year beginning July 1st or within 60 days of a Laos coalition government formed, whichever happens first.

All that remains of the onetime U.S. combat presence of about 30 men is an American supervisor, an American administrative officer and two case officers who handle the Thai irregular forces still in Long Cheng.

But they too should be gone before July 1st. The

Thais are already down to less than half their previous strength.

The impact is most obvious at the last brothel, once staffed by 45 girls imported from the Mekong River towns. It did a roaring trade. Now there are only 21 girls and the brothel keeper says business is poor.

U.S. officials say they have gone ahead with the Laos withdrawal even though hope for a new government is far from formed. Billions of U.S. tax dollars were spent here and about 800 Americans were killed in the Laos fighting, mostly in downed aircraft, but, at least 24 were lost in ground action with the Lao forces and 80 more in South Vietnam-based ground operations against the Ho Chi Minh Trail in South Laos.

Although the U.S. paramilitary forces are gone, some of them and the bulk of U.S. air power are just across the border in Thailand 30 minutes away. It could be employed swiftly by President Nixon if new fighting started ends.

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS
Washington, D. C., Tuesday, January 22, 1974

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Washington, D. C., Tuesday, January 22, 1974

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, JANUARY 21, 1974

U.S.-Thai Relations Expected to Survive C.I.A. Blow

By JAMES F. CLARITY
Special to The New York Times

BANGKOK, Thailand, Jan. 20 —The admitted interference of the Central Intelligence Agency in an internal Thai affair does not mean, in the view of knowledgeable Western diplomats, that the C.I.A. has garroted itself with its own cloak in this country, but that it has at least pinked itself with its own dagger.

The incident, which stirred vigorous student protests in a country where students are the most influential political force, left Thai-American relations frayed, but not tattered, the diplomats say.

The affair focused new attention on the large American presence, mostly military, in Thailand. It also marred the entrance on the scene of a new United States Ambassador, William R. Kintner, and forced the interim Government here to disentangle itself from another problem in the midst of the difficulties it has been trying to solve since it replaced the military regime deposed in a student uprising in October.

In the view of some analysts here, the C.I.A. affair was an embarrassment to almost everyone concerned, including the office boy whose registration of an ersatz letter led to the blowing of the cover.

The plot itself seemed simple enough. An agent of the American intelligence agency, not identified but sent home earlier this month, composed a letter purportedly from an insurgent leader asking to discuss a cease-fire with the Government.

The purpose of the letter, ac-

cording to Ambassador Kintner, was to produce dissension and defections among the insurgents who have been fighting the Bangkok Government for years. The registered letter found its way—how is not clear—to the offices of an English-language Bangkok newspaper, The Nation. The paper traced it to the C.I.A. and published it, the ambassador admitted the American involvement and the scandal was under way.

In the succeeding two weeks, Dr. Kintner has apologized for the incident several times, including personal apologies to King Phumiphol Aduldet and Premier Sanya Dhamasakti, and said he had taken measures to prevent American officials from meddling in Thailand's internal affairs. The student organizations, which had first demanded the total ouster of the C.I.A. and the recall of Dr. Kintner to Washington, have not reacted to the Bangkok Government's relatively mild reprimand to the United States and the ambassador last Thursday.

Dr. Kintner, who was personally vulnerable to the student criticism because he worked for

the Central Intelligence Agency for two years during the Korean war, said in a recent interview that the incident caused "chagrin" among Thai officials.

It also, the ambassador said, reflected a "patronizing attitude" that he has found among some of his embassy staff members—not necessarily members of the intelligence agency—toward the Thais. The employee who patronized, whose attitude the ambassador describes as "Look, Charlie, we'll show you how to do it," will be transferred, the ambassador indicated.

The furor over the letter has had a number of other effects.

It has prompted the Government to say that it is re-examining the extent of Central Intelligence Agency operations here. In the process of saying this, the Government has acknowledged that the American intelligence organization provides it with various kinds of help in internal security, counterintelligence, counterinsurgency and narcotics-control programs.

The United States attitude toward this kind of help, as indicated by the ambassador

and other competent diplomats here, is that in future the Thais will get only the intelligence assistance they ask for.

No Thai officials seriously expect the Central Intelligence Agency to stop operating here. They concede that a total ban would be foolish, as the agents would only continue to operate in mufti. There are now in Thailand, American officials say, 50 operating agents supported by 100 clerical and communications assistants.

Ambassador Kintner, an outspoken man who has divided his professional life between the Army and the academic world, says Thai-American relations have survived the incident. He shrugs off questions whether it has caused friction between him and the intelligence agency chiefs in Washington.

Acknowledging that the incident took place without his knowledge after he became ambassador two months ago, Dr. Kintner said of the present structure at the embassy here, "I have full authority from the President and the Secretary of State."

CIA to Cut Operations in Thailand

By David Binder

New York Times News Service

The Central Intelligence Agency's operations in Thailand will soon be sharply reduced, according to U.S. officials.

The CIA has been conducting a sizable counterinsurgency program against Communist guerrillas in Thailand for almost 10 years.

But last month an agency operative stationed in a provincial town in Thailand sent to the Bangkok govern-

ment a fake letter purporting to be a peace offer from a guerrilla leader. The deception was revealed, stirring an outcry in Thailand against the CIA, the United States and Ambassador William R. Kintner.

THE WASHINGTON officials said that Kintner is preparing recommendations that would greatly limit CIA operations in Thailand. The agency now is said to have 150 operatives in Thailand, most in the counterinsurgency program, and the rest combating narcotics traffickers from Burma.

The officials said Kintner had planned a reduction of intelligence operations before the incident, as part of a general readjustment of U.S. policy toward the new Thai government, which came to power last October.

But big demonstrations against U.S. policy in three major cities — Bangkok, Chiang Mai and Udon — during the last two weeks and demands by the government of Premier Sanya Dhamasakti have impelled the ambassador to plan greater reductions, the officials reported.

THE WASHINGTON officials said that during a routine staff discussion conducted by the CIA station chief in Bangkok, Bernardo Hugh Tovar, "the idea was floated" of manufacturing fake letters purporting to be peace offers to Premier Sanya from a Thai Communist leader. "The idea was shot down at the meeting," one official said.

Nonetheless, one CIA agent who was assigned to advise Thai military and

intelligence officers at the provincial town of Sakon Nakhon thought the idea was a good one.

The official said the CIA agent wrote the letter without telling his Thai colleagues and sent it to Sanya, with copies going to several Bangkok newspapers. Evidently, the fake letter was designed to undermine morale in the Communist insurgent movement and cause defections.

The letter was exposed in the first week of January, and the agent was hastily sent out of the country.

STAR

SATURDAY -

19 JAN 1974

HS/HC-950

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, JANUARY 18, 1974

Thailand Officially Chides U.S. Over C.I.A. Interference There

By JAMES F. CLARITY

Special to The New York Times

BANGKOK, Thailand, Jan. 17 —Thailand expressed official dissatisfaction to the United States today over the admitted interference by the Central Intelligence Agency in Thai affairs.

A Foreign Ministry statement was the first official reaction to the scandal, which erupted here nearly two weeks ago after it was disclosed that a C.I.A. agent had sent Premier Sanya Dharmasakti a letter purporting to be from an insurgent leader seeking peace with the Government. The incident caused vigorous protests from student organizations, the most influential political force here since the ouster of the military government in November.

The Foreign Ministry said that Ambassador William R. Kintner, at his request, met with Premier Sanya and was told of "the dissatisfaction of students and the people with the event that had happened as well as the dissatisfaction of the Thai people in general with the general behavior of C.I.A. units inside Thailand and their demand that the United States stop all actions of interference in the internal affairs of Thailand."

Dr. Kintner, who admitted the C.I.A. plot and apologized for it last week, was said by the ministry to have assured the Premier again today that "he would do everything to

prevent any action of interference in Thailand's internal affairs from happening again."

The statement said Thailand was examining the American agency's connections with Thai agencies, but it did not indicate whether the Government planned any further action. There was a widespread opinion among Western diplomats that unless the student organizations refused to accept the Government's handling of the issue in the statement today, the matter would be allowed to fade away.

Ambassador Kintner, in an interview after he visited the Premier and the Foreign Minister, Charunphan Issarangkun na Ayuthaya, said that the letter had caused chagrin among Thai officials but that senior officials had assured him that they wanted relations to remain cordial.

The ministry statement said Dr. Kintner had assured the Premier that the agent responsible for the plot had been sent back to the United States and that the C.I.A. office in the northern town of Sakon Nakhon, where the plot was born, had been closed.

In the interview Dr. Kintner, a one-time C.I.A. employee who became Ambassador two months ago, said that the plot had been stupidly conceived and executed. Its purpose, he said, was to produce dissension among the leaders of insurgent groups.

Poster

Once More Into The Big Muddy

A Commentary

By Nicholas von Hoffman

Les Aspin, the young Wisconsin Democrat who is proving there is useful work for a member of Congress if he wants to do it, has learned that contracts for Air America, the CIA's transparently phony airline, have doubled to more than \$41 million. It is assumed by those who study the outfit's murky doings the money will be spent encouraging our mercenaries to muck around Laos anew.

Our government disguises what we are shipping into Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam with the same care the Russians use in hiding their military expenditures so only a spy or a detective can hope to know the truth. Not only do we appropriate munitions under such categories as Food for Peace but since the Pentagon places the dollar value on our war shipments, they can conceal enormous amounts by assessing tanks at \$1 apiece and airplanes at \$5 a throw. The Pentagon has told Aspin that the inventory of what we're sending is classified, and therefore not available to the unstable, national security risks whom the voters send to Congress.

Nevertheless, by the end of Fiscal Year 74, next July that is, our military costs in that part of the world will be running at above \$4 billion a year. This necessarily means violating the Paris ceasefire agreements which confine us to resupplying depleted stocks. We are also breaking our word by introducing a new combat plane, gloriously and honorably named Tiger II Freedom Fighters.

Asked about this stepped-up bomb procurement for Southeast Asia, Air Force Gen. Jonas Blank explained everything by saying, "The requirement to accelerate production occurred as a result of the March 26, 1974, Secretary of Defense guidance which tasked the Air Force to protect a Southeast Asia contingency capability that we had not previously planned."

In short, it appears we are returning to our old winning formula of guns and military advisers, of which it is now believed we have 20,000 sneaking about those dear, old familiar palms. Thus, instead of using our decisive leverage to make him abide by it, we are apparently egging Thieu on to forget the Paris agreements which were supposed to be our tickets out of that bog.

Some moderates or liberals or whatever you want to call the wishy-washies in Congress seem to be content to vote the money for the destruction of the Paris agreements in return for keeping our people out of the fighting and because you don't want the Reds to take over, do you? Of course, the Reds are going to take over anyway, only it will be longer and more costly. They've got most of Cambodia now and they're going to get the rest of it soon enough.

Ultimately, they'll get General Thieu also because we know that a corrupt, inflation-wracked, debilitated South Vietnam can't win without our armed intervention. We already have our Secretary of Defense getting us acclimated to the thought again, and there is the memory of Dr. Kissinger saying, "I wanted to bomb the daylight out of Hanoi, but Congress wouldn't let me." It looks like the boys regard the Paris agreements as a truce to buy time to get the peaceniks off their backs.

The justification for what we're doing is that the North Vietnamese are doing the same thing. Doubtless they are. But if they win, they get the other half of their country. What do we get if we win? Honor? The President's told us we already have that. The satisfaction of keeping the Reds out of Saigon? Well, what's wrong with these Reds? They're far less obnoxious than the ones in Moscow or Peking and being fewer in number and poorer in resources, are much less of a threat.

Even if we don't go back there with the big birds but try to buy the victory this time, all we are going to get for it is a big debt. This isn't 1955 or 1965, and we can't afford it anymore. Our inflation rate is running 10 per cent now, and if we have to pay for three wars in Indochina and another one in the Middle East, it simply isn't going to matter who wins. We will lose.

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THE WASHINGTON POST

B 2 Friday, Jan. 18, 1974

HS/HC-950

Thursday, Jan. 17, 1974 THE WASHINGTON POST

What Is the U.S. Doing in Thailand?

AN EXTRAORDINARY instance of American overreaching has just come to light in Thailand. It involves the CIA, an agency so habituated—at least in Thailand—to acting like a sovereign state that it seems to have been unable to adjust to the winds of Thai change. It seems that a CIA agent sent a letter to the new prime minister, who came to power last fall replacing the generals identified with a close military link to the United States, signing the name of a Communist insurgent leader in Sakhon Nakhon province, the agent sounded out the prime minister on his interest in opening talks with the insurgents. The letter's internal inconsistencies struck Thai officials, they now say. Since it had been sent by registered mail, it was easily traced to the CIA office in a particular province. The government then evidently leaked the story to the Thai press, which gave it a play worthy of the outrageousness of the event itself. "Really bad," the prime minister summed up.

The newly posted American ambassador, William R. Kintner, was forced to acknowledge and apologize for this "regrettable and unauthorized initiative." "No American official is to be involved in any activity which could be interpreted as interference in Thai internal affairs," he announced. Yet this hardly puts the matter to rest. Is it more believable that the agent was acting on his own or that, unmasked, his operation—whatever its purpose—was simply repudiated? Since CIA activities in Thailand are supposed to be confined to providing technical intelligence assistance to Thais, how is it that the CIA appears to have set up what the Thai press

calls "operation units in various areas"? The CIA's indiscretion "demonstrates to the people that the United States is involved in the fight to suppress the Communist terrorists," the Bangkok radio noted, and thus it compromises the Thai government claim that the insurgents, but not the government, lack independence and sovereignty. How could the CIA be insensitive to the central political value of this claim in a struggle against what is said to be a foreign-supported insurgency?

The most troubling aspect of this incident, however, goes beyond the damage that may have been done to U.S.-Thai relations. Just how deeply is the United States "involved in the fight to suppress the Communist terrorists," in the Bangkok radio's words? A Senate staff report issued last June stated that there were 545 Americans working in Thai counter-insurgency within the U.S. Military Assistance Command. But if, as the Thai counter-insurgency chief now says, "it has especially been the principle of [his program] that the fight to suppress the Communists is the Thai people's affair," then what are all those Americans doing, whether they are inside or outside the CIA? The new Thai leadership, by publicizing and protesting the affair of the letter, indicates its own decision to put some nationalistic distance between itself and Thailand's former American patrons. This is an understandable choice flowing from the winding down of the American role in all of Indochina. The Thais, who live there, are adjusting. But we Americans still have questions of our own to ask about any residual counter-insurgency role. It sounds too much like—one hesitates to say the word—Vietnam.

U.S. INTELLIGENCE SEES HANOI PUSH

But Timing of Offensive Is
a Matter of Estimates,
Public and Private

By LESLIE H. GELB

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 13—Fifteen years after the first American combat troops entered South Vietnam, the American intelligence community is telling the President that the question is still when—not whether—North Vietnam is going to launch a major offensive against the South.

According to intelligence sources and Administration officials, the formal position of the intelligence community, as embodied in a policy paper, is that the chances are slightly less than 50-50 that Hanoi will strike in a big way in the next six months.

But the informal positions of intelligence analysts—in the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the State Department—vary significantly on both sides from that formal posture. In fact, most intelligence officers believe that the odds are not slightly but significantly less than 50-50 that North Vietnam will mount a big offensive in this dry season in Vietnam.

Hedging Is Protective

It is not unusual for the intelligence community or the bureaucracy generally to display official caution in a formal position paper and then a greater degree of candor in private briefings of senior officials. Because political leaders have often blamed past policy failures on "faulty intelligence," analysts tend to protect themselves from becoming the "scapegoats" by hedging their predictions in written documents.

As a result, the informal briefings of senior officials by analysts—the more unvarnished presentations—tend to assume greater importance than formal papers.

In the case of Vietnam intelligence, the two key men are William E. Colby, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and George A. Carver Jr., its chief national intelligence officer. Mr. Colby headed American political pacification programs in South Vietnam from 1969 to 1971; Mr. Carver was known as the "father of the hamlet-evaluation system," a method of measuring the progress of pacification.

Both were widely considered controversial figures over the years in the development of United States policy toward South Vietnam. One analyst remarked, however, that "even though we recognize their past histories in Vietnam, I think that they're trying to be intellectually fair on the current estimates."

Several intelligence specialists say that they are denied access to key pieces of intelligence, namely the content of conversations between Secretary of State Kissinger and such foreign leaders as Leonid I. Brezhnev, Chou En-lai and Le Duc Tho.

"It's hard to make guesses about what Hanoi is going to do without having some idea of what those guys are telling Kissinger," an analyst said—referring to the Soviet Communist party leader, the Chinese Premier and Hanoi's chief negotiator—"about whether or not Moscow and Peking would help Hanoi out in resupplying an all-out offensive."

Of 'Sensitive' Conversations

In an interview, Mr. Colby confirmed this, but he went on to say: "Kissinger keeps me informed on his conversations with foreign leaders, but I don't get a full formal debriefing. I don't pass this down to the analysts, except on rare occasions. These conversations are very sensitive. I myself factor them into the formal estimates of the intelligence community."

The prevailing judgment of recent months of intelligence-estimating about Vietnam, Administration and intelligence analysts say, is that both Hanoi and Saigon are still unwilling to risk the compromises necessary for a political settlement and that Hanoi's continuing objective is to gain control of South Vietnam by force.

Last September, the intelligence services, in a national-intelligence-estimate policy paper, predicted that the chances were better than even that Hanoi would open a full-scale offensive in the dry season beginning this month; then in December that estimate was updated and the odds reversed.

Following is a composite view of the explanations of analysts for the shift.

Does Hanoi think that Moscow and Peking will support a renewed offensive? Probably not, the analysts say, noting that Mr. Carver believes probably yes. Do Hanoi leaders expect that President Nixon would be able politically to resume the bombing of North Vietnam if big attacks were launched in the south? Almost certainly no.

Will Saigon force Hanoi's hand by launching a major attack in the South? A strong but positive no. Who has the upper hand in Hanoi's Politburo, the hawks or the doves? On balance, the intelligence community believes the doves now prevail. Mr. Carver is said to hold the opposite view.

Stuart H. Loory

Press Credibility And Journalist-Spies

Sunday, Jan. 13, 1974

THE WASHINGTON POST

In the old days — the pre-Watergate days — when even small deceptions by the government, once revealed, were considered scandalous, the revelation that the Central Intelligence Agency was using American foreign correspondents as spies would have provoked an uproar.

Remember the furore in 1967 when Ramparts magazine disclosed the CIA's infiltration of foundations, labor unions and student organizations? In contrast, there has been only muted criticism in the wake of the disclosure a few weeks ago that the CIA had on its payroll overseas some three dozen Americans who were either working as foreign correspondents or masquerading in such positions as a cover.

William E. Colby, director of the agency, has already promised that five of those operatives working full time

The writer, a journalism professor at Ohio State University, was a Moscow correspondent for the New York Herald Tribune. He later served as White House correspondent for the Los Angeles Times.

for general-circulation news-gathering organizations as well as for the CIA will be "phased out" of their spying roles. But he has also made the explicit decision to maintain contractual relationships with newsmen working for specialized publications or as freelance reporters.

Colby apparently draws a distinction between larger news-gathering organizations and smaller ones, between general-circulation organizations and trade publications. Foreigners do not make such nice distinctions; to them, an American newsmen is an American newsmen. Why should anyone believe that Colby has indeed removed the stigma of spying from American journalists overseas?

The News Business

Putting aside the credibility problem of the American government, obvious in these Watergate-dominated days, consider the status of Soviet foreign correspondents: The Soviet Union's leadership repeatedly denies that any Soviet newsmen working overseas are government agents. It claims that Soviet newsmen are simply gatherers and interpreters of news for the benefit of the reading public in the Soviet Union.

The claim, of course is laughable, and no American official talking to a Tass, Izvestia or Pravda correspondent in Washington is naive enough to think he is dealing with a bona fide reporter. For this reason, Soviet newsmen do not have an easy time with officials in countries outside the socialist bloc.

American newsmen have a far easier time of it abroad. They develop sources and uncover news because their reputation for freedom, fairness and nonentanglement with their own government has been respected over the years. Only in Moscow—and perhaps in Peking, where this writer has had no experience—are American newsmen treated as government agents. For years, American newsmen in the Soviet capital laughed off allegations of spying out of the feeling that the Russians were only applying the same standards to foreign newsmen that they used for their own.

The Russians have had the last laugh.

The CIA does not deny the news reports of its entanglement with the American press. "We cannot comment on covert activities," an agency spokesman said in virtual confirmation.

Nor would the agency comment on Colby's plan for disentanglement in the future. That plan—to fire some but keep other newsmen—does not go far enough. American newsmen abroad as well as at home must remain free of their government to act as a distant early-warning system in reporting problems and progress that might affect this country's interests abroad. Newsmen often do a better job of reporting than either covert CIA agents or overt members of the diplomatic corps.

That lesson was brought home to me 15 years ago in Czechoslovakia. Just out of graduate school, I had gone there as a freelance writer and had obtained interviews with Czech officials responsible for the country's television system and the youth movement. I also visited coal mines and steel mills in a part of Moravia generally off limits to Americans. Before I wrote my stories, I tried to check my information with American diplomats. The result of my effort—made only a few years after William N. Oatis, an Associated Press correspondent working in Prague, had been jailed as a spy—was terrifying.

The embassy officer led me to a secure room behind a door as heavy as a bank vault's. When I started talking, he began taking notes rapidly and then questioned me closely.

"What else did you learn? What else did they tell you? What else did you see?"

The officer grilled me until I re-

"The plan—to fire some but keep other newsmen on the CIA payroll—does not go far enough. American newsmen abroad as well as at home must remain free of their government."

fused to say more. Then he said: "You correspondents can find out a lot more than we diplomats because we simply cannot get access to the same people or travel as much."

Unwittingly, I had become an agent of my government rather than a representative of the American people. Now I could see how the Czechs might have misunderstood Oatis' role even if he were not, as charged, a CIA employee.

When I left the embassy that afternoon, it was with the fear that I was in far greater danger abroad from my own government than from a government which still, at that time, had a statue of Stalin looking down on the capital.

American newsmen must not be compromised in the same manner that so many—too many—officials, bureaucrats and military men have been corrupted in recent years. The public and Congress should demand that the CIA break all contractual relationships with bona fide newsmen. Beyond that, publishers maintaining foreign bureaus should seek out and discipline any employees with dual relationships.

Anything less makes the news business the handmaiden of the government and that cannot be tolerated. Otherwise, the free flow of news from overseas—so important to public awareness—will be seriously jeopardized.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL,
Friday, January 11, 1974

CIA PLANS a study comparing U.S. and Russian naval strength in the Mediterranean. Navy chief Adm. Zumwalt has warned repeatedly of the Soviet buildup there. Some top civilian analysts concede that if the two fleets had started shooting amid the Mideast crisis, a U.S. victory might have been in doubt. Main reason: the Russians' antiship missile.

HS/HC-950

A 16 Thursday, Jan. 10, 1974 THE WASHINGTON POST

U.S. Reportedly Weighed Plot to Kill Castro in '65

NEW YORK, Jan. 9 (AP)—Free-lance journalist Tad Szulc says the United States during President Lyndon Johnson's administration planned a second invasion of Cuba combined with an effort to assassinate Premier Fidel Castro. The plan had to be canceled, Szulc said in an article to be published in the Jan. 17 Esquire magazine, when rebellion unexpectedly erupted in the

Dominican Republic in April, 1965, and Johnson sent troops to that country.

Szulc, a former diplomatic correspondent for The New York Times, said the operation was planned by the Central Intelligence Agency, "presumably acting with President Lyndon Johnson's authority unless it was another do-it-yourself undertaking." He wrote:

"The new invasion was to be on a smaller scale than the Bay of Pigs. The scenario was to bring ashore some 750 armed Cubans at the crucial moment when Castro would be dead and inevitable chaos had developed . . .

"The existence of the assassination plot, hatched by the CIA in Paris and Madrid, was disclosed by the Cuban government in March, 1966, after the designated gunman—a bearded Cuban physician and former Cuban revolutionary army major named Rolando Cubela—was arrested in Havana following investigations by Castro's counterintelligence agents, who had become suspicious of him."

Szulc said that although the Cuban government revealed the assassination plot, it never reported the invasion plan, probably because it didn't know much about it.

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS
Washington, D. C., Wednesday, January 9, 1974

Q and A

By ROBIN ADAMS SLOAN

Q: Is there a link between Watergate's E. Howard Hunt and the JFK-Wallace shootings? — N.N., Monroe, La.

A: There's no actual evidence, but Gore Vidal, writing in *The New York Review of Books*, threw another log on the conspiracy fire by noting the following:

Oswald visited Mexico City in 1963 when Hunt was acting chief of the CIA there. Hunt's 1972 novel "The Coven" was about the Vanes rich, young, handsome and much like Jack and Jackie. Hardly flattering, the novel was in line with Hunt's expressed hatred of JFK, whom he blamed for deserting the Cubans fighting Castro at the Bay of Pigs. Lee Harvey Oswald's "attempt" to kill rightist Gen. Edwin Walker before actually killing JFK coincides, says Vidal, with Arthur Bremer's "intention" to kill Nixon before actually shooting Wallace.

Vidal cites Hunt's 50-odd highly imaginative works of fiction. He says perhaps it is only a coincidence that the comic-book-and-pornography-reading Bremer suddenly began to keep a diary that is almost a work of art. Vidal contends that Bremer, like Oswald and Sirhan, was set up as a patsy to deflect attention from the true right-wing conspirators. He finds it coincidentally odd that Oswald, Sirhan, and Bremer all kept diaries. He notes that Bremer's was written by someone with talent.

FRANK GETIEN

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Hunt's Ingenious Ploy

E. Howard Hunt Jr., the right-wing burglar, got himself sprung out of the pokey last week with a ploy the ingenuity of which was precisely appropriate for a clash between the murky twilight world in which Hunt has operated most of his professional life as spy, dirty-tricks man, surreptitious insurrectionary, electronic caves-dropper and burglar, and the sunlit world of American justice.

★

One of the field supervisors of the Watergate break-in, Hunt confessed and was tucked away by Judge Sirica for 30 months to eight years, a remarkably lenient sentence for a convicted criminal whose target was not a dry cleaner's or a liquor store, not even a bank, but the Republic itself.

As of last week, he is out roaming the streets once more, free, as his reactionary admirers never tire of asserting of pettier criminals paroled or freed on appeal, to do it again.

Hunt is free because he has asked the U.S. Court of Appeals here to allow him to change his original plea of guilty to one of not guilty and to decree a new trial on that new plea. The basic reason behind his change of heart as to his own guilt, according to his lawyers, is the contention that improper actions by the U.S. government prejudiced his original trial, making justice impossible.

The improper actions by the government cited by Hunt's lawyers are the taking of documents from Hunt's White House safe and the destruction of them by L. Patrick Gray III, then acting head of the FBI, now practicing law in New London, Conn., in spite of his

attitude toward the destruction of evidence, an attitude one would have thought unseemly in an officer of the court.

Hunt's friends are familiar enough with the technique of criminals charging governmental improprieties and going scot-free. Traditionally, the right has denounced the technique when employed by Mafiosi and other undesirables. More recently, the right has denounced the technique when employed by such victims of apparent government conspiracy as the Berrigan brothers and Dr. Ellsberg. It will be interesting to see how much protest the right generates over Hunt's use of the same ploy.

It is not, however, quite the same ploy, although it looks it.

★

The difference is this: When the government behaved improperly in the Berrigan affair that caused Henry Kissinger to fear for his virtue at the hands of sex-starved nuns, as he delicately put it, the government was clearly the enemy of the Berrigans, so much so as to employ a criminal as informer, quite possibly as agent-provocateur to some degree.

When the government behaved improperly in the prosecution of Dr. Ellsberg, again the government was the declared enemy of the doctor, of his psychiatrist and of normal American justice, going so far as to burglarize the psychiatrist's office and to dangle an attractive appointment before the presiding judge at Ellsberg's trial.

When the government behaved improperly toward Hunt, however, the government was not Hunt's enemy, but his friend, his employer, his partner and, he confidently if mistakenly

expected, his protector of last resort.

That's quite a difference.

It is true enough that distinctions can and certainly will be made between the U.S. government and the Committee to Re-Elect the President. The two things were, in theory, separate entities.

On the other hand, an old disreputable like Hunt, after two decades of carrying on for the CIA in the style made familiar to all through his novels, may be excused for confusing the two things, for assuming the CREEPs were a mere cover, a surface organization of the sort he was long familiar with, created as a base for his dirty tricks on behalf of the government.

★

He may be excused the more when we recall that so many of his encounters took place in the White House with people who were top presidential aides and that the papers on the destruction of which he bases his appeal were in the White House and handled by White House personnel.

If Hunt beats the rap on the grounds that the government that hired him as a burglar was subsequently improper in its dealings with him, the course of justice will have no alternative but to go on, in criminal terms, to Gray, the man who destroyed the papers, to the men who gave Gray the papers to destroy and to the man in whose interest they were destroyed.

All of this is merely one of many similar reasons that the Watergate affair will not be over in a hurry and that in the matter of the impeachment the House of Representatives would be seriously derelict in its duties to rush to judgment, to "vote it up or vote it down" before all the evidence is in.

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS

Washington, D. C., Wednesday, January 9, 1974

CIA Doubles Air America Asia Awards.

Associated Press

Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.) said yesterday that defense contracts for Air America, which has done work for the Central Intelligence Agency in Indochina, more than doubled last year to a total of \$41.4 million.

"Apparently, unknown to the American public, the CIA has taken up some of the slack created by our military withdrawal," said Aspin, a former Pentagon economic adviser.

"Without a doubt," he said, "the contracts reflect substantial U.S. involvement in the Southeast Asia war, and that's the last thing we want."

Aspin said nearly all contracts were for Air America operations out of Thailand or for maintenance work on planes based in Thailand.

The CIA and Air America had no comment.

Aspin said the \$41.4 million in contracts, compared with \$17.7 million the year before, moved Air America's parent company, Pacific Corp., up to the 91st in the ranking of defense contractors.

Wednesday, Jan. 9, 1974 THE WASHINGTON POST

For the Record

- U.S. Ambassador William R. Kintner told Thai newsmen that the CIA agent who mailed the government a phony cease-fire offer has left Thailand after "appropriate disciplinary action."

- Police in Maseru, Lesotho, announced that opposition leader Shakane Mokhele had surrendered following what was reported as a coup attempt in the African kingdom.

- Carlos Altamirano, leader of Chile's banned Socialist Party and first on the most-wanted list of the ruling junta, is now living in Havana, Cuba.

- The United States and Panama have agreed on a set of principles for the drawing up of a new Panama Canal Treaty, according to Panamanian and U.S. sources quoted by Reuter.

From staff reports and news dispatches

U.S. Envoy Called Agent for CIA

BUENOS AIRES, Jan. 8 (AP) — The new U.S. ambassador to Argentina, who has yet to arrive at his post, was accused today of being a member of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Robert C. Hill was named ambassador by President Nixon last December, to replace John Davis Lodge, who resigned. El Descamisado, a weekly news magazine linked to the leftist faction of the ruling Peronist movement, made the charge.

HS/HC-950

Thais Given U.S. Apology for Hoax

BANGKOK, Thailand (AP) — A CIA agent sent the Thai government a bogus cease-fire offer in the name of a Thai Communist insurgent leader, the U.S. Embassy said yesterday. The hoax was said to have been discovered because of an over-cautious errand boy.

Informed sources said the letter was posted in November from Sakon Nakhon, a province capital 350 miles northeast of Bangkok in an area where U.S. reports say 1,600 to 2,000 armed rebels operate.

The letter was reported to have contained a cease-fire offer in return for local autonomy in "liberated areas" near the Laos border.

The agent, reliably reported to be an American, was said to have hoped the letter would increase defections to the government. It was not made clear how he expected this to happen.

THE U.S. EMBASSY, which admitted the affair after Thai Bangkok newspapers published the story, said, "The incident of the cease-fire letter was a regrettable, unauthorized initiative."

It added that U.S. Ambassador William R. Kintner, who presented his credentials only Nov. 29, "has directed categorically that no American official be involved in any activity which could be interpreted as interference in Thai internal affairs."

The incident was especially embarrassing to Kintner, who has been trying to play down his former career as a U.S. Army officer, including two years with the Central Intelligence Agency in Washington as a planning specialist on paramilitary activities in 1950-1952.

Student militants denounced Kintner as a CIA agent after his arrival and urged that the government watch him carefully.

The embassy statement said the incident "has been discussed with the appropriate Thai officials," but gave no further.

HOWEVER, informed sources said an account of the affair in the Bangkok newspaper The Nation was accurate.

The Nation cited "an impeccable source" as saying the CIA had apologized to Thai authorities for the affair and that the agent who sent the letter — code-named "Lion" — actually had contacted insurgents in the northeast jungles and had sent the hoax letter with good intentions hoping to win more Communist defections.

The letter was signed "Chamras" — the code name of a Central Committee member of the Communist party of Thailand in the northeast. The Nation reported it said the agent put no return address on the letter to Premier Sanya Thammasak, but the agent who mailed

the letter had it registered and the government tracked the registration to the agent's address in Sakon Nakhon.

THE HEAD OF Thailand's Communist suppression organization, Lt. Gen. Saiyud Kerdphol, had previously termed the letter's offer ridiculous and informed sources had expressed suspicion of its authenticity, saying it was not consistent with Communist strategy.

On Dec. 9 the Thai government radio station reported that Communists in nine northern provinces had been distributing leaflets with essentially the same promise — cooperation with the new civilian government in return for autonomy behind "the Communist line."

Officials were skeptical of this proposal too and said they were investigating.

On Dec. 24 Defense Minister Dawee Chulitasap told reporters that the cabinet was considering proposing a cease-fire to the Communists and subsequently the government did announce that it would give amnesty to insurgents captured this year and to all who want to surrender.

The government yesterday took another step in its new approach to counter insurgency by dissolving the communism suppression organization and decentralizing its functions.

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS
Washington, D. C., Saturday, January 5, 1974A-11
★

CIA Chief Fears Leaks In Book Censorship Case

By Lesley Oelsner
New York Times News Service

The director of the Central Intelligence Agency has told a federal judge that "highly classified" intelligence information might be "leaked" to the public if the agency complied with the judge's recent order to make that information available to a limited group of security experts.

One of those experts — the only one named specifically in the judge's order — is Morton H. Halperin, a former consultant to the National Security Council and a former deputy assistant secretary of Defense.

Halperin's telephone was tapped for 21 months in 1969-71, while he was an assistant to Henry A. Kissinger on the NSC and afterward, as part of a wiretap operation that President Nixon said later was an attempt to stop leaks of secret information to the press. Kissinger has said that the conversations overheard on Halperin's phone "never cast any doubt" on Halperin's "loyalty or discretion."

THE JUDGE, Albert V. Bryan Jr. of the U.S. District Court in Alexandria, Va., had issued the order

two weeks ago at the request of the publisher and the authors of a book about the CIA. The agency is trying to censor the book.

The publisher and the authors contended that they needed the opinions and advice of experts on security matters in order to prepare their lawsuit contesting the censorship attempt.

William E. Colby, the CIA director, made his assertion in a three-page affidavit submitted to the court Wednesday along with a motion by the government asking Bryan to reconsider his ruling.

Colby did not mention Halperin by name. Nor did he amplify upon his "concern," as he phrased it, other than to say that he was "personally knowledgeable of many incidents of leaked privileged or classified information — for example, the publication of testimony before a grand jury investigating the Watergate break-in."

HE ASKED for a private hearing before Bryan, "in order to explain the basis of my concern."

He said in his affidavit that disclosure of the information would "result in the

compromise of certain currently active intelligence sources and intelligence-gathering operations which would cause serious harm to the national defense interests of the United States and will seriously disrupt the conduct of this country's foreign relations."

Melvin L. Wulf of the American Civil Liberties Union, attorney for the two authors — Victor L. Marchetti and John Marks — and Floyd Abrams, lawyer for Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., publishers, said today they expect to file written answers to the court early next week opposing the government's motion.

The book in question is titled "The CIA And The Cult Of Intelligence," and was completed last summer by Marchetti, a former CIA employee. And Marks, a former State Department employee. But because of earlier court rulings stemming from litigation started by the government, Marchetti was forced to submit the manuscript to the CIA for approval before he could send it to his publisher.

THE CIA specified 225 portions that, it said, should be cut from the book. Ac-

cording to Marks, the deletions generally include the examples cited by the authors to back up their conclusions about the agency. He cited the agency's role in the 1970 elections in Chile, the payment of CIA money to foreign leaders, and the agency's use of "fake" companies as fronts.

Two weeks ago, at the request of the authors and the publisher, Bryan ordered the government to give them certain documents to back up its contention that the portions should be censored.

He also ordered the government to begin immediate security clearance procedures for Halperin and a "reasonable number" of other experts to be named by the authors and publisher so the experts could see the entire manuscript, including the deleted portions, as well as the documents.

The government is contesting both orders, although, as Colby put it, the "aspect" that left him "gravely concerned" was the fact that the material would be made available "not only to the plaintiffs and their attorneys but to their expert witnesses."

Head of CIA Enters Book Court Fight

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

Central Intelligence Agency Director William E. Colby has intervened directly in a court battle over a book manuscript that he said would compromise highly sensitive intelligence sources and operations.

The CIA director, in an affidavit filed Wednesday in U.S. District Court in Alexandria, offered to testify in private before Judge Albert V. Bryan Jr. in support of the government's efforts to prevent publication of 225 deletions ordered by the agency on security grounds.

Colby asserted that the disclosures in the manuscript by two former government intelligence officers would "cause serious harm to the national defense interests of the United States and will seriously disrupt the conduct of this country's foreign relations."

The authors of the manuscript, former CIA analyst Victor L. Marchetti and former State Department intelligence official John D. Marks, are challenging the basis of the CIA's security deletions. This could lead to a new legal battle on the issues of governmental secrecy powers that were thrashed out in the Pentagon Papers trial, which was decided by the Supreme Court.

Specifically, the government has asked Bryan to reconsider his Dec. 21 ruling requiring the CIA to produce documents supporting its classification of the 225 offending items in the Marchetti-Marks manuscript, entitled "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence."

Attorneys for the government also asked Bryan to reconsider his order that attorneys for the publisher, Knopf, and expert witnesses on classification be given access to the manuscript, which the CIA has classified "Top Secret-Sensitive."

In his affidavit, Colby said of the Bryan ruling:

"Production of additional

Colby Bids Court Prevent Disclosure of CIA Data

COLBY, From A1

documents as ordered by the court causes additional difficulties for the Central Intelligence Agency. These additional documents will in most cases contain further classified information and in many cases are of a highly sensitive nature. . . .

"Compliance with both aspects of the court's order exposes additional highly classified information not only to plaintiffs and their attorneys but to their expert witnesses."

The one expert witness to be qualified under Bryan's Dec. 21 decision was former National Security Council staffer Morton Halperin, who served as part of the defense team for Daniel Ellsberg in his California trial. Halperin is also currently suing Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger for damages in the taping of his telephone from 1969 to 1971.

In requesting the secret hearing before Bryan on the reconsideration issue, Colby cited the language of the 1947 National Security Act, which provides that "the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."

The CIA director also said he is "personally knowledgeable of many incidents of leaked privileged or classified information, for example, the publication of testimony before a grand jury investigating the Watergate break-in."



WILLIAM E. COLBY

... sees "serious harm"

Earlier this year columnist Jack Anderson published transcripts of grand jury proceedings in the Watergate investigation.

The government brought its case against Marchetti in April, 1972, after obtaining a

copy of a book outline he had submitted to several New York publishers. It dealt with covert intelligence operations.

The government was granted an injunction to prevent Marchetti from publishing, without prior review by the agency, classified material gathered during CIA service. The injunction was upheld by the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.

After Marchetti, in collaboration with Marks, completed the manuscript and submitted it for CIA review the two authors went ahead with a legal challenge of the 225 deletions ordered by the agency.

In their challenge of the security actions the two authors are seeking to invoke the standard applied by the Supreme Court in the Pentagon Papers case — whether publication would "surely result in direct, immediate and irreparable injury to the nation or its people."

But the case has not yet moved on to this issue.

Saturday, Jan. 5, 1974

THE WASHINGTON POST

Raoul Berger How Impeachment Works

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
How the CIA by Taylor Branch

Tips Without Drugs New Routes to Inner Reality

January 1974 \$1.00

Harper's

Magazine



HS/HC-950

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Taylor Branch

THE CENSORS OF BUMBLEDOM

In which the CIA bypasses the First Amendment in order to hide a bugged house cat

ARNOLD TOYNBEE, renowned as a spokesman for intelligent decency in the world, has written that the American CIA has surpassed Soviet Communism as the most powerful sinister force on earth. "Wherever there is trouble, violence, suffering, tragedy," he says, "the rest of us are now quick to suspect the CIA had a hand in it." This view has been widely accepted in the United States, but it had no political weight until the Watergate scandal introduced the manipulative techniques of the CIA into American politics. Many commentators have expressed the opinion that the Watergate intrigues have raised the possibility of the CIA's undercover, totalitarian methods coming home to our shores to destroy our democratic traditions. We were given a reprieve, they say, because the amateurs of CREEP had not yet learned the deft skills by which the CIA arranges the destiny of a foreign country.

The most recent evidence suggests that all this is nonsense. Victor Marchetti, who spent fourteen years as a CIA executive before resigning in 1969, describes Watergate as fairly typical of an Agency operation, exposed when the fates caused a security guard to stumble over foul-ups normal to a covert mission. The officials in charge of CREEP apparently shared the illusions that lie at the heart of the Agency—that the politics of a country can be guided by tapping the phone of a Larry O'Brien or a Spencer Oliver, or by employing someone like Donald Segretti to write fake letters and hire women to run nude in front of Muskie headquarters. One bit of Watergate testimony with the ring of truth is that the Gemstone information was "essentially useless." The stupidity of the mis-

sion—from the practical, amoral viewpoint of the clandestine operative—is vintage Agency material.

Like Watergate, the CIA is dangerous not because of its diamond-hard efficiency but because of the principles it violates. The Agency is good at bribes—it pumped \$20 million into the 1964 elections in Chile—and it can supervise mercenary armies in backward countries like Laos. These things are terrible enough, but none too subtle or difficult, and Marchetti believes that the everyday operations of the Agency give the lie to the myth of its deadly professionalism. The CIA does not leave dark messages written in blood. During his entire career, Marchetti says that he never came across a single "termination mission" by or against a career CIA agent. An agent is not a daredevil but a handler of knaves—he is E. Howard Hunt directing the freedom-loving Cubans from across the street. The CIA's chief weapons are not the martini-olive bug or the cyanide dart gun; instead, agents spend most of their time with memos, and on a real action mission they are most likely to be equipped with nothing more than bribe money.

The CIA's fearsome reputation is its best protection against the meddlesome notions of outsiders. No one dares move against Leviathan. There has never been any serious move in the media to curb the Agency, and the Congress has been so cowed by the covert operatives that it has been too scared even to set up a committee on the CIA. The old codgers on the informal "oversight" committees have professed not to want to know anything that might compromise the national security.

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IN 1972, VICTOR MARCHETTI proposed to write a book that would make a mockery of the CIA myths and expose its operatives as bureaucrats with delusions, dangerous in spite of themselves, living off an undeserved reputation for derring-do. Only if the Agency were made human, he believed, could anything ever be done about Arnold Toynbee's nightmare.

Apparently this idea struck a sensitive spot somewhere in the CIA, for the Agency stole a copy of Marchetti's book outline from a New York publishing house. The agents retired to CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, and scoured the law for a way to keep the book from seeing the light of day. They found one. In April 1972, the U.S. government sought and obtained a permanent court order enjoining "Victor Marchetti, his agents, servants, employees and attorneys, and all other persons in active concert or participation with him" from disclosing any information, "factual, fictional or otherwise," without the prior consent of the CIA. The order was upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court declined to review the case. If Marchetti now speaks out from his classified mind, he faces instant imprisonment for contempt of court—no juries, not even a show trial.

Marchetti, outspooked and outlawed in round one, vowed to go on. After signing a contract with Alfred A. Knopf for a critical, non-fiction book on the CIA, he took on a coauthor—John Marks, a thirty-year-old ex-Foreign Service officer—and drafted a 500-page manuscript. It was dutifully handed over to the Agency in August 1973, and the authors tried reasoning together with the CIA censors, hoping to avoid the Ellsberg dilemma of keeping quiet or risking jail. But the book came back from the scissors shop riddled with 339 national-security deletions, excising more than a fifth of the text.

As a new legal challenge to the censorship begins, all the parties to the case have pulled out their Sunday rhetoric. For the ACLU lawyers who represent the authors, it is the first legally sustained exercise of prior restraint on national-security grounds in the history of the United States, a pernicious (but almost unnoticed) reversal of the decision in the *New York Times* case on the Pentagon Papers. For the CIA, the principle at hand is nothing less than the government's right to conduct its business without internal subversion. If people like Marchetti are allowed to blab incontinently about matters of state, the government's executive arm will be paralyzed and Washington will degenerate into a giant ADA meeting.

The Justice Department, representing the Agency, sees the sanctity of contracts as the real issue. Marchetti, like Ellsberg, Marks, and anyone else dealing with classified material—got his job only after signing a contractual

agreement not to reveal secrets, and the government successfully contended that such a contract overrides Marchetti's First Amendment rights. This is a new twist in the effort to protect official secrets, overlooked in the Ellsberg case. The Justice Department briefs are loaded with the lore of corporate trade secrets—citing precedents like *Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Carter Products*—as if Marchetti had threatened to let loose the magic ingredient in Coca-Cola. Lying behind all the questions of CIA spying and security, this rather unorthodox contract approach to secrecy carries with it a potential for widespread application against dissenting government employees.

Less intelligence than ever

OVER ITS TWENTY-SIX-YEAR history, partly by design and partly by failure, the CIA has come to specialize in foreign manipulations rather than intelligence. Classical espionage against the Russians and the Chinese has produced one of the driest wells in spy history. According to Marchetti, the CIA has been unable to penetrate the governments of the major Cold War opponents. The warring spy camps have had to content themselves by striking public-relations blows against one another. When Kim Philby defected to the Russians in 1963, after twenty years as a double agent in Britain, the KGB held elaborate press conferences and rushed his memoirs into print to thrill the world with Soviet spy power. The CIA said his book was phony—double agents do not keep journals of their perfidy—and most experts agree that Philby's activities did not hurt the British or help the Russians very much. Still, the CIA smarted under the publicity barrage, and it soon trotted out one Col. Oleg Penkovsky, claiming

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
that he had been as valuable as Philby. Formerly, it is proudly that Penkovsky had helped the U.S. detect Russian missiles in Cuba in 1962. Soon, Penkovsky's carefully recorded memoirs were on the best-seller lists, and it didn't matter that many experts doubted their authenticity, suspecting that the colonel had gotten more than a little editorial assistance at Langley. Marchetti's revelations on this matter are clipped from the book, but he has written elsewhere that Penkovsky was a British agent who provided no information whatever on the installation of the missiles in Cuba—the Agency detected them from aerial photographs. Penkovsky was preoccupied with other matters, such as insisting that he wear the full colonel's uniform of whichever Western intelligence outfit was debriefing him.

Other than the Cuban missile crisis, the CIA (created out of the Pearl Harbor, if-we-had-only-known syndrome) has not anticipated a single one of the many outbreaks of war and armed confrontation in the past twenty-five years. Now the CIA has become marginal to even the detection of future missile crises, for it has given the Pentagon control of the satellites that provide the crucial security information on weapon and troop movements. What special intelligence there is in the world seems largely boring and of little consequence. In 1964 the Agency learned that the American Embassy in Moscow had been bugged from top to bottom since 1952. For twelve years at the height of the Cold War, the KGB had access to every secret message within the embassy and to the cable exchanges with Washington—with little evident advantage. The great powers are too big and cumbrous to move with much subtlety.

While the intelligence value of the CIA has been whittled down continuously—until Henry Kissinger now scorns the calculations and posi-

tion papers—the analysts—the Clandestine (modestly known as the Plans Division) has mushroomed in size and importance. Marchetti and Marks assert that fully two-thirds of the CIA's money and manpower are devoted to covert activities in the form of dirty tricks and paramilitary operations. This fact, along with the organization charts and the budget figures that support it, was originally censored from the book; but the CIA relented when Marchetti and his lawyers pointed out that Sen. William Proxmire had already ferreted out the information and put it in the *Congressional Record*.

THE MARCHETTI-MARKS MANUSCRIPT shows that the CIA has trimmed away its intelligence functions so completely that it can now justify its existence only on the basis of the clandestine jujitsu it tries to practice on foreign governments—the bribes, the coups, the surgical removal of unfriendly political strains abroad. Such a specialty is just fine with the covert types who run the Agency, but they know that it is precisely these covert operations that have made the CIA vulnerable to public criticism as the symbol of sinister and undemocratic pre-occupations within the American government. Harry Truman, whose administration created the CIA in 1947, stated repeatedly that the Agency was intended to be the centralized intelligence branch of government, not a squad of secret D-Day operatives. Recently a whole chorus of foreign-policy heavies like Nicholas deB. Katzenbach have picked up Truman's theme and argued that the Agency should be confined to its statutory duty "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security." They point out that the legal basis for all the James Bond stuff is extremely tenuous.



The Marchetti-Marks revelations would provide more grist for the Katzenbach position, which is anathema at Langley. Telling the CIA to stick with information-gathering is like telling the vigilantes of the Klan to put away their hoods and nooses in favor of due process of law.

To survive and prosper, the CIA must convince the public that it is employing all its professional wizardry to sniff out future Pearl Harbors. And it must keep the President thinking that in political emergencies, when men of action must discard the niceties of constitutional theory, the CIA will respond with piano-wire efficiency. Now come Marchetti and Marks to say that the Agency is out of the Pearl Harbor business, having abandoned it to the diplomats and the satellite people at the Pentagon. Moreover, they say, the CIA's covert missions are short on piano wire and long on giddy P. T. Barnum schemes fit for a Donald Segretti. The CIA would much rather be subjected to a dozen books by the usual liberal critics—attributing every suspicious automobile accident, Bolivian coup, and Republican election to the deadly genius of its agents—than suffer from one inside book like Marchetti's, which exposes a clandestine circus behind the awe-inspiring curtain of secrecy.

Cats, rabbits, and snake oil

THE MATERIALS FOR RIDICULE have long been available, but writers have been so seduced by Agency folklore that they have glided over the absurd to focus on the imaginary agent with the garrote in the wings. In *The Invisible Government*, David Wise and Thomas Ross describe the Agency's incredible clandestine feat of setting up a CIA radio station, under elaborate cover, to encourage and direct the popular up-

rising that was to follow the Bay of Pigs operation. The agents set up shop on Great Swan Island, a tiny spot in the Caribbean made entirely of guano and infested with three-foot lizards. While the front men vainly sought to protect the unlikely cover story that the new station on the deserted guano island was an independent venture on the part of profit-minded entrepreneurs—changing around the phony corporate charter, fending off small landing parties of Honduran students who came to denounce the CIA presence and to claim the island as Honduran soil—the intrepid CIA technicians went on the air to drum up the spirit of Cuban revolt. Three days after the invasion had failed, Radio Swan was still issuing orders to nonexistent troops. Even a year after the invasion, the station—renamed “Radio Americas” under the new leadership of the “Vanguard Service Corporation”—had not given up. It exhorted freedom-loving Cubans to tie up communications by taking receivers off hooks in phone booths, and to subvert the Cuban economy by breaking enough bottles to create a beer shortage.

The Marchetti-Marks manuscript is full of anecdotes fit for the Marx brothers or Maxwell Smart—secret projects to float balloons over Communist countries, dropping forged leaflets that promote the democratic alternative; fake letters to sow confusion within the French student movement; agents scrambling for enough Benny Goodman records to satisfy the longings of an informant. Marchetti says that the most ludicrous incidents have been censored to protect the security of the twilight-zone devices invented in the CIA lab. “I’ll give you one example that they took out,” he said, “because I can’t imagine that the Agency could stand the publicity of putting me in jail for revealing it. We spent hundreds of thousands of dollars and several years to develop a bugging device that could be surgically implanted inside the body of an ordinary house pet. The idea was finally scuttled when someone realized that we couldn’t control the animal’s movements to put it within range of sensitive conversations, even if we could somehow place a wired cat or dog in the household of a target person. Many of the Agency projects are like that—pitifully silly.”

THE SECRET MYTHS SWIRLING around the Agency have enabled it to go a long way on the intricate logic of Rube Goldberg. At the height of the Cold War, the Agency faced the problem of containing Communism everywhere. To do so, reasoned the head spooks, it would be helpful if the American people believed that the menace was making headway, since this would stir public support for anti-Communist measures. To stimulate that belief, it would be helpful if the government could point to tan-

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gible evidence that the Communist party was making gains right here at home. That might be accomplished if the CIA could show that many demented citizens were reading the official newspaper of the American Communist party, which in turn could be done if the CIA subsidized *The Daily Worker* to keep it alive. By this reasoning, CIA operatives were put to work concocting several thousand phony names and addresses for new, nonexistent "subscribers" to *The Daily Worker*. The CIA sent the taxpayers' money to the apostles of Moscow so that the Cold War agencies of government could point to the bulging circulation of *The Daily Worker* to support their demands for bigger anti-Communist national-security budgets.

The same aura of secrecy that makes outsiders fear the Agency like death has a powerful influence on the operatives *inside* the CIA. Marchetti and Marks have written a chapter called "The Clandestine Mentality," whose basic point is that secrecy creates a whole culture, and that the trappings of clandestine work infuse the most mundane undertaking with the significance of a spy thriller. It grips the brain. An agent who makes his calls from a phone booth, decked out in a disguise and a code name, can't help feeling the buzz of importance—even if he is calling to check on his subscription to *The Daily Worker*. It is a private glow similar to that experienced by liberal Democrats who take precautions against the possibility that their phones might be tapped. Paranoia is the twin brother of the clandestine mentality.

The CIA is a pioneer in the organized use of secrecy, and in this role it reflects a general condition of American culture. Government secrecy is a measure of status and prestige for its officials, and its symbols—the security clearance, the locked briefcase, the top secret-sensitive discussions, the magic references to the national security—are highly coveted. They are signs of high authority, like the Freudian terminology of the psychiatrist and the computer-laden tomes of the urbanologist. These signs can be the mark of genuine and vitally needed skills—if the Agency's secrets protect the explosive techniques of master operatives, if the multi-variable systems analysis of the urbanologist is required for genuine insights into the plight of the cities—but they can also be the smokescreen for professional shamanism. Secrecy provides not only a badge of importance but a meal ticket. We pay for what we do not understand, because we hunger for an expert.

Anyone who has lost the faith, like Marchetti and Marks, poses an enormous threat to those who traffic in mysteries and hidden talents—like a renegade magician who shows the public where his colleagues get their rabbits. The authors have already driven the CIA farther out into the open than the Agency finds comfort-

able, for in seeking to censor the book the CIA is reduced to naked trust—this material must be kept within the confines of the government, they say, for reasons so secret we cannot reveal them. It is reminiscent of the old Hubert Humphrey, telling the voters that they would support the President if they only knew what he knew about Vietnam, which, unfortunately, was classified. In a pinch, secrecy becomes a mask, completing the circle of its uses. The snake oil merchant's greatest secret was not the ingredients of his potions—anything would do—but the gullibility of the people in his audience and their need to believe that the good doctor could sweep away their real and imagined ills.

Top secrets everyone knows

THE POLITICAL MESSAGE of the Marchetti-Marks manuscript confirms and supports the themes of several recent books critical of the CIA, but it is much more offensive to the Agency than the others—largely because of Marchetti's high position at the CIA. Although much of the material in the Marchetti-Marks book is available in newspapers and in the CIA books, the Agency censored it anyway, on the ground that Marchetti's former status would authenticate what is now only rumor. The authors estimate that about a quarter of the stricken facts are already on the public record.

There is a reference in the manuscript, right after several pages that have been decimated by CIA censors, to "the CIA's ties with foreign political leaders." The obvious inference to be drawn is that the authors had identified foreign leaders with past or present CIA connections, and several sources have identified this kind of material as the most explosive in the book—the Agency's best case for secrecy by prior restraint.

While it is impossible to evaluate this claim without knowing precisely what has been cut, one can make an educated guess after scanning the public literature on the CIA and talking with reporters, ex-agents, and others who specialize in intelligence. I have done so, and it appears likely that the Agency is close to political leaders in Jordan, Greece, Iran, Ethiopia, Taiwan, and West Germany. In general, the Agency probably has political ties wherever it has operated in the past—Laos, Vietnam, Bolivia, Guatemala—and also in the smaller countries of Latin America and Africa, where a little bribe money can be effective enough for the spooks to throw their weight around. All this seems hardly surprising or fraught with peril for the national security. And, as Marchetti tells it, Agency ties to a foreign government do not necessarily mean that we run the country. They come closer to meaning that one of our agents gets to have lunch with a foreign official occa-

sionally, much the way an American mogul gets to bend the ear of a Senator from time to time after making a political contribution.

BUT FAIRNESS DEMANDS that we suppress boredom and consider the Agency's view. After all, the entire national-security apparatus of the United States, the Justice Department, the ACLU, a major publishing house, and the federal courts are all burning up legal pads trying to hash out whether this material should be forbidden in the name of military security. Should Victor Marchetti, by virtue of having sat in the highest councils of spy headquarters, be allowed to declare authoritatively that foreign leaders are, or have been, tainted by American intelligence? What if the minister loses his job as a result, and the CIA is cut off from its leverage and information? The subtle minds at Langley would say that the cooperative ministers of the future will refuse to associate with the CIA for fear of later being exposed.

Marchetti replies that the book does not reveal the names of classical spies, citizens of "unfriendly" countries who slip their military secrets to a CIA agent. He says that the book will cause embarrassment, but that no exposed contacts will be rubbed out by the Soviet KGB or anyone else, and no wars will break out. The case of Amintore Fanfani supports his point. In May 1973, Seymour Hersh wrote a story in the *New York Times* about Graham Martin, now Ambassador to South Vietnam, and his efforts to get the CIA to support Fanfani's wing of the Christian Democrat party in Italy. This occurred in 1970, when Martin was Ambassador to Italy, and Fanfani, a former Italian premier, was trying to take over the government again during one of Italy's periodic crises. Fanfani, a conservative, figured that \$1 million from the CIA would go a long way toward keeping the left-wingers out of power, and he made his pitch to Martin in secret meetings.

There is a hole in the Marchetti-Marks manuscript where I assume the details of this story once were. The Agency censored it, because it reveals Fanfani's ties to the CIA; but the censors had to leave in the reference to the Hersh story, which is quite thorough. The revelations in the *Times* caused some minor repercussions in Italy but didn't make any noise in the dark passageways of international espionage. If the censored anecdotes of foreigners' ties to the CIA are as tame as this one, the government would have a tough time demonstrating a grave threat to the national security. Actually, the point of the discussion in the book manuscript is that the *Times* initially balked at running the story because the editors thought it wasn't newsworthy—a basic yawner from back in 1970. The end result is to barrass our new envoy to Thieu's republic.

When Marchetti was enjoined from writing his book without censorship, one CIA official was quoted as giving thanks for the injunction because the revelations would have "blown us out of the water" in many places around the world. (The official was CIA director William Colby.) He could have meant this in the way the Fanfani story made future operations difficult in Italy, or he could have been focusing on a second kind of exposure in the book—Marchetti's plans to identify CIA "cover" organizations in and out of the United States. The Agency wants to avoid more troubles like the 1967 scandal that exposed the National Student Association as a CIA front. The Agency's proprietary fronts are detailed in a chapter that was mutilated in the first round of censorship. Rocky Mountain Air, of Arizona, was identified in a magazine article by Marchetti as a CIA domestic airline, but this does not appear in the book and has apparently fallen under the knife.

Agency airlines and corporate covers evoke the stale air of yesteryear, for, despite the CIA's predictions of dire rumblings in the foreign underworld, the revelations of the past have had little impact beyond a brief period of media interest. But the CIA contends that all these little covert fronts make up a vital collective enterprise for clandestine use against our enemies. Agency officials have sworn that blowing more covers like NSA "would cause grave and irreparable damage to the national security," and therefore must be censored.

Done in by the Princeton men

MARCHETTI VIEWS THE CASE with just as much passion as the various lawyers and government officials, but in much earthier fashion. He sees himself as the target of a personal vendetta by the Old Boy network that has always run the agency. The upper reaches of the CIA are completely dominated by Ivy League WASPs, most of whom got started in the OSS during the war. William Colby, the current director, is fully in the tradition—an OSS operative who continued his work with the Agency, personally designing the Phoenix assassination program in Vietnam and virtually every other covert operation on his turf, Southeast Asia, rising to the top because he conducted every mission with the skillful good grace of a man who appreciates fine wine. A real Princeton man, say those who meet him.

Marchetti, on the other hand, went to Penn State and describes himself as "the cousin of bulldozer drivers." He joined the Agency in 1955 and worked his way up to the executive suites on the seventh floor of the CIA building. He was a special adviser to the top brass, sitting in on CIA policy meetings, a

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hawk on Vietnam, a general analyst of good reputation on strategic matters, a lover of things covert. As he describes it, he began to fall away from the CIA spirit when he saw first hand that the directors and assistant directors were much more interested in dreaming up clandestine operations, the cloak-and-dagger stuff, than they were in the production and analysis of intelligence. The Agency is still marked by a split between the analysts and the operatives, with thinly concealed contempt on both sides. Marchetti shared the analysts' view that the clandestine types, like E. Howard ("Eduardo") Hunt, had read too many spy novels and worn too many disguises—that they found the Agency a playground for their covert fantasies. (Any CIA operator, on the other hand, lets you know quickly that the analysts are pale-faced bookworms who "don't do anything" and might as well be in the State Department.) Marchetti half expected these traditional jealousies to be ironed out at the top, but he found that the operatives were in control, too busy hatching plots to care much about position papers. He began to "lose effectiveness," he says, when, in executive meetings, he started questioning the wisdom and purpose of clandestine schemes—which, in the CIA, is somewhat like casting doubt on the humanity of football in the heat of a pep rally.

WHATEVER THE FINAL OUTCOME in the courts, the lawyers in the Justice Department deserve some credit within the profession for staging one of the most imaginative legal comebacks in recent history. Charged by the Nixon Administration with the task of protecting the government against conspirators and tattlers, the Department assembled a truly dismal record. Scores of left-wing conspirators were brought to trial without a single conviction, and the prosecutors became successful only when the charge toward security turned inward. John Dean and Jeb Magruder have been convicted of conspiracy; John Mitchell is squirming under a mound of conspiracy evidence. Prosecutors who failed miserably against hippies and malcontents have been so lethal against their colleagues in the surrounding offices that eminences like Richard Kleindienst, Will Wilson, and Robert Mardian have fled, hoping to get out of range.

In the midst of all this came the loss in the Pentagon Papers case. The Justices ruled that it is possible for the government to obtain a restraining order against a newspaper—that the First Amendment is not an absolute guarantee of the right to publish national security information. But the government has to meet a heavy burden of proof, showing that the information is overwhelmingly likely to harm U.S.

military preparedness by threatening the loss of lives or jeopardizing vital military secrets. The Department lawyers warned of horrible calamities if the *Times* were allowed to publish more top-secret cables by the Old Boys, but the Court surveyed the ramparts of freedom after the first batch of papers had appeared in the *Times* and detected little damage. The government stumbled miserably, and the precedent looked useful to Marchetti.

Then the Department failed to convict Ellsberg of espionage, or anything else, and the cause of secrecy seemed hopeless. When the CIA lawyers brought the Marchetti problem over to the Justice Department, two flimsy weapons seemed available to shut him up. They could seek an injunction before a judge on the same grounds they had tried against the *New York Times*, but the courts had proved to be attached to the First Amendment. The second unpromising avenue was the old reliable: criminal deterrence. They could threaten to prosecute Marchetti for espionage if he persisted. They knew from their Ellsberg preparations, however, that conviction would be difficult. Marchetti might want to take his case before a jury, whose members might be too secure or too unsophisticated to perceive a grave threat to the national security. Besides, a threat is not as permanent as an injunction; and if it ever lost credibility, Marchetti would be free to publish and the government would be left with only a long shot at a post facto remedy in a criminal trial. The secrets would already be out.

Whoever hit upon the contract approach, based on Marchetti's secrecy agreement, brought about a Newtonian advance in the prospects for quiet, discreet government. It was a fivefold stroke of genius.

(1) It fuzzed up First Amendment objections to prior restraint. The government sued to enjoin Marchetti from breaching his contractual obligation not to reveal classified information. Federal officials submit to other limitations on their First Amendment rights as a condition of employment, such as the Hatch Act prohibition against political activity, and this is merely another limitation—sanctified in writing.

(2) The government did not have to show that the material would do substantial damage to the national defense, because the terms of the contract refer only to classified material. Not many things clearly injure military preparedness, but everything can be classified.

(3) With these two new advantages, the government could seek prior restraint before a judge instead of conviction before a jury. The Justice Department does not like juries. Also, the hearing would take place *in camera*, a secret proceeding to discuss classified secrets, with no reporters to ask fresh questions.

(4) The contract question made the issue

more complicated and toning down publicity. The focus shifted from big sexy matters of secrecy and national defense to the question of whether Marchetti would honor his own written word.

(5) The contract injunction, if sustained, has enormous value for application in other agencies of the government where secrecy agreements are required. Already, the addition of Marks to the case puts the State Department and its mandatory oath under the secrecy blanket. Conceivably, the Justice Department could obtain an injunction against anyone, in or out of government, who has signed a secrecy oath and is suspected of leaking classified material. This would not be of much use against isolated, unanticipated leaks to the press, but it would be a potent weapon against known dissenters with a lot on their minds. Even a casual leak would be much more dangerous for those under injunction, for it would pose the risk of being jailed instantly for contempt of court.

THESE OMINOUS RAMIFICATIONS of the Marchetti precedent have sent the ACLU lawyers diving for their 1984 quotes and their best speeches on the Bill of Rights. They fear that their fortunes might be reversed from the "peoples' right to know" victories of the Pentagon Papers case, and they see the specter of a government whose employees have to get a note signed by an Old Boy before they can speak their mind. They know that the power to control classified information and punish national-security critics would be selectively enforced. Lyndon Johnson, Ted Sorensen, and Bill Bundy would still be able to make "appropriate usage" of state secrets in their memoirs without fear of injunction. (LBJ quoted extensively from the top-secret Pentagon Papers before they were released; but instead of being tried for espionage, like Ellsberg, he received an estimated \$1.5 million for *The Vantage Point*.) Every spring at budget time, the Pentagon would still leak startling new intelligence and tricolor graphs showing that the collective Russian nuclear missile is longer and more explosive than ours—and the generals will get bigger budgets, not an injunction. By carefully exploiting the new legal power of the secrecy contract, the government might be able to revive the absurd, discredited classification system—using the power of judges' robes to bring back the old days, when the function of a classified leak was to serve the government and when dissent was officially approved.

Staring into this libertarian's horror, the ACLU has pulled out all the stops in seeking to reverse the Marchetti defeat. The publisher, Knopf, has joined Marchetti and Marks to bring a little more First Amendment

The plaintiffs will now push their First Amendment position—no prior restraint at all, under any circumstances. If they fail again there, which is likely, they will argue that the secrecy oaths are valid only if the secret material is *properly* classified—that is, if its release would plainly and seriously injure the military defense.

The government lawyers are confident that they won't have to get into the First Amendment morass, as they expect the district court to reaffirm its decision that the secrecy oath eliminates the civil liberties question: "In the opinion of the Court the contract takes the case out of the scope of the First Amendment; and, to the extent the First Amendment is involved, the contract constitutes a waiver of the defendant's rights thereunder." It's much simpler for the courts to look at things this way, the attorneys say, and if they can make this argument wash again, the Justice Department will leave behind a legacy of secrecy protection that President Nixon would be proud of. It would be a victory for zipper-lipped government snatched from the ashes of the Ellsberg case, achieved quietly while the public is preoccupied with Nixon's sanity and his character flaws—something that the Administration could pass on to future Presidents, who would no doubt welcome the new secrecy guarantee, since classified material looks much dearer from the inside.

If the government wins again, the case will abound with new ironies. Marchetti and Marks will have unwittingly helped create the legal tools to make a vassal of every government employee who enters the sacred chambers of national security. In effect, Americans might then become divided into two basic types—those sufficiently gulled by the state's alleged need for privacy to sign its contract of *omerta*, and those who refuse. The robots of the first group would run the government, protected by the courts against the public. They would tend to become more cynical about the old principles of the Republic, while the second group would lose interest in the government itself. Mesmerized by clandestine fantasies, the courts would presumably consider the First Amendment inoperative in national-security matters such as the CIA's bugged house pets. The Agency would be left free, in the name of military defense, to expand its covert missions in the global fringes of the Third World—the only places where, especially to the bombed peasants of Southeast Asia, it is clearly no joke. The CIA is drawn to the Third World like a lonely derelict to a porn shop, where the salve for dreams is cheap and available. Instead of puncturing the myth of the CIA's awesome powers, Marchetti and Marks may ultimately find themselves and their secrecy oaths being used to reinforce the Agency's poi-

"If the government wins its case, Marchetti and Marks will have unwittingly helped create the legal tools to make a vassal of every government employee who enters the sacred chambers of national security."

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INSTRUCTIONS

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Place card vertically in place of charged out folder.
Place card horizontally in returned file folder.

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CASE FILE CHARGE-OUT CARD